arXiv:quant-ph/0605099 · Physical Review A

Reply to “Comment II on ‘Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

Published Jul 21, 2006• 3 citations

Abstract

In the preceding Comment [Jian-Zhong Du, Su-Juan Qin, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu, Phys. Rev. A 74, 016301 (2006)], it has been shown that in a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], one of the receivers can cheat by splitting the entanglement of the carrier and intercepting the secret, without being detected. In this reply we show that a simple modification of the protocol prevents the receivers from this kind of cheating.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.74.016302

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