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arXiv:gr-qc/9409037 · Physical Review Letters

Properties of Consistent Histories

Fay Dowker B, Adrian Kent

Published Oct 23, 1995• 162 citations
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Abstract

We describe some properties of consistent sets of histories in the Gell-Mann--Hartle formalism, and give an example to illustrate that one cannot recover the standard predictions, retrodictions, and inferences of quasiclassical physics using the criterion of consistency alone.
DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.75.3038

Related papers

Properties of Consistent Histories. (arXiv:gr-qc/9409037v4 CROSS LISTED)

Fay Dowker B, Adrian Kent

We describe some properties of consistent sets of histories in the Gell-Mann--Hartle formalism, and give an example to illustrate that one cannot recover the standard predictions, retrodictions and inferences of quasiclassical physics using the criterion of consistency alone.

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Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory

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In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalized time-neutral quantum mechanics.

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Kent Replies:

Adrian Kent

It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections $P$ and $Q$, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that $PQ = QP = 0$ and $P \neq 1 -Q$. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences $P$ and $Q$ where $P = 1 - Q$. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.

arXiv:gr-qc/9808016•Physical Review Letters•Aug 31, 1998•30 citations

Quasiclassical dynamics in a closed quantum system

Adrian Kent

We consider Gell-Mann and Hartle's consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology in the interpretation in which one history, chosen randomly according to the decoherence functional probabilities, is realized from each consistent set. We show that in this interpretation, if one assumes that an observed quasiclassical structure will continue to be quasiclassical, one cannot infer that it will obey the predictions of classical or Copenhagen quantum mechanics. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.

arXiv:gr-qc/9512023•Physical Review A•Dec 1, 1996•107 citations

Quantum Histories

Adrian Kent

There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.

arXiv:gr-qc/9809026•Physica Scripta•Jan 1, 1998•35 citations
In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalized time-neutral quantum mechanics.
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections PPP and QQQ, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that PQ=QP=0PQ = QP = 0PQ=QP=0 and P≠1−QP \neq 1 -QP=1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences PPP and QQQ where P=1−QP = 1 - QP=1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
We consider Gell-Mann and Hartle's consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology in the interpretation in which one history, chosen randomly according to the decoherence functional probabilities, is realized from each consistent set. We show that in this interpretation, if one assumes that an observed quasiclassical structure will continue to be quasiclassical, one cannot infer that it will obey the predictions of classical or Copenhagen quantum mechanics. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.