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Cambridge University Press eBooks

QBism versus Ozawa’s Intersubjectivity Theorem?

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Published Nov 28, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

QBism’s foundational statement that “the outcome of a measurement ofan observable is personal” is in direct contradiction with Ozawa’sIntersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantummeasurement theory) states that two observers, agents within the QBismterminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable A on asystem S in the state ψ should get the same outcome A = x. In Ozawa’s terminology,this outcome is intersubjective and it can’t be treated as personal.This is the strong objection to QBism which can’t survive without updatingits principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT impact onQBism’s foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. We discussthe difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy,quantum observables which are represented by the projection valued measures(PVMs) and positive operator valued measures (POVMs), respectively.Moreover, we discuss the OIT impact on the Copenhagen interpretation ofquantum mechanics.

DOI
10.1017/9781009313469.018

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QBism’s foundational statement that “the outcome of a measurement ofan observable is personal” is in direct contradiction with Ozawa’sIntersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantummeasurement theory) states that two observers, agents within the QBismterminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable A on asystem S in the state ψ should get the same outcome A = x. In Ozawa’s terminology,this outcome is intersubjective and it can’t be treated as personal.This is the strong objection to QBism which can’t survive without updatingits principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT impact onQBism’s foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. We discussthe difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy,quantum observables which are represented by the projection valued measures(PVMs) and positive operator valued measures (POVMs), respectively.Moreover, we discuss the OIT impact on the Copenhagen interpretation ofquantum mechanics.
Abstract QBism’s foundational statement that “the outcome of a measurement of an observable is personal” is in the straight contraversion with Ozawa’s Intersubjectivity Theorem (OIT). The latter (proven within the quantum formalism) states that two observers, agents within the QBism terminology, performing joint measurements of the same observable A on a system S in the state ψ\psi ψ ψ should get the same outcome A=x.A=x.A=x. A = x . In Ozawa’s terminology, this outcome is intersubjective and it can’t be treated as personal. This is the strong objection to QBism which can’t survive without updating its principles. The essential aspect in understanding of the OIT-impact on QBism’s foundations takes the notion of quantum observable. This paper comprises the complementary discussion highlighting the difference between the accurate, von Neumann, and inaccurate, noisy, quantum observables which are represented by PVMs and POVMs respectively. Moreover, we discuss the OIT-impact on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action an agent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is an extension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilities are personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalism implies that the quantum state assignments of two agents or their respective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently, Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurement is invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, following Stacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa's mathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBism is incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreement in QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agents to agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive to create conditions under which she would expect another agent's reported measurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions of Ozawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.
We identify an operational principle that singles out Projection-Valued Measures (PVMs) among general Positive Operator-Valued Measures (POVMs), bridging the modern quantum measurement theory and the traditional formulation based on projective measurements of physical observables. We reformulate Ozawa's intersubjectivity condition, which requires inter-observer agreement of the measurement outcomes, in a quantitative manner within the framework of generalized probabilistic theories. We prove that (i) a POVM is a PVM if and only if its every coarse-graining is intersubjective, and (ii) a system is classical if and only if intersubjectivity is preserved under any coarse-graining, establishing a complete characterization of the physical observables and the classical theory. Furthermore, measurements with intersubjectivity are sufficiently rich for the informational tasks of state tomography and state discrimination, testifying to its operational significance in quantum and beyond information processing.
Abstract The Ozawa’s intersubjectivity theorem (OIT) proved within quantum measurement theory supports the new postulate of relational quantum mechanics (RQM), the postulate on internally consistent descriptions. But from OIT viewpoint postulate’s formulation should be completed by the assumption of probability reproducibility. We remark that this postulate was proposed only recently to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity of information in RQM. In contrast to RQM for which OIT is a supporting theoretical statement, QBism is challenged by OIT.
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities, are so subjective they never tell nature what to do. This includes probability-1 assignments. Quantum states thus have no "ontic hold" on the world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes just are personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them. Particularly, quantum measurement outcomes are not, to paraphrase Bohr, instances of "irreversible amplification in devices whose design is communicable in common language suitably refined by the terminology of classical physics." Finally, an explicit comparison is given between QBism and Bohr with regard to three subjects: a) The issue of the "detached observer" as it arose in a debate between Pauli and Bohr, b) Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, and c) Bohr's mature notion of "quantum phenomena." At the end, we discuss how Bohr's notion of phenomena may have something to offer the philosophy of William James: A physics from which to further develop his vision of the world---call it an ontology if you will---in which "new being comes in local spots and patches."
Recently Pienaar (2026), building on work of Cavalcanti (2021), has shown that QBism cannot always assume distinct observers' quantum-measurement outcomes---say, of Wigner and his friend---are embedded in a single spacetime. This follows from QBism's rejection of the `Absoluteness of Observed Events' assumption in the Bong et al. no-go theorem. Thus, QBism has no choice but to treat the notion of spacetime every bit as personalistic as it treats quantum states and quantum measurement outcomes. In a way, this is not a surprise to QBists, as they have taken the notion of `personalist spacetimes' to be the ansatz most compatible with their other views since at least 2009. But it does enjoin us to finally make crystal clear the sense in which QBism is a purely local interpretation of quantum mechanics despite this new theorem and despite quantum theory's age-old violation of Bell's inequalities. With the extra clarity we also hope to poise QBism for a distinctly new way to approach issues at the interface of quantum theory and gravity.