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arXiv:0811.0810

De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?

Antony Valentini

Published Nov 5, 2008• 38 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We reply to claims (by Deutsch, Zeh, Brown and Wallace) that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), we show that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own ('subquantum') theory of measurement, and in general describes a 'nonequilibrium' state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0811.0810

Related papers

De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?

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Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.

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Reply to Valentini, ‘De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?’

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Abstract The reality of the patterns in the wave-function representing different worlds is not like that of locality and the uncertainty relations, which hold only for the equilibrium distribution. Nor, in the light of the Deutsch–Wallace representation theorem for the Born rule, is the appeal to non-equilibrium probability distributions as the ground for the distinction between pilot-wave theory and many-worlds theory well-motivated. Finally, Valentini's counter-claim, that the latter is motivated by eigenvalue realism, ignores the need to give an account of macroscopic superpositions.

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Comment on Valentini, "De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?" [arXiv:0811.0810]

Harvey R. Brown

Valentini [arXiv:0811.0810] has recently defended the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave version of quantum theory from the claim that it is essentially Everett theory encumbered with the redundant postulation of point particles. In this note, Valentini's central arguments are questioned.

arXiv:0901.1278•Jan 9, 2009•7 citations

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The original version of the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory, also called Bohmian mechanics, attempted to treat the wave function or pilot wave as a part of the physical ontology of nature. More recent versions of the de Broglie-Bohm theory appearing in the last few decades have tried to regard the pilot wave instead as an aspect of the theory's nomology, or dynamical laws. This paper argues that neither of these views is correct, and that the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave is best understood as a collection of latent variables in the sense of a hidden Markov model, a construct that was not available when de Broglie and Bohm originally formulated what became their pilot-wave theory. This paper also discusses several other challenges for the ontological view of the pilot wave. One such challenge is due to Foldy-Wouthuysen gauge transformations, which connect up with the Deotto-Ghirardi ambiguity in the de Broglie-Bohm theory. Another challenge arises from the freedom to carry out canonical transformations in the wave function's own notion of phase space, as defined by Strocchi and Heslot.

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Comment on Valentini, "De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?"

Harvey R. Brown

Valentini has recently defended the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave version of quantum theory from the claim that it is essentially Everett theory encumbered with the redundant postulation of point particles. In this note, Valentini’s central arguments are questioned. 1

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On the Explanation of Born-Rule Statistics in the de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory

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The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory promises not only a realistic description of the microscopic world (in particular, a description in which observers and observation play no fundamental role) but also the ability to derive and explain aspects of the quantum formalism that are, instead, (awkwardly and problematically) postulated in orthodox versions of quantum theory. Chief among these are the various "measurement axioms" and in particular the Born rule expressing the probability distribution of measurement outcomes. Compared to other candidate non-orthodox quantum theories, the pilot-wave theory suffers from something of an embarrassment of riches in regard to explaining the Born rule statistics, in the sense that there exist, in the literature, not just one but two rather compelling proposed explanations. This paper is an attempt to critically review and clarify these two competing arguments. We summarize both arguments and also survey some objections that have been given against them. In the end, we suggest that there is somewhat less conflict between the two approaches than existing polemics might suggest, and that indeed elements from both arguments may be combined to provide a unified and fully-compelling explanation, from the postulated dynamical first principles, of the Born rule.

Entropy•May 31, 2018•36 citations
We reply to claims (by Deutsch, Zeh, Brown and Wallace) that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), we show that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own ('subquantum') theory of measurement, and in general describes a 'nonequilibrium' state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
Abstract The reality of the patterns in the wave-function representing different worlds is not like that of locality and the uncertainty relations, which hold only for the equilibrium distribution. Nor, in the light of the Deutsch–Wallace representation theorem for the Born rule, is the appeal to non-equilibrium probability distributions as the ground for the distinction between pilot-wave theory and many-worlds theory well-motivated. Finally, Valentini's counter-claim, that the latter is motivated by eigenvalue realism, ignores the need to give an account of macroscopic superpositions.
The original version of the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory, also called Bohmian mechanics, attempted to treat the wave function or pilot wave as a part of the physical ontology of nature. More recent versions of the de Broglie-Bohm theory appearing in the last few decades have tried to regard the pilot wave instead as an aspect of the theory's nomology, or dynamical laws. This paper argues that neither of these views is correct, and that the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave is best understood as a collection of latent variables in the sense of a hidden Markov model, a construct that was not available when de Broglie and Bohm originally formulated what became their pilot-wave theory. This paper also discusses several other challenges for the ontological view of the pilot wave. One such challenge is due to Foldy-Wouthuysen gauge transformations, which connect up with the Deotto-Ghirardi ambiguity in the de Broglie-Bohm theory. Another challenge arises from the freedom to carry out canonical transformations in the wave function's own notion of phase space, as defined by Strocchi and Heslot.
The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory promises not only a realistic description of the microscopic world (in particular, a description in which observers and observation play no fundamental role) but also the ability to derive and explain aspects of the quantum formalism that are, instead, (awkwardly and problematically) postulated in orthodox versions of quantum theory. Chief among these are the various "measurement axioms" and in particular the Born rule expressing the probability distribution of measurement outcomes. Compared to other candidate non-orthodox quantum theories, the pilot-wave theory suffers from something of an embarrassment of riches in regard to explaining the Born rule statistics, in the sense that there exist, in the literature, not just one but two rather compelling proposed explanations. This paper is an attempt to critically review and clarify these two competing arguments. We summarize both arguments and also survey some objections that have been given against them. In the end, we suggest that there is somewhat less conflict between the two approaches than existing polemics might suggest, and that indeed elements from both arguments may be combined to provide a unified and fully-compelling explanation, from the postulated dynamical first principles, of the Born rule.