Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2302.09475

Whose Probabilities? About What? A Reply to Khrennikov

Blake C. Stacey

Published Feb 19, 2023• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a recent article, Khrennikov claims that a particular theorem about agreement between quantum measurement results poses a problem for the interpretation of quantum mechanics known as QBism. Considering the basic setup of that theorem in light of the meaning that QBism gives to probability shows that the claim is unfounded.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2302.09475

Related papers

On probabilities in quantum mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Khrennikov on the one hand and Stacey and Schack on the other hand. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, as seen from my point of view, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach toward the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics before I give some final remarks.

APL Quantum•Aug 21, 2024•8 citations

On Quantum Bayesianism

Moses Fayngold

The lately developed part of Quantum Bayesianism named QBism has been proclaimed by its authors a powerful interpretation of Quantum Physics. This article presents analysis of some aspects of QBism. The considered examples show inconsistencies in some basic statements of the discussed interpretation. In particular, the main quantum mechanical conundrum of measurement and the observer is, contrary to the claims, not resolved within the framework of QBism. The conclusion is made that the basic tenets of QBism as applied in Physics are unsubstantiated.

arXiv:2003.11022•Mar 24, 2020•0 citations

On probabilities in quantum mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.

arXiv:2401.17717•Jan 31, 2024•0 citations

When will Two Agents Agree on a Quantum Measurement Outcome? Intersubjective Agreement in QBism

Rüdiger Schack

In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action an agent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is an extension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilities are personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalism implies that the quantum state assignments of two agents or their respective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently, Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurement is invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, following Stacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa's mathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBism is incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreement in QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agents to agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive to create conditions under which she would expect another agent's reported measurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions of Ozawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.

arXiv:2312.07728•International Journal of Theoretical Physics•Oct 5, 2024•6 citations

On Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and R\(\mathrm{\ddot{u}}\)diger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then refer to my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.

Qeios•Feb 2, 2024•1 citation

On Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics

Inge Svein Helland

This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.

Qeios•Mar 5, 2024•1 citation
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Khrennikov on the one hand and Stacey and Schack on the other hand. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, as seen from my point of view, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach toward the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics before I give some final remarks.
The lately developed part of Quantum Bayesianism named QBism has been proclaimed by its authors a powerful interpretation of Quantum Physics. This article presents analysis of some aspects of QBism. The considered examples show inconsistencies in some basic statements of the discussed interpretation. In particular, the main quantum mechanical conundrum of measurement and the observer is, contrary to the claims, not resolved within the framework of QBism. The conclusion is made that the basic tenets of QBism as applied in Physics are unsubstantiated.
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.
In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action an agent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is an extension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilities are personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalism implies that the quantum state assignments of two agents or their respective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently, Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurement is invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, following Stacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa's mathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBism is incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreement in QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agents to agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive to create conditions under which she would expect another agent's reported measurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions of Ozawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Ru¨\mathrm{\ddot{u}}u¨diger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then refer to my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection, I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.
This is an attempt to clarify certain concepts related to a debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, a debate between Andrei Khrennikov on the one side and Blake Stacey and Rüdiger Schack on the other side. Central to this debate is the notion of quantum probabilities. I first take up the probability concept in the QBist school, and then give my own arguments for the Born formula for calculating quantum probabilities. In that connection I also sketch some consequences of my approach towards the foundation and interpretation of quantum theory. I discuss my general views on QBism as a possible alternative interpretation before I give some final remarks.