In this paper, I argue that there is a problem with the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI). I show this by relying on the notion of envariance. Zurek's work on envariance was intended to strengthen the MWI by providing a non-circular derivation of the Born rule within the MWI framework. However, I will argue that envariance actually undermines the MWI by showing that in many situations, the system-environment terms in the entangled universal quantum state don't correspond to distinct entities as MWI-advocates such as David Wallace claim they do. After making my envariance-based objection to the MWI, I show that three other interpretations—the Relational Quantum Mechanics interpretation, the de Broglie-Bohm (aka the Pilot Wave) interpretation, and the GRW interpretation—do not adopt all the assumptions needed for envariance, and so can sidestep the problem that envariance presents to the MWI. My argument against the MWI is of relevance to the philosophy of middle-sized objects since it highlights a problem with the claim that a multiplicity of middle-sized objects emerge in different worlds from a universal quantum state.
In this paper, I argue that there is a problem with the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI). I show this by relying on the notion of envariance. Zurek's work on envariance was intended to strengthen the MWI by providing a non-circular derivation of the Born rule within the MWI framework. However, I will argue that envariance actually undermines the MWI by showing that in many situations, the system-environment terms in the entangled universal quantum state don't correspond to distinct entities as MWI-advocates such as David Wallace claim they do. After making my envariance-based objection to the MWI, I show that three other interpretations—the Relational Quantum Mechanics interpretation, the de Broglie-Bohm (aka the Pilot Wave) interpretation, and the GRW interpretation—do not adopt all the assumptions needed for envariance, and so can sidestep the problem that envariance presents to the MWI. My argument against the MWI is of relevance to the philosophy of middle-sized objects since it highlights a problem with the claim that a multiplicity of middle-sized objects emerge in different worlds from a universal quantum state.
We reply to claims (by Deutsch, Zeh, Brown and Wallace) that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), we show that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own ('subquantum') theory of measurement, and in general describes a 'nonequilibrium' state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.
In the de Broglie Bohm pilot-wave theory and the many-worlds interpretation, unitary development of the quantum state is universally valid. They differ in that de Broglie and Bohm assumed that there are point particles with positions that evolve in time and that our observations are observations of the particles. The many-worlds interpretation is based on the fact that the quantum state can explain our observations. Both interpretations rely on the decoherence mechanism to explain the disappearance of interference effects at a measurement. From this fact, it is argued that for the pilot-wave theory to work, circumstances must be such that the many-worlds interpretation is a viable alternative. However, if this is the case, the de Broglie–Bohm particles become irrelevant to any observer. They are truly hidden. The violation of locality and the corresponding violation of Lorenz invariance are good reasons to believe that dBB particles do not exist.
Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
This unpublished 1990 preprint argues that a crucial distinction in discussions of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is that between versions of the interpretation positing a physical multiplicity of worlds, and those in which the multiplicity is merely psychological, and due to the splitting of consciousness upon interaction with amplified quantum superpositions. It is argued that Everett's original version of the MWI belongs to the latter class, and that most of the criticisms leveled against the MWI, in particular that it is illogical or incoherent, are not valid against such "psychological-multiplicity" versions. Attempts to derive the quantum-mechanical probabilities from the many-worlds interpretation are reviewed, and Everett's initial derivation is extended in an attempt to show that these are the unique possible probabilities. But there remains a challenge for proponents of the MWI: to show that their interpretation requires probabilities, rather than merely nonprobabilistic indeterminacy. A 2002 preface, revised in 2004, briefly discusses the extent to which I still agree with the claims in the paper. While its derivation of probabilities used, and failed to justify, noncontextuality, I still agree with the paper's general interpretation of the MWI, though not with the MWI itself.
As cutting-edge experiments display ever more extreme forms of non-classical behavior, the prevailing view on the interpretation of quantum mechanics appears to be gradually changing. A (highly unscientific) poll taken at the 1997 UMBC quantum mechanics workshop gave the once all-dominant Copenhagen interpretation less than half of the votes. The Many Worlds interpretation (MWI) scored second, comfortably a head of the Consistent Histories and Bohm interpretations. It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics give identical cookbook prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the “shut-up-and-calculate interpretation”, typically show little interest in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some untestable metaphysical sense or merely the way we subjectively perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrödinger equation describes everything – and that they are therefore becoming less bothered by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion of words. Common objections to the MWI are discussed. It is argued that when environment-induced decoherence is taken into account, the experimental predictions of the MWI are identical to those of the Copenhagen interpretation except for an experiment involving a Byzantine form of “quantum suicide”. This makes the choice between them purely a matter of taste, roughly equivalent to whether one believes mathematical language or human language to be more fundamental.