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Informatica

Towards ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

Tsu‐Yang Wu, Yuh‐Min Tseng

Published Jan 1, 2012• 17 citations
Publisher

Abstract

An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.

DOI
10.15388/informatica.2012.362

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An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.
An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows a group of participants to establish a common session key and then provides secure group communications in collaborative and distributed applications. Recently, Wu et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. They claimed that their protocol can detect and identify the malicious participants, which means it not only can check whether malicious participants exist in the protocol or not, but also can find out who the malicious participants are. However, their protocol is not as secure as claimed. In this letter, we show that Wu et al.'s protocol is insecure against an insider colluding attack. Two malicious participants can collude to impersonate several honest participants to the rest participants in the group. In addition, we also figure out what has gone wrong with Wu et al.'s protocol and how to fix it.
Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.
The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols. Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols. In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS). Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al. proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants. However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants. In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way. We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants. When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.
An ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol allows a group of members to share a key and provide an assurance of key sharing with an intended group with the user's identity, which is used for conferencing environments. In 2004, Choi et al proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement with bilinear maps (also called CHL protocols), which was extended from Burmester and Desmedt conference key agreement protocols. Unfortunately, their protocols were found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks in which cases that the two malicious users have the previous authentication transcripts of the party by Zhang, Chen and Shim. In this paper, we proposed an improved ID-based AGKA. In our scheme, each session has a unique session identity which is published by Key Generation Center. With such unique session identity binding to each session, our protocols can prevent the insider attack. Especially, our protocols can not enhance the computationally cost and it is still efficient.
In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.