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arXiv:gr-qc/9808016 · Physical Review Letters

Kent Replies:

Adrian Kent

Published Aug 31, 1998• 30 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections $P$ and $Q$, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that $PQ = QP = 0$ and $P \neq 1 -Q$. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences $P$ and $Q$ where $P = 1 - Q$. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.81.1982

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Comment on “Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory”

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In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.

arXiv:gr-qc/9710025•Physical Review Letters•Aug 31, 1998•51 citations

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Properties of Consistent Histories

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It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections PPP and QQQ, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that PQ=QP=0PQ = QP = 0PQ=QP=0 and P≠1−QP \neq 1 -QP=1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences PPP and QQQ where P=1−QP = 1 - QP=1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.
In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalized time-neutral quantum mechanics.
Classical mechanics and standard Copenhagen quantum mechanics respect subspace implications. For example, if a particle is confined in a particular region RRR of space, then in these theories we can deduce that it is confined in regions containing RRR. However, subspace implications are generally violated by versions of quantum theory that assign probabilities to histories, such as the consistent histories approach. I define here a new criterion, ordered consistency, which refines the criterion of consistency and has the property that inferences made by ordered consistent sets do not violate subspace relations. This raises the question: do the operators defining our observations form an ordered consistent history? If so, ordered consistency defines a version of quantum theory with greater predictive power than the consistent histories formalism. If not, and our observations are defined by a non-ordered consistent quantum history, then subspace implications are not generally valid.