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Computer Networks

A revocable ID-based authenticated group key exchange protocol with resistant to malicious participants

Tsu‐Yang Wu, Yuh‐Min Tseng, Tung‐Tso Tsai

Published Jun 5, 2012• 43 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.comnet.2012.05.011

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The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols. Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols. In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS). Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al. proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants. However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants. In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way. We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants. When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.
An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.