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arXiv:quant-ph/0410221 · Physical Review A

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum dense key distribution’ ”

Ivo Pietro Degiovanni, Ivano Ruo Berchera, Stefania Castelletto, Maria Luisa Rastello, Fabio Antonio Bovino, A.M. Colla, Giuseppe Castagnoli

Published Jan 28, 2005• 12 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the quantum dense key distribution protocol, detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by W'ojcik in his Comment [W'ojcik, Phys. Rev. A 71, 016301 (2005)].
DOI
10.1103/physreva.71.016302

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Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular eavesdropping attack [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 63}, 036301 (2001), quant-ph/0009042] which shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 61}, 052312 (2000), quant-ph/9911025] is insecure. However, security against this attack can be attained with a simple modification. In addition, a simpler version of the protocol using four qubits is introduced.

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We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys. Lett. A \textbf{374} (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept-and-Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve's attack based on a double CNOT gate.

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