arXiv:quant-ph/0505052 · Physical Review A

Comment on “Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers”

Fei Gao, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qiaoyan Wen, Fu-Chen Zhu

Published Sep 20, 2005• 42 citations

Abstract

In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure if Eve employs a special strategy to attack.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.72.036302

Related papers

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne- Zeilinger states as secure carriers’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

We show that the criticism of a recent Comment by Gao et al. on the insecurity of the quantum secret sharing protocol [proposed in S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)] is based on a misconception about the meaning of security and hence is invalid.

arXiv:quant-ph/0506145Physical Review ANov 18, 20056 citations

Comment II on “Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers”

DU Jian-zhong, Su‐Juan Qin, Qiaoyan Wen +1 more

In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable GHZ states was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure because a cheater can gain all the secret bits before sharing, while introducing one data bit error at most in the whole communication, which makes the cheater avoid the detection by the communication parities.

arXiv:quant-ph/0605088Physical Review AJul 21, 20065 citations

Reply to “Comment II on ‘Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

In the preceding Comment [Jian-Zhong Du, Su-Juan Qin, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu, Phys. Rev. A 74, 016301 (2006)], it has been shown that in a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], one of the receivers can cheat by splitting the entanglement of the carrier and intercepting the secret, without being detected. In this reply we show that a simple modification of the protocol prevents the receivers from this kind of cheating.

arXiv:quant-ph/0605099Physical Review AJul 21, 20063 citations

Secure Quantum Secret Sharing Based on Reusable GHZ States as Secure Carriers

Song Jie, Zhang Shou

We show that a potential eavesdropper can eavesdrop whole secret information when the legitimate users use secure carrier to encode and decode classical information repeatedly in the protocol proposed by Bagherinezhad S and Karimipour V [Phys. Rev. A 67 (2003) 044302]. Then we present a revised quantum secret sharing protocol by using the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger state as secure carrier. Our protocol can resist Eve's attack.

arXiv:quant-ph/0605065Chinese Physics LettersMay 30, 200615 citations

Improved Multipartite Quantum Secret Sharing Protocol Using Preshared Greenberger—Horne—Zeilinger States

Deng Xie, Ming-Yong Ye, Xinghua Li

Inspired by the protocol presented by Bagherinezhad and Karimipour [ Phys. Rev. A 67 (2003) 044302 ], which will be shown to be insecure, we present a multipartite quantum secret sharing protocol using reusable Greenberger—Horne—Zeilinger (GHZ) states. This protocol is robust against eavesdropping and could be used for the circumstance of many parties.

Communications in Theoretical PhysicsDec 1, 20110 citations

Reply to Comments on "Quantum Key Distribution for d-level systems for generalized Bell states" [Phys. Rev. A, 052331, (2002)] and "Quantum secret sharing based on a reusable Greenberger-Horne -Zeilinger states as secure carriers" [Phys. Rev. A, 67, 044302, (2003)]"

Vahid Karimipour

We show that the criticisms of two recent comments \\cite{ch1,ch2} on the insecurity of quantum key distributions proposed in \\cite{zhang} and \\cite{v1} and the secret sharing protocol proposed in \\cite{v2} are based on a misconception about the meaning of security and hence are invalid.

Jun 17, 20052 citations