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The Scientific World JOURNAL

A Provably Secure Revocable ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

Tsu‐Yang Wu, Tung‐Tso Tsai, Yuh‐Min Tseng

Published Jan 1, 2014• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols. Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols. In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS). Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al. proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants. However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants. In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way. We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants. When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.

DOI
10.1155/2014/367264

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The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols. Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols. In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS). Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al. proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants. However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants. In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way. We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants. When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.
An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.
An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows a group of participants to establish a common session key and then provides secure group communications in collaborative and distributed applications. Recently, Wu et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. They claimed that their protocol can detect and identify the malicious participants, which means it not only can check whether malicious participants exist in the protocol or not, but also can find out who the malicious participants are. However, their protocol is not as secure as claimed. In this letter, we show that Wu et al.'s protocol is insecure against an insider colluding attack. Two malicious participants can collude to impersonate several honest participants to the rest participants in the group. In addition, we also figure out what has gone wrong with Wu et al.'s protocol and how to fix it.
Many conference systems over the Internet require authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) for secure and reliable communication. After Shamir [1] proposed the ID-based cryptosystem in 1984, ID-based AGKA protocols have been actively studied because of the simple public key management. In 2006, Zhou et al. [12] proposed two-round ID-based AGKA protocol which is very efficient in communication and computation complexity. However, their protocol does not provide user identification and suffers from the impersonation attack by malicious participants. In this paper, we propose improved ID-based AGKA protocol to prevent impersonation attack from Zhou et al.'s protocol. In our protocol, the malicious insider cannot impersonate another participants even if he knows the ephemeral group secret value. Moreover, our protocol reduces the computation cost from Zhou et al.'s protocol.
Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.
Establishing a session key (SSK) is very important for real-world deployment in open networks, which enables secure communication between remote parties. In the past, some authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have been proposed to generate a SSK, but the certificate management issue is inhered in the traditional public key infrastructure and must be addressed. To tackle this issue, the identity (ID)-based concept is added to AKE, called ID-AKE. Indeed, the security of the existing AKE/ID-AKE protocols is gaining increasing importance due to some new types of attacks, namely, side-channel attacks. In such attacks, adversaries could obtain secret keys’ partial information during the execution of cryptographic protocols (including AKE/ID-AKE). To withstand such attacks, many leakage-resilient ID-AKE (LR-ID-AKE) protocols resisting side-channel attacks have been proposed. However, these existing LR-ID-AKE protocols have no efficient solution to revoke compromised users. In this article, the first LR-ID-AKE protocol with an efficient revocation mechanism, called LR-RID-AKE, is proposed. The proposed protocol is not only as secure as existing LR-ID-AKE protocols but also able to efficiently revoke compromised users from the system.