arXiv:quant-ph/0405035 · Physical Review A

Comment on “Quantum dense key distribution”

Antoni Wójcik

Published Jan 28, 2005• 56 citations

Abstract

In this Comment we question the security of recently proposed by Degiovanni et al. [Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 032310] scheme of quantum dense key distribution.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.71.016301

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