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Eidos A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

Quantum Meta-physics: Nonlocality and Limits of Determinism

Bartosz Wesół

Published Dec 31, 2023• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism.First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms.Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible.I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls "objective validity."The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization -a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry.

DOI
10.14394/eidos.jpc.2023.0030

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•May 3, 2017•0 citations
This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism.First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms.Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible.I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls "objective validity."The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization -a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry.
Quantum Mechanics (QM) has faced deep controversies and debates since its origin when Werner Heisenberg proposed the first mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for what had been recently discovered as the new field of quantum phenomena. Today, even though we have reached a standardized version of QM which is taught in Universities all around the world, there is still no consensus regarding the conceptual reference of the theory and, if or if not, it can refer to something beyond measurement outcomes. In this work we will argue that the reason behind the impossibility to reach a meaningful answer to this question is strictly related to the 20th Century Bohrian-positivist re-foundation of physics which is responsible for having introduced within the theory of quanta a harmful combination of metaphysical dogmatism and naive empiricism. We will also argue that the possibility of understanding QM is at plain sight, given we return to the original framework of physics in which the meaning of understanding has always been clear.
Abstract Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (QM) works perfectly well for all practical purposes. Once one admits, however, that a successful scientific theory is supposed not only to make predictions but also to tell us a story about the world in which we live, a philosophical problem emerges: in the specific case of QM, it is not possible to associate with the theory a unique scientific image of the world; there are several images. The fact that the theory may be compatible with distinct ontologies, and that those ontologies may themselves be associated with a plurality of metaphysical approaches, gives rise to the problem of metaphysical underdetermination. This paper concludes that the available metametaphysical criteria fail to deliver objectivity in theory choice, and it puts forward its own criterion based on a tension between two methods of metaphysical inquiry: one that is closely related to science and another that is not.
This paper will present questions from three perspectives about Quantum Mechanics (QM): physics, epistemological, and metaphysical.The quantum phenomena do not fit with the parameters of classical physics, so a daily intuition on macroscopic world is dispensable when it is the quantum object investigated.This physical domain induces a new thinking, which requires also new concepts to describe such object.The QM is disturbing and stimulates epistemological reflections, as the issues of access about what is known; and metaphysical theme are not to be left behind with regard to QM: What would the quantum object to?What is apprehended when this object is perceived, once considered the disturbing characteristics that constitute its physical description: interference and non-separability?What is its nature?This paper focuses briefly on the analysis of B. d'Espagnat in Veiled Reality, which would represent the physical perspective of QT; for epistemological questions, one will resort to the Kantian conception of knowledge; and with regard to the metaphysical perspective, we will rely on an article by Professor J. B. Arenhart.It is necessary to note that the question that pervades in this paper is about if the experience in QM is built.Thus, we will try to seek clarity on the philosophical issues through QT, regarding the problems about the possibility of knowledge of the quantum object and its nature, and whether experience in this case is built.But furthermore, the QM instigates us to think whether metaphysics proceeds on the investigation of nature when it comes to the QM.And such a question is more than to have as problem as the scope of the description of physical data, but rather whether it makes sense or whether metaphysical research is pertinent to the QM.
We discuss some methodological aspects of the relation between physics and metaphysics by dealing specifically with the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our main claim is that current attempts to productively integrate quantum mechanics and metaphysics are best seen as approaches of what should be called `the metaphysics of science', which is developed by applying already existing metaphysical concepts to scientific theories. We argue that, in this perspective, metaphysics must be understood as an autonomous discipline. It results that this metaphysics cannot hope to derive any kind of justification from science. Thus, one of the main motivations of such project, which is the obtaining of a scientifically respectable justification for the attribution of a single true metaphysical profile to the posits of a scientific theory, is doomed because of the emergence of metaphysical underdetermination from the outset. If metaphysics floats free from physics, which is a premise of such project of integration between these two areas, then it is always possible to attribute more than one metaphysical profile to dress physical entities.
Instead of either formulating new metaphysical images (as realists would do) or rejecting any metaphysical attempt (as empiricists would do), the case of quantum mechanics might well require from us a complete redefinition of the nature and task of metaphysics.The sought redefinition can be performed in the spirit of Kant, according to whom metaphysics is the discipline of the boundaries of human knowledge.This can be called a "reflective" conception of metaphysics.In this paper, each one of the most popular "interpretations" of quantum mechanics is shown to be naturally associated with a variety of Kant-like reflective metaphysics.Then, the two major "paradoxes" of quantum mechanics (the measurement problem and the EPR correlations) are reformulated by way of this reflective attitude, and they are thereby "dissolved".Along with this perspective, quantum mechanics becomes one of the most elegant and understandable theories of the history of physics in addition of being one of the most efficient.The only point that must be clarified is why it looks culturally so difficult to accept a reflective and non-ontological standpoint on physical theories.
In the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.