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arXiv:2312.07728 · International Journal of Theoretical Physics

When will Two Agents Agree on a Quantum Measurement Outcome? Intersubjective Agreement in QBism

Rüdiger Schack

Published Oct 5, 2024• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action an agent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is an extension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilities are personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalism implies that the quantum state assignments of two agents or their respective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently, Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurement is invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, following Stacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa's mathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBism is incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreement in QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agents to agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive to create conditions under which she would expect another agent's reported measurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions of Ozawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.

DOI
10.1007/s10773-024-05790-w

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In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action an agent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is an extension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilities are personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalism implies that the quantum state assignments of two agents or their respective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently, Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurement is invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, following Stacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa's mathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBism is incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreement in QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agents to agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive to create conditions under which she would expect another agent's reported measurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions of Ozawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.
Abstract QBism’s foundational statement that “the outcome of a measurement of an observable is personal” is in the straight contraversion with Ozawa’s Intersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantum formalism) states that two observers, agents within the QBism terminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable A on a system S in the state ψ\psi ψ ψ should get the same outcome A=x.A=x.A=x. A = x . In Ozawa’s terminology, this outcome is intersubjective and it can’t be treated as personal. This is the strong objection to QBism which can’t survive without updating its principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT-impact on QBism’s foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. This paper comprises the complementary discussion highlighting the difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy, quantum observables which are represented by PVMs and POVMs respectively. Moreover, we discuss the OIT-impact on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
QBism’s foundational statement that “the outcome of a measurement ofan observable is personal” is in direct contradiction with Ozawa’sIntersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantummeasurement theory) states that two observers, agents within the QBismterminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable A on asystem S in the state ψ should get the same outcome A = x. In Ozawa’s terminology,this outcome is intersubjective and it can’t be treated as personal.This is the strong objection to QBism which can’t survive without updatingits principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT impact onQBism’s foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. We discussthe difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy,quantum observables which are represented by the projection valued measures(PVMs) and positive operator valued measures (POVMs), respectively.Moreover, we discuss the OIT impact on the Copenhagen interpretation ofquantum mechanics.
QBism is a recently developed version of Quantum Bayesianism. QBists think that the primitive concept of experience is the central subject of science. QBism refuses the idea that the quantum state of a system is an objective description of this system. It is a tool for assigning a subjective probability to the agent's future experience. So quantum mechanics does not directly say something about the "external world". A measurement (in the usual sense) is just a special case of what QBism calls experience and this is any action done by any agent on her external world. The result of the measurement is the experience that the agent gets from her action on her personal world. For Qbists, this way of seeing the measurement helps rejecting any non-local influences. We will examine if these claims are robust and will show that a certain number of issues needs to be clarified in order to get a coherent picture. Depending on the way these necessary clarifications are made, the global image given by Qbism can vary from pure instrumentalism to interpretations making the observer play a radical role.
Intersubjective consistency asks when different observers of a physical system, reasoning from a shared theory, will agree on their probability assessments. Classical probability theory provides a benchmark in the form of the Agreement Theorem (Aumann, 1976). We study the quantum mechanics (QM) analog to the classical Agreement Theorem in a finite-dimensional tripartite setting in which two observers obtain information via local projective measurements. We represent their mutual awareness by common certainty, which is formally an infinite hierarchy of certainty operators concerning the probability of an event of interest. We first prove that if the observers' measurements commute with one another and with the property of interest, common certainty forces their probability assessments to coincide, thereby recovering a QM analog to the classical Agreement Theorem. We then construct a one-parameter family of qutrit-qubit-qubit models in which one observer's measurement does not commute with the property and common certainty of disagreement occurs -- a distinctively QM phenomenon. The mechanism is coherence between branches distinguished by one but not the other observer's measurement. When measurement outcomes are stored in a classical register, the resulting dephasing removes this coherence and restores agreement. Finally, we prove that QM does not permit the extreme 0-1 configuration in which Alice is certain of a property and is also certain that Bob is certain of its negation. These results aim to turn debate in QM about observer-dependent facts into precise mathematical conditions for when intersubjective agreement or disagreement in QM can be sustained.
QBism has long recognized quantum states, positive-operator-valued measure elements, Kraus operators, and even unitary operations to be of the same type: they express aspects of an agent's belief system concerning the consequences (for her) of actions she might take upon her external world. Such action-consequence pairs have conventionally been called ``quantum measurements.'' The calculus of quantum theory is then viewed as an empirically motivated addition to Bayesian decision theory when brought to this notion of measurement. This radical approach has allowed QBism to eliminate conceptual problems that plague other interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, one issue has remained elusive: If a QBist does not believe in the existence of an ontic (agent-independent) dynamical variable evolving over time, why would there be any constraints on her quantum-state assignment in the absence of performing a measurement? Why would she introduce unitary or open-system quantum dynamics at all? Here, we present a representation theorem based on van Fraassen's reflection principle to answer these questions. Simply put, an agent's assignment of quantum dynamics represents her belief that a measurement action she is contemplating would not change her current odds for future gambles. A corollary to this approach is that one can make sense of ``open-system dynamics'' without the need to introduce an ``environment with a measurement record,'' as is common in decoherence accounts of quantum measurement. QBism's understanding instead rests more fundamentally on an agent's beliefs about the system of interest (not system plus environment) and her judgments about measurements she might perform on that system. More broadly, this result establishes QBism's contention that measurement itself is the central concept of quantum theory and thus the framework upon which any future QBist ontology must hang.