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Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences

Agreement and disagreement in a non-classical world

Adam M. Brandenburger, Patricia Contreras-Tejada, Pierfrancesco La Mura, Giannicola Scarpa, Kai Steverson

Published Jan 28, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

, 1236-1239. (doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654)) states that if two Bayesian agents start with a common prior, then they cannot have common knowledge that they hold different posterior probabilities of some underlying event of interest. In short, the two agents cannot 'agree to disagree'. This result applies in the classical domain where classical probability theory applies. But in non-classical domains, such as the quantum world, classical probability theory does not apply. Inspired principally by their use in quantum mechanics, we employ signed probabilities to investigate the epistemics of the non-classical world. We find that here, too, it cannot be common knowledge that two agents assign different probabilities to an event of interest. However, in a non-classical domain, unlike the classical case, it can be common certainty that two agents assign different probabilities to an event of interest. Finally, in a non-classical domain, it cannot be common certainty that two agents assign different probabilities, if communication of their common certainty is possible-even if communication does not take place. This article is part of the theme issue 'Quantum contextuality, causality and freedom of choice'.

DOI
10.1098/rsta.2023.0004

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, 1236-1239. (doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654)) states that if two Bayesian agents start with a common prior, then they cannot have common knowledge that they hold different posterior probabilities of some underlying event of interest. In short, the two agents cannot 'agree to disagree'. This result applies in the classical domain where classical probability theory applies. But in non-classical domains, such as the quantum world, classical probability theory does not apply. Inspired principally by their use in quantum mechanics, we employ signed probabilities to investigate the epistemics of the non-classical world. We find that here, too, it cannot be common knowledge that two agents assign different probabilities to an event of interest. However, in a non-classical domain, unlike the classical case, it can be common certainty that two agents assign different probabilities to an event of interest. Finally, in a non-classical domain, it cannot be common certainty that two agents assign different probabilities, if communication of their common certainty is possible-even if communication does not take place. This article is part of the theme issue 'Quantum contextuality, causality and freedom of choice'.
According to Aumann's celebrated theorem, rational agents cannot agree to disagree. In other words, agents who once shared a common prior probability distribution and who have common knowledge about their posteriors cannot assign different probability distributions to a given proposition. Common knowledge imposes strong restrictions on assigned probabilities. In fact, Aumann's agreement theorem was one of the first attempts to formalise and explore the role played by common knowledge in decision theory. Recently, the debate over possible (quantum) extensions of Aumann's results has resurfaced. This paper contributes to this discussion. First, we argue that agreeing to disagree is impossible in quantum theory. Secondly, by building on the quantum argument, we show that agreeing to disagree is also forbidden in any generalised probability theory. The upshot is that in its probabilistic version, the agreement theorem is a direct consequence of how we choose to condition upon acquiring new information.
Agreement theorems are no-go results about rational disagreement: if two agents start from a common prior and their posterior beliefs are common knowledge, they cannot assign different probabilities to the same event. Standard treatments of the result have the agents reason about an underlying state of the world, which has lead some to ask whether the result can extend to quantum or postquantum phenomena, where such a description may no longer be appropriate. We derive an operational version of Aumann's agreement theorem without assuming an objective state of the world and instead focusing only on what is observed. This allows us to establish the theorem's validity in quantum theory and even in situations with indefinite causal order or involving hypothetical postquantum phenomena. We comment on seemingly contradictory results in the literature and point to the one place where the theorem might fail: Wigner's friend-type situations.
Intersubjective consistency asks when different observers of a physical system, reasoning from a shared theory, will agree on their probability assessments. Classical probability theory provides a benchmark in the form of the Agreement Theorem (Aumann, 1976). We study the quantum mechanics (QM) analog to the classical Agreement Theorem in a finite-dimensional tripartite setting in which two observers obtain information via local projective measurements. We represent their mutual awareness by common certainty, which is formally an infinite hierarchy of certainty operators concerning the probability of an event of interest. We first prove that if the observers' measurements commute with one another and with the property of interest, common certainty forces their probability assessments to coincide, thereby recovering a QM analog to the classical Agreement Theorem. We then construct a one-parameter family of qutrit-qubit-qubit models in which one observer's measurement does not commute with the property and common certainty of disagreement occurs -- a distinctively QM phenomenon. The mechanism is coherence between branches distinguished by one but not the other observer's measurement. When measurement outcomes are stored in a classical register, the resulting dephasing removes this coherence and restores agreement. Finally, we prove that QM does not permit the extreme 0-1 configuration in which Alice is certain of a property and is also certain that Bob is certain of its negation. These results aim to turn debate in QM about observer-dependent facts into precise mathematical conditions for when intersubjective agreement or disagreement in QM can be sustained.
We establish a strong link between two apparently unrelated topics: the study of conflicting information in the formal framework of valuation algebras, and the phenomena of non-locality and contextuality. In particular, we show that these peculiar features of quantum theory are mathematically equivalent to a general notion of disagreement between information sources. This result vastly generalizes previously observed connections between contextuality, relat- ional databases, constraint satisfaction problems and logical paradoxes, and gives further proof that contextual behaviour is not a phenomenon limited to quantum physics, but pervades various domains of mathematics and computer science. The connection allows to translate theorems, methods and algorithms from one field to the other, and paves the way for the application of generic inference algorithms to study contextuality. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign different states to the same quantum system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? And how should the state assignments of different agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory (Leifer M S and Spekkens R W 2013 Phys. Rev. A 88 052310). Specifically, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion, based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state when you learn someone else's state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this context.