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International Symposium on Information Theory and its Applications

A group-key agreement protocol secure against the malleability attacks

Seiko Arita, Akihiko Sakuma

Published Dec 1, 2008• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In group key agreement protocols, it is important to consider the effects of existence of malicious insiders. In this paper, we define a type of key-control attacks and the security against them for group key agreement protocols with malicious insiders. Then, we give a first ideal functionality of group key agreement that takes key-control attacks (as well as key-integrity attacks) into consideration, and construct a group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality. The construction is efficient enough for practical uses, being comprised of 2 rounds and n messages for n-party groups.

DOI
10.1109/isita.2008.4895468

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Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols are protocols allowing\na group of principals to contributively generate a key by the\nexchange of messages on a network possibly controlled by an\nattacker. Furthermore, their execution also guarantees all group\nmembers that the key they obtained can only be known by the other\nintended protocol participants. These protocols can be exploited\nin many applications such as audio or videoconferencing,\nreplicated servers (such as database, web, time servers), chat or\nnetwork games for instance. \n AGKAP's present several particularities that make them interesting\ncase studies for research in the theory of security. At first, the\nconsideration of the number of protocol participants as a\nparameter raises several complexity problems that are not present\nin the classical two or three-party frameworks. Furthermore, up to\nnow, the security properties of group protocols have roughly been\nconsidered as direct extensions of two-party properties, what does\nnot capture several plausible attack scenarios. A second\ninteresting aspect of the analysis of AGKAP's is the consideration\nof Diffie-Hellman-type primitives, that present properties out\nof the scope of most classical models. \n We started our study with the construction of a simple model for\nthe analysis of a classical family of protocols: the Cliques\nAGKAP's. This allowed us to discover several attacks and define\ndifferent flavors of group security properties. We then tried to\nfix these protocols, what led us to extend our model in order to\nprove that it is in fact impossible to build a secure AGKAP based\non the same design assumptions as the Cliques protocols. Finally,\nwe designed a new AGKAP based on different cryptographic\nprimitives (signature and hash functions) for which we proved\nauthentication, freshness and secrecy properties. A comparison\nwith a similar AGKAP developed in parallel to ours is also\nproposed.

•Jan 1, 2003•19 citations
In group key agreement protocols, it is important to consider the effects of existence of malicious insiders. In this paper, we define a type of key-control attacks and the security against them for group key agreement protocols with malicious insiders. Then, we give a first ideal functionality of group key agreement that takes key-control attacks (as well as key-integrity attacks) into consideration, and construct a group key agreement protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality. The construction is efficient enough for practical uses, being comprised of 2 rounds and n messages for n-party groups.
Authenticated group key agreement allows a group of users to generate a shared key which satisfies various security requirements. Several identity-based authenticated group key agreement schemes are proposed. However, these schemes are shown to be vulnerable to insider impersonation attacks that any two malicious group members can impersonate other user to agree some session keys in a new group. In this paper, a simple two round authenticated group agreement scheme based on Burmester and Desmedt's scheme is proposed. Compared to previous protocols, our protocol is efficient while secure against various known attacks, including key exposure attacks and insider impersonation attacks.
Authenticated group key agreement is an important cryptographic mechanism underlying many collaborative and distributed applications. Some identity-based authenticated group key agreement schemes are proposed, however most of these protocols are vulnerable to insider attacks, while the other protocols are not efficient in communication. In this paper a new authenticated group key agreement protocol is proposed based on a modified identity-based cryptography infrastructure with new system setup and key extraction algorithms. The main feature of this protocol is that it needs only one round, which is optimal in terms of communication complexity; meanwhile the protocol is secure against insider attacks such as impersonation attacks and other known attacks.
Group key agreement protocols allow a group of users, communicating over a public network, to establish a shared secret key to achieve a cryptographic goal. Protocols based on certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) are preferred since CL-PKC does not need certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and does not suffer from key escrow of identity-based cryptography. Most previous certificateless group key agreement protocols deploy signature schemes to achieve authentication and do not have constant rounds. No security model has been presented for group key agreement protocols based on CL-PKC. This paper presents a security model for a certificateless group key agreement protocol and proposes a constant-round group key agreement pro- tocol based on CL-PKC. The proposed protocol does not involve any signature scheme, which increases the efficiency of the protocol. It is formally proven that the proposed protocol provides strong AKE-security and tolerates up to n-2 malicious insiders for weak MA-security. The protocol also resists key control attack under a weak corruption model.
Through the group key agreement, all group members could negotiate a common session key which is used in later secure communication.While simple GKA cannot provide enough security to resist the adversary's attack, and the malicious damage during the agreement makes the authenticated key agreement particularly important.In identity-based authentication, user's unique identity information is used as the public key, which makes it exempt from a series of management of the certification in public-key infrastructure.Thereby, the identity-based key agreement can simplify the key management procedures and reduce the risk of failure at the certification authority.Recently, several identity-based group key agreement protocols have been proposed, however most of them are either vulnerable to impersonation and replay attack or inefficient and unscalable.This paper proposes a novel authenticated group key agreement protocol which is based on bilinear pairings.It needs two rounds to negotiate the session key, and the low computational complexity makes the protocol efficient and scalable.Meanwhile, our protocol also ensures the forward and backward secrecy and the key independence.Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, our protocol is proved to be secure against the adversary. 1.
Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols are protocols allowing\na group of principals to contributively generate a key by the\nexchange of messages on a network possibly controlled by an\nattacker. Furthermore, their execution also guarantees all group\nmembers that the key they obtained can only be known by the other\nintended protocol participants. These protocols can be exploited\nin many applications such as audio or videoconferencing,\nreplicated servers (such as database, web, time servers), chat or\nnetwork games for instance. \n AGKAP's present several particularities that make them interesting\ncase studies for research in the theory of security. At first, the\nconsideration of the number of protocol participants as a\nparameter raises several complexity problems that are not present\nin the classical two or three-party frameworks. Furthermore, up to\nnow, the security properties of group protocols have roughly been\nconsidered as direct extensions of two-party properties, what does\nnot capture several plausible attack scenarios. A second\ninteresting aspect of the analysis of AGKAP's is the consideration\nof Diffie-Hellman-type primitives, that present properties out\nof the scope of most classical models. \n We started our study with the construction of a simple model for\nthe analysis of a classical family of protocols: the Cliques\nAGKAP's. This allowed us to discover several attacks and define\ndifferent flavors of group security properties. We then tried to\nfix these protocols, what led us to extend our model in order to\nprove that it is in fact impossible to build a secure AGKAP based\non the same design assumptions as the Cliques protocols. Finally,\nwe designed a new AGKAP based on different cryptographic\nprimitives (signature and hash functions) for which we proved\nauthentication, freshness and secrecy properties. A comparison\nwith a similar AGKAP developed in parallel to ours is also\nproposed.