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arXiv:2511.21258

The Quantum Agreement Theorem

María García Díaz, Adam Brandenburger, Giannicola Scarpa

quant-phSubmitted Nov 26, 2025• Announced Nov 27, 2025• 0 citations• Revised Mar 19, 2026 (v2)

v1 · Nov 26, 2025 v2 · Mar 19, 2026 v3 · Sep 20, 2026

Abstract

We formulate and prove an Agreement Theorem for quantum mechanics (QM), describing when two agents, represented by separate laboratories, can or cannot maintain differing probability estimates of a shared quantum property of interest. Building on the classical framework (Aumann, 1976), we define the modality of ``common certainty" through a hierarchy of certainty operators acting on each agent's Hilbert space. In the commuting case -- when all measurements and event projectors commute -- common certainty leads to equality of the agents' conditional probabilities, recovering a QM analog of the classical theorem. By contrast, when non-commuting operators are allowed, the certainty recursion can stabilize with different probabilities. This yields common certainty of disagreement (CCD) as a distinctive QM phenomenon. We show that agreement will nevertheless re-emerge if measurement outcomes are recorded in a classical register. We also establish an impossibility result stating that QM forbids a scenario where one agent is certain that a property of interest occurs, and is also certain that the other agent is certain that the property does not occur. In this sense, QM admits non-classical disagreement, but disagreement is still bounded in a disciplined way. We argue that our analysis offers a rigorous approach to the longstanding issue of how to understand intersubjectivity across agents in QM.

Comments: 19 pages, 5 figures, 3 tables

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