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Comment on Valentini, "De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?"

Harvey R. Brown

Published Jan 1, 2009• 8 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Valentini has recently defended the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave version of quantum theory from the claim that it is essentially Everett theory encumbered with the redundant postulation of point particles. In this note, Valentini’s central arguments are questioned. 1

Related papers

Comment on Valentini, "De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?" [arXiv:0811.0810]

Harvey R. Brown

Valentini [arXiv:0811.0810] has recently defended the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave version of quantum theory from the claim that it is essentially Everett theory encumbered with the redundant postulation of point particles. In this note, Valentini's central arguments are questioned.

arXiv:0901.1278•Jan 9, 2009•7 citations

Reply to Valentini, ‘De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?’

Harvey R. Brown

Abstract The reality of the patterns in the wave-function representing different worlds is not like that of locality and the uncertainty relations, which hold only for the equilibrium distribution. Nor, in the light of the Deutsch–Wallace representation theorem for the Born rule, is the appeal to non-equilibrium probability distributions as the ground for the distinction between pilot-wave theory and many-worlds theory well-motivated. Finally, Valentini's counter-claim, that the latter is motivated by eigenvalue realism, ignores the need to give an account of macroscopic superpositions.

•Jun 24, 2010•7 citations

De Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?

Antony Valentini

We reply to claims (by Deutsch, Zeh, Brown and Wallace) that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), we show that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own ('subquantum') theory of measurement, and in general describes a 'nonequilibrium' state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.

arXiv:0811.0810•Nov 5, 2008•38 citations

De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?

Antony Valentini

Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.

•Jun 24, 2010•33 citations

Pilot-wave theory in retrospect

Guido Bacciagaluppi, Antony Valentini

As we discussed in Section 2.4, in his Solvay lecture of 1927 de Broglie presented the pilot-wave dynamics of a non-relativistic many-body system, and outlined some simple applications of his ‘new dynamics of quanta’ (to interference, diffraction and atomic transitions). Further, as we saw in Section 10.2, contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, in the general discussion de Broglie's reply to Pauli's objection contained the essential points needed to treat inelastic scattering (even if Fermi's misleading optical analogy confused matters): in particular, de Broglie correctly indicated how definite quantum outcomes in scattering processes arise from a separation of wave packets in configuration space. We also saw in Section 10.4 that de Broglie was unable to reply to a query from Kramers concerning the recoil of a single photon on a mirror: to do so, he would have had to introduce a joint wave function for the photon and the mirror. De Broglie's theory was revived by Bohm 25 years later (Bohm 1952a,b) (though with the dynamics written in terms of a law for acceleration instead of a law for velocity). Bohm's truly new and very important contribution was a pilot-wave account of the general quantum theory of measurement, with macroscopic equipment (pointers, etc.) treated as part of the quantum system. In effect, in 1952, Bohm provided a detailed derivation of quantum phenomenology from de Broglie's dynamics of 1927 (albeit with the dynamical equations written differently).

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 22, 2009•0 citations

The measurement theory of Everett and de Broglie's pilot wave

James S. Bell

In 1957 H. Everett published a paper setting out what seemed to be a radically new interpretation of quantum mechanics. His approach has recently received increasing attention. He did not refer to the ideas of de Broglie of thirty years before nor to the intervening elaboration of those ideas by Bohm. Yet it will be argued here that the elimination of arbitrary and inessential elements from Everett's theory leads back to, and throws new light on, the concepts of de Broglie. Everett was motivated by the notion of a quantum theory of gravitation and cosmology. In a thoroughly quantum cosmology, a quantum mechanics of the whole world, the wave function of the world could not be interpreted in the usual way. For this usual interpretation refers only to the statistics of measurement results for an observer intervening from outside the quantum system. When that system is the whole world, there is nothing outside. This situation presents no particular difficulty for the traditional (or ‘Copenhagen’) philosophy, which holds that a classical conception of the macroscopic world is logically prior to the quantum conception of the microscopic. The microscopic world is described by wave functions which are determined by and have implications for macroscopic phenomena in experimental set-ups.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 3, 2004•4 citations
Abstract The reality of the patterns in the wave-function representing different worlds is not like that of locality and the uncertainty relations, which hold only for the equilibrium distribution. Nor, in the light of the Deutsch–Wallace representation theorem for the Born rule, is the appeal to non-equilibrium probability distributions as the ground for the distinction between pilot-wave theory and many-worlds theory well-motivated. Finally, Valentini's counter-claim, that the latter is motivated by eigenvalue realism, ignores the need to give an account of macroscopic superpositions.
We reply to claims (by Deutsch, Zeh, Brown and Wallace) that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), we show that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own ('subquantum') theory of measurement, and in general describes a 'nonequilibrium' state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie-Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds are an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
Abstract This chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
As we discussed in Section 2.4, in his Solvay lecture of 1927 de Broglie presented the pilot-wave dynamics of a non-relativistic many-body system, and outlined some simple applications of his ‘new dynamics of quanta’ (to interference, diffraction and atomic transitions). Further, as we saw in Section 10.2, contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, in the general discussion de Broglie's reply to Pauli's objection contained the essential points needed to treat inelastic scattering (even if Fermi's misleading optical analogy confused matters): in particular, de Broglie correctly indicated how definite quantum outcomes in scattering processes arise from a separation of wave packets in configuration space. We also saw in Section 10.4 that de Broglie was unable to reply to a query from Kramers concerning the recoil of a single photon on a mirror: to do so, he would have had to introduce a joint wave function for the photon and the mirror. De Broglie's theory was revived by Bohm 25 years later (Bohm 1952a,b) (though with the dynamics written in terms of a law for acceleration instead of a law for velocity). Bohm's truly new and very important contribution was a pilot-wave account of the general quantum theory of measurement, with macroscopic equipment (pointers, etc.) treated as part of the quantum system. In effect, in 1952, Bohm provided a detailed derivation of quantum phenomenology from de Broglie's dynamics of 1927 (albeit with the dynamical equations written differently).
In 1957 H. Everett published a paper setting out what seemed to be a radically new interpretation of quantum mechanics. His approach has recently received increasing attention. He did not refer to the ideas of de Broglie of thirty years before nor to the intervening elaboration of those ideas by Bohm. Yet it will be argued here that the elimination of arbitrary and inessential elements from Everett's theory leads back to, and throws new light on, the concepts of de Broglie. Everett was motivated by the notion of a quantum theory of gravitation and cosmology. In a thoroughly quantum cosmology, a quantum mechanics of the whole world, the wave function of the world could not be interpreted in the usual way. For this usual interpretation refers only to the statistics of measurement results for an observer intervening from outside the quantum system. When that system is the whole world, there is nothing outside. This situation presents no particular difficulty for the traditional (or ‘Copenhagen’) philosophy, which holds that a classical conception of the macroscopic world is logically prior to the quantum conception of the microscopic. The microscopic world is described by wave functions which are determined by and have implications for macroscopic phenomena in experimental set-ups.