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Infringing Key Authentication of an ID-Based Group Key Exchange Protocol Using Binary Key Trees

Junghyun Nam, Juryon Paik, Youngsook Lee, Jin Kwak, Ung Mo Kim, Dongho Won

Published Sep 11, 2007• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-74819-9_83

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An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.