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Lecture notes in computer science

A Non-malleable Group Key Exchange Protocol Robust Against Active Insiders

Yvo Desmedt, Josef Pieprzyk, Ron Steinfeld, Huaxiong Wang

Published Jan 1, 2006• 25 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/11836810_33

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In group key agreement protocols, it is important to consider the effects of existence of malicious insiders. In this paper, we define a type of key-control attacks and the security against them for group key agreement protocols with malicious insiders. Then, we give a first ideal functionality of group key agreement that takes key-control attacks (as well as key-integrity attacks) into consideration, and construct a group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality. The construction is efficient enough for practical uses, being comprised of 2 rounds and n messages for n-party groups.