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arXiv:gr-qc/9710025 · Physical Review Letters

Comment on “Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory”

Robert B. Griffiths, James B. Hartle

Published Aug 31, 1998• 51 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.81.1981

Related papers

Kent Replies:

Adrian Kent

It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections $P$ and $Q$, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that $PQ = QP = 0$ and $P \neq 1 -Q$. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences $P$ and $Q$ where $P = 1 - Q$. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.

arXiv:gr-qc/9808016•Physical Review Letters•Aug 31, 1998•30 citations

Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory

Adrian Kent

In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalized time-neutral quantum mechanics.

arXiv:gr-qc/9604012•Physical Review Letters•Apr 14, 1997•114 citations

Incompatible multiple consistent sets of histories and measures of quantumness

J. J. Halliwell

In the consistent histories approach to quantum theory probabilities are assigned to histories subject to a consistency condition of negligible interference. The approach has the feature that a given physical situation admits multiple sets of consistent histories that cannot in general be united into a single consistent set, leading to a number of counterintuitive or contrary properties if propositions from different consistent sets are combined indiscriminately. An alternative viewpoint is proposed in which multiple consistent sets are classified according to whether or not there exists any unifying probability for combinations of incompatible sets which replicates the consistent histories result when restricted to a single consistent set. A number of examples are exhibited in which this classification can be made, in some cases with the assistance of the Bell, Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt, or Leggett-Garg inequalities together with Fine's theorem. When a unifying probability exists logical deductions in different consistent sets can in fact be combined, an extension of the ``single framework rule.'' It is argued that this classification coincides with intuitive notions of the boundary between classical and quantum regimes and in particular, the absence of a unifying probability for certain combinations of consistent sets is regarded as a measure of the ``quantumness'' of the system. The proposed approach and results are closely related to recent work on the classification of quasiprobabilities and this connection is discussed.

arXiv:1704.01783•Physical Review A•Jul 25, 2017•5 citations

Consistent histories and quantum reasoning

Robert B. Griffiths

A system of quantum reasoning for a closed system is developed by treating nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory. The sample space corresponds to a decomposition, as a sum of orthogonal projectors, of the identity operator on a Hilbert space of histories. Provided a consistency condition is satisfied, the corresponding Boolean algebra of histories, called a framework, can be assigned probabilities in the usual way, and within a single framework quantum reasoning is identical to ordinary probabilistic reasoning. A refinement rule, which allows a probability distribution to be extended from one framework to a larger (refined) framework, incorporates the dynamical laws of quantum theory. Two or more frameworks which are incompatible because they possess no common refinement cannot be simultaneously employed to describe a single physical system. Logical reasoning is a special case of probabilistic reasoning in which (conditional) probabilities are 1 (true) or 0 (false). As probabilities are only meaningful relative to some framework, the same is true of the truth or falsity of a quantum description. The formalism is illustrated using simple examples, and the physical considerations which determine the choice of a framework are discussed. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.

arXiv:quant-ph/9606004•Physical Review A•Oct 1, 1996•210 citations

Completeness of decoherence functionals

Stephan Schreckenberg

The basic ingredients of the ‘‘consistent histories’’ approach to a generalized quantum theory are ‘‘histories’’ and decoherence functionals. The main aim of this program is to find and to study the behavior of consistent sets associated with a particular decoherence functional d. In its recent formulation by Isham [‘‘Quantum logic and the histories approach to quantum theory,’’ J. Math. Phys. 35, 2157–2185 (1994)] it is natural to identify the space 𝒰𝒫 of propositions about histories with an orthoalgebra or lattice. When 𝒰𝒫 is given by the lattice of projectors 𝒫(𝒱) in some Hilbert space 𝒱, consistent sets correspond to certain partitions of the unit operator in 𝒱 into mutually orthogonal projectors {α1,α2,...}, such that the function d(α,α) is a probability distribution on the boolean algebra generated by {α1,α2,...}. Using the classification theorem for decoherence functionals proven in Isham et al. [‘‘The classification of decoherence functionals: An analog of Gleason’s Theorem,’’ J. Math. Phys. 35, 6360–6370 (1994)] we show that in the case where 𝒱 is some separable Hilbert space there exists for each partition of the unit operator into a set of mutually orthogonal projectors, and for any probability distribution p(α) on the corresponding boolean algebra, decoherence functionals d with respect to which this set is consistent and which are such that for the probability functions d(α,α)=p(α) holds.

arXiv:gr-qc/9502036•Journal of Mathematical Physics•Sep 1, 1995•9 citations

Choice of consistent family, and quantum incompatibility

Robert B. Griffiths

In consistent-history quantum theory, a description of the time development of a quantum system requires choosing a framework or consistent family, and then calculating probabilities for the different histories that it contains. It is argued that the framework is chosen by the physicist constructing a description of a quantum system on the basis of questions he wishes to address, in a manner analogous to choosing a coarse-graining of the phase space in classical statistical mechanics. The choice of framework is not determined by some law of nature, though it is limited by quantum incompatibility, a concept that is discussed using a two-dimensional Hilbert space (spin half particle). Thus certain questions of physical interest can only be addressed using frameworks in which they make (quantum-mechanical) sense. The physicist's choice does not influence reality, nor does the presence of choices render the theory subjective. On the contrary, predictions of the theory can, in principle, be verified by experimental measurements. These considerations are used to address various criticisms and possible misunderstandings of the consistent-history approach, including its predictive power, whether it requires a new logic, whether it can be interpreted realistically, the nature of ``quasiclassicality,'' and the possibility of ``contrary'' inferences.

arXiv:quant-ph/9708028•Physical Review A•Mar 1, 1998•178 citations
In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections PPP and QQQ, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that PQ=QP=0PQ = QP = 0PQ=QP=0 and P≠1−QP \neq 1 -QP=1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences PPP and QQQ where P=1−QP = 1 - QP=1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalized time-neutral quantum mechanics.
In the consistent histories approach to quantum theory probabilities are assigned to histories subject to a consistency condition of negligible interference. The approach has the feature that a given physical situation admits multiple sets of consistent histories that cannot in general be united into a single consistent set, leading to a number of counterintuitive or contrary properties if propositions from different consistent sets are combined indiscriminately. An alternative viewpoint is proposed in which multiple consistent sets are classified according to whether or not there exists any unifying probability for combinations of incompatible sets which replicates the consistent histories result when restricted to a single consistent set. A number of examples are exhibited in which this classification can be made, in some cases with the assistance of the Bell, Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt, or Leggett-Garg inequalities together with Fine's theorem. When a unifying probability exists logical deductions in different consistent sets can in fact be combined, an extension of the ``single framework rule.'' It is argued that this classification coincides with intuitive notions of the boundary between classical and quantum regimes and in particular, the absence of a unifying probability for certain combinations of consistent sets is regarded as a measure of the ``quantumness'' of the system. The proposed approach and results are closely related to recent work on the classification of quasiprobabilities and this connection is discussed.
A system of quantum reasoning for a closed system is developed by treating nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory. The sample space corresponds to a decomposition, as a sum of orthogonal projectors, of the identity operator on a Hilbert space of histories. Provided a consistency condition is satisfied, the corresponding Boolean algebra of histories, called a framework, can be assigned probabilities in the usual way, and within a single framework quantum reasoning is identical to ordinary probabilistic reasoning. A refinement rule, which allows a probability distribution to be extended from one framework to a larger (refined) framework, incorporates the dynamical laws of quantum theory. Two or more frameworks which are incompatible because they possess no common refinement cannot be simultaneously employed to describe a single physical system. Logical reasoning is a special case of probabilistic reasoning in which (conditional) probabilities are 1 (true) or 0 (false). As probabilities are only meaningful relative to some framework, the same is true of the truth or falsity of a quantum description. The formalism is illustrated using simple examples, and the physical considerations which determine the choice of a framework are discussed. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.
The basic ingredients of the ‘‘consistent histories’’ approach to a generalized quantum theory are ‘‘histories’’ and decoherence functionals. The main aim of this program is to find and to study the behavior of consistent sets associated with a particular decoherence functional d. In its recent formulation by Isham [‘‘Quantum logic and the histories approach to quantum theory,’’ J. Math. Phys. 35, 2157–2185 (1994)] it is natural to identify the space 𝒰𝒫 of propositions about histories with an orthoalgebra or lattice. When 𝒰𝒫 is given by the lattice of projectors 𝒫(𝒱) in some Hilbert space 𝒱, consistent sets correspond to certain partitions of the unit operator in 𝒱 into mutually orthogonal projectors {α1,α2,...}, such that the function d(α,α) is a probability distribution on the boolean algebra generated by {α1,α2,...}. Using the classification theorem for decoherence functionals proven in Isham et al. [‘‘The classification of decoherence functionals: An analog of Gleason’s Theorem,’’ J. Math. Phys. 35, 6360–6370 (1994)] we show that in the case where 𝒱 is some separable Hilbert space there exists for each partition of the unit operator into a set of mutually orthogonal projectors, and for any probability distribution p(α) on the corresponding boolean algebra, decoherence functionals d with respect to which this set is consistent and which are such that for the probability functions d(α,α)=p(α) holds.
In consistent-history quantum theory, a description of the time development of a quantum system requires choosing a framework or consistent family, and then calculating probabilities for the different histories that it contains. It is argued that the framework is chosen by the physicist constructing a description of a quantum system on the basis of questions he wishes to address, in a manner analogous to choosing a coarse-graining of the phase space in classical statistical mechanics. The choice of framework is not determined by some law of nature, though it is limited by quantum incompatibility, a concept that is discussed using a two-dimensional Hilbert space (spin half particle). Thus certain questions of physical interest can only be addressed using frameworks in which they make (quantum-mechanical) sense. The physicist's choice does not influence reality, nor does the presence of choices render the theory subjective. On the contrary, predictions of the theory can, in principle, be verified by experimental measurements. These considerations are used to address various criticisms and possible misunderstandings of the consistent-history approach, including its predictive power, whether it requires a new logic, whether it can be interpreted realistically, the nature of ``quasiclassicality,'' and the possibility of ``contrary'' inferences.