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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

id-eCK Secure ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange on Symmetric and Asymmetric Pairing

Atsushi Fujioka, Fumitaka Hoshino, Tetsutaro Kobayashi, Koutarou Suzuki, Berkant Ustaoğlu, Kazuki Yoneyama

Published Jan 1, 2013• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol that is secure in the identity-based extended Canetti-Krawczyk (id-eCK) model in the random oracle model under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. The proposed ID-AKE protocol is the most efficient among the existing ID-AKE protocols that is id-eCK secure, and it can be extended to use in asymmetric pairing.

DOI
10.1587/transfun.e96.a.1139

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In this paper, we propose an identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol that is secure in the identity-based extended Canetti-Krawczyk (id-eCK) model in the random oracle model under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. The proposed ID-AKE protocol is the most efficient among the existing ID-AKE protocols that is id-eCK secure, and it can be extended to use in asymmetric pairing.
Recently,LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model,which captures all security properties of authenticated key enchange protocols.Most of existing identity-based authenticated key exchange protocols are not secure in the eCK model.This paper proposes an identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol,and the security of proposed protocol can be proved in the eCK model.When compaer with other schemes,the proposed protocol achieves efficiency in terms of computation and communication.The proposal achieve strong security,and can be proved under the random oracle assumption and the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Most of the existing Identity-based(ID) authenticated protocols are proven secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk(CK) model which is weaker than the extended Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model.Based on NAXOS trick,a new scheme using bilinear pairing was proposed.The security of the scheme was proven in the eCK model under the random oracle assumption and the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman(GBDH) assumption.The proposed protocol was efficient in computational cost and communication round when compared with other solutions.The new protocol also satisfied master key forward security,perfect forward security and anti-key-leak disguise.
In this paper, we present a new ID-based two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which makes use of a new technique called twin Diffie-Hellman problem proposed by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup. We show that our scheme is secure under bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, which better supports the adversary's queries than previous AKE models. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based AKE protocol provably secure in eCK model.
In 2007, LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In this paper, we first modify the eCK model by adding a new query to make the adversary can reveal all ephemeral secret information. Then we propose a new efficient and strongly secure AKE protocol in the asymmetric setting, called E-NETS (enhanced NETS) protocol, and prove its security in the modified eCK (meCK) model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
This paper proposes an id-eCK secure identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) scheme, where the id-eCK security implies that a scheme resists against leakage of all combinations of master, static, and ephemeral secret keys except ones trivially break the security. Most existing id-eCK secure ID-AKE schemes require two symmetric pairing operations or a greater number of asymmetric pairing, which is faster than symmetric one, operations to establish a session key. However, our scheme is realized with a single asymmetric pairing operation for each party, and this is an advantage in efficiency. The proposed scheme is based on the ID-AKE scheme by McCullagh and Barreto, which is vulnerable to an active attack. To achieve id-eCK security, we apply the HMQV construction and the NAXOS technique to the McCullagh-Barreto scheme. The id-eCK security is proved under the external Diffie-Hellman for target group assumption and the q-gap-bilinear collision attack assumption.
Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that covers many attacks on existing models. An ID-based AKE protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) (respectively Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS)) ensures that revelation of the static keys of the parties (respectively the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. In our preliminary version [18] we have proposed, without proofs, ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. To achieve this, we also have constructed ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. In this full version, we provide proofs to show that all of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.