In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign different states to the same quantum system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? And how should the state assignments of different agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory (Leifer M S and Spekkens R W 2013 Phys. Rev. A 88 052310). Specifically, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion, based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state when you learn someone else's state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this context.
In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign different states to the same quantum system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? And how should the state assignments of different agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory (Leifer M S and Spekkens R W 2013 Phys. Rev. A 88 052310). Specifically, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion, based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state when you learn someone else's state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this context.
Suppose N parties describe the state of a quantum system by N possibly different density operators. These N state assignments represent the beliefs of the parties about the system. We examine conditions for determining whether the N state assignments are compatible. We distinguish two kinds of procedures for assessing compatibility, the first based on the compatibility of the prior beliefs on which the N state assignments are based and the second based on the compatibility of predictive measurement probabilities they define. The first procedure leads to a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein, and Mermin [BFM, Phys. Rev. A 65, 032315 (2002)]. The second procedure leads to a hierarchy of measurement-based compatibility criteria which is fundamentally different from the corresponding classical situation. Quantum mechanically none of the measurement-based compatibility criteria is equivalent to the BFM criterion.
When Alice and Bob have different quantum knowledges or state assignments (density operators) for one and the same specific individual system, then the problems of compatibility and pooling arise. The so-called first Brun-Finkelstein-Mermin (BFM) condition for compatibility is reobtained in terms of possessed or sharp (i. e., probability one) properties. The second BFM condition is shown to be generally invalid in an infinite-dimensional state space. An argument leading to a procedure of improvement of one state assifnment on account of the other and vice versa is presented.
When Alice and Bob have different quantum knowledges or state assignments (density operators) ρ A and ρ B , respectively, for one and the same specific individual system, then the problems of compatibility and pooling arise. The so-called first Brun–Finkelstein–Mermin (BFM) condition for compatibility is reobtained in terms of possessed or sharp (i.e., probability one) properties. The second BFM condition is shown to be generally invalid in an infinite-dimensional state space. An argument leading to a procedure of improvement of ρ A on account of ρ B and vice versa is presented.
Quantum theory can be viewed as a generalization of classical probability theory, but the analogy as it has been developed so far is not complete. Whereas the manner in which inferences are made in classical probability theory is independent of the causal relation that holds between the conditioned variable and the conditioning variable, in the conventional quantum formalism, there is a significant difference between how one treats experiments involving two systems at a single time and those involving a single system at two times. In this article, we develop the formalism of quantum conditional states, which provides a unified description of these two sorts of experiment. In addition, concepts that are distinct in the conventional formalism become unified: Channels, sets of states, and positive operator valued measures are all seen to be instances of conditional states; the action of a channel on a state, ensemble averaging, the Born rule, the composition of channels, and nonselective state-update rules are all seen to be instances of belief propagation. Using a quantum generalization of Bayes' theorem and the associated notion of Bayesian conditioning, we also show that the remote steering of quantum states can be described within our formalism as a mere updating of beliefs about one system given new information about another, and retrodictive inferences can be expressed using the same belief propagation rule as is used for predictive inferences. Finally, we show that previous arguments for interpreting the projection postulate as a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning are based on a misleading analogy and that it is best understood as a combination of belief propagation (corresponding to the nonselective state-update map) and conditioning on the measurement outcome.
A core tenet of Bayesian epistemology is that rational agents update by conditionalization.Accuracy arguments in favour of this norm are well-known.Meanwhile, scholars working in quantum probability and quantum state estimation have proposed multiple updating rules, all of which look prima facie like analogues of Bayesian conditionalization.The most common are Lüders conditionalization and Bayesian mean estimation (BME).Some authors also endorse a lesser-known alternative that we call retrodiction.We show how one can view Lüders and BME as complementary rules, and we give expected accuracy and accuracy dominance arguments for both.By contrast, we find that retrodiction is accuracy-dominated, at least on many measures of accuracy.Bayesian norms do not immediately carry over to this setting.(Here and in what follows, we assume that there are objective quantum probabilities, and that quantum systems have true, objective quantum states.The idea that there are both subjective and objective probabilities, and we can discuss their relationship, is sometimes known as Lewisian dualism (Wallace [2012]).)While it is unclear how to translate standard Bayesian norms into this quantum operatortheoretic setting, we can draw a natural analogy.Usually, the Bayesian represents both credences and states of the world as real-valued functions over an algebra of propositions; we can view credences as 'estimates' of the truth values assigned by a given state. 1 In quantum theory, one represents states with bounded, linear operators on a Hilbert space.It turns out that one can also use such operators to encode estimates of quantum states.We adopt this paradigm to construct natural analogues of the accuracy arguments, affording novel Bayesian justifications for several quantum updating rules.It is controversial whether such a non-classical approach to probability is necessary once we fix an appropriate solution to the measurement problem (Loewer, Healey [1994, 2020]).However, even if it is not necessary, this alternate setting is immensely popular.Experimenters typically work within the framework of Hilbert-space operators, as this framework houses most approaches to quantum state estimation (that is, the reconstruction of quantum states based on measurement outcomes; see Jones, Blume-Kohout, Granade et al. [1991Granade et al. [ , 2010Granade et al. [ , 2016]]).So, the status of Bayesian norms in this setting seems well worth exploring.Interestingly, authors have proposed multiple updating norms in this framework, all of which look prima facie like analogues of Bayesian conditionalization:
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.