Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences

A dynamic ID-based authenticated group key exchange protocol without pairings

Liyun Xie, Mingxing He

Published May 12, 2010• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

So far, most of the proposed group key exchange (GKE) protocols do not consider the attack when the adversary reveals the parties’ ephemeral private keys without their long-term private keys, so these GKE protocols are insecure on this attack. In this paper, for resisting above attack, we propose a dynamic authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol in the ID-based setting. Different from previous ID-based protocols, our protocol does not utilize bilinear pairings, which makes it more efficient. At last, we analyze the security of the protocol in the eCK (enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk) security model.

DOI
10.1007/s11859-010-0315-5

Related papers

Towards ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

Tsu‐Yang Wu, Yuh‐Min Tseng

An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.

Informatica•Jan 1, 2012•17 citations

A Secure ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol Resistant to Insider Attacks.

Tsu‐Yang Wu, Yuh‐Min Tseng, Ching-Wen Yu

Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.

Journal of information science and engineering•Jan 1, 2011•18 citations

Attack on An ID-based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

Fushan Wei, Yun Wei, Chuangui Ma

An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows a group of participants to establish a common session key and then provides secure group communications in collaborative and distributed applications. Recently, Wu et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. They claimed that their protocol can detect and identify the malicious participants, which means it not only can check whether malicious participants exist in the protocol or not, but also can find out who the malicious participants are. However, their protocol is not as secure as claimed. In this letter, we show that Wu et al.'s protocol is insecure against an insider colluding attack. Two malicious participants can collude to impersonate several honest participants to the rest participants in the group. In addition, we also figure out what has gone wrong with Wu et al.'s protocol and how to fix it.

International journal of network security•Mar 1, 2016•6 citations

id-eCK Secure ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange on Symmetric and Asymmetric Pairing

Atsushi Fujioka, Fumitaka Hoshino, Tetsutaro Kobayashi +3 more

In this paper, we propose an identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol that is secure in the identity-based extended Canetti-Krawczyk (id-eCK) model in the random oracle model under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. The proposed ID-AKE protocol is the most efficient among the existing ID-AKE protocols that is id-eCK secure, and it can be extended to use in asymmetric pairing.

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences•Jan 1, 2013•8 citations

An ID-based authenticated key exchange protocol based on bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem

Hai Huang, Zhenfu Cao

In this paper, we present a new ID-based two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which makes use of a new technique called twin Diffie-Hellman problem proposed by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup. We show that our scheme is secure under bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, which better supports the adversary's queries than previous AKE models. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based AKE protocol provably secure in eCK model.

ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)•Mar 10, 2009•78 citations

An Insider-Resistant Group Key Exchange Protocol without Signatures

Hai Huang, Zhenfu Cao

The well-known method for a group key exchange (GKE) protocol to be against insider attack is to make use of signatures. However, using signatures considerably degrades the performance of the GKE protocol. In this paper, we propose a new method to resist insider attack. The underlying tool of our method is a two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which can be used to authenticate all other participants' session identifiers instead of using signatures. Based on the two- party AKE protocol, we propose an efficient insider-resistant GKE protocol without signatures. We show that our proposal is provably secure against insider attack if the underlying two-party AKE protocol is secure.

International Conference on Communications•Jun 1, 2009•2 citations
So far, most of the proposed group key exchange (GKE) protocols do not consider the attack when the adversary reveals the parties’ ephemeral private keys without their long-term private keys, so these GKE protocols are insecure on this attack. In this paper, for resisting above attack, we propose a dynamic authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol in the ID-based setting. Different from previous ID-based protocols, our protocol does not utilize bilinear pairings, which makes it more efficient. At last, we analyze the security of the protocol in the eCK (enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk) security model.
An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows participants to construct a common key and provide secure group communications in cooperative and distributed applications. Recently, Choi et al. proposed an identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocol from bilinear pairings. However, their protocol suffered from an insider colluding attack because it didn't realize the security issue of withstanding insider attacks. Withstanding insider attacks mean that it can detect whether malicious participants exist in the group key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, an AGKE protocol resistant to insider attacks is still unable to find “who are malicious participants”. In this paper, we propose an ID-based AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants. In our protocol, we use a confirmed computation property to achieve identifying malicious participants. Certainly, it is also secure against insider attacks. In the random oracle model and under related mathematical hard problems, we prove that the proposed protocol a secure AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants.
Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.
An authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol allows a group of participants to establish a common session key and then provides secure group communications in collaborative and distributed applications. Recently, Wu et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key exchange protocol based on bilinear pairings. They claimed that their protocol can detect and identify the malicious participants, which means it not only can check whether malicious participants exist in the protocol or not, but also can find out who the malicious participants are. However, their protocol is not as secure as claimed. In this letter, we show that Wu et al.'s protocol is insecure against an insider colluding attack. Two malicious participants can collude to impersonate several honest participants to the rest participants in the group. In addition, we also figure out what has gone wrong with Wu et al.'s protocol and how to fix it.
In this paper, we present a new ID-based two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which makes use of a new technique called twin Diffie-Hellman problem proposed by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup. We show that our scheme is secure under bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, which better supports the adversary's queries than previous AKE models. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based AKE protocol provably secure in eCK model.
The well-known method for a group key exchange (GKE) protocol to be against insider attack is to make use of signatures. However, using signatures considerably degrades the performance of the GKE protocol. In this paper, we propose a new method to resist insider attack. The underlying tool of our method is a two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which can be used to authenticate all other participants' session identifiers instead of using signatures. Based on the two- party AKE protocol, we propose an efficient insider-resistant GKE protocol without signatures. We show that our proposal is provably secure against insider attack if the underlying two-party AKE protocol is secure.