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arXiv:quant-ph/0605088 · Physical Review A

Comment II on “Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers”

DU Jian-zhong, Su‐Juan Qin, Qiaoyan Wen, Fu-Chen Zhu

Published Jul 21, 2006• 5 citations
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Abstract

In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable GHZ states was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure because a cheater can gain all the secret bits before sharing, while introducing one data bit error at most in the whole communication, which makes the cheater avoid the detection by the communication parities.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.74.016301

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In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable GHZ states was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure because a cheater can gain all the secret bits before sharing, while introducing one data bit error at most in the whole communication, which makes the cheater avoid the detection by the communication parities.
In the preceding Comment [Jian-Zhong Du, Su-Juan Qin, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu, Phys. Rev. A 74, 016301 (2006)], it has been shown that in a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], one of the receivers can cheat by splitting the entanglement of the carrier and intercepting the secret, without being detected. In this reply we show that a simple modification of the protocol prevents the receivers from this kind of cheating.