The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the main philosophical and metaphysical implications of quantum physics, especially those which concern the issues of epistemic humility and ontological realism. My thesis is that the impossibility of reaching an objective knowledge of nature does not imply the renunciation of ontological realism, but rather encourages scientists to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility. The argument firstly presents the main theories of quantum physics currently discussed, focusing on the measurement problem and its ontological implications. Afterwords, the issues of objectivity and realism are properly addressed. In the end, we discuss statistics as the new form of scientific epistemology, along with the concept of potentiality as the fundamental category of quantum metaphysics. Throughout, we establish some parallelisms between quantum physics theories and theology to show that, when human beings investigate the foundations of reality, some thought patterns, some core problems, and some possible solutions resemble one another, regardless of the specific perspective and language with which they are formulated.
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the main philosophical and metaphysical implications of quantum physics, especially those which concern the issues of epistemic humility and ontological realism. My thesis is that the impossibility of reaching an objective knowledge of nature does not imply the renunciation of ontological realism, but rather encourages scientists to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility. The argument firstly presents the main theories of quantum physics currently discussed, focusing on the measurement problem and its ontological implications. Afterwords, the issues of objectivity and realism are properly addressed. In the end, we discuss statistics as the new form of scientific epistemology, along with the concept of potentiality as the fundamental category of quantum metaphysics. Throughout, we establish some parallelisms between quantum physics theories and theology to show that, when human beings investigate the foundations of reality, some thought patterns, some core problems, and some possible solutions resemble one another, regardless of the specific perspective and language with which they are formulated.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
This study examines the epistemological implications of competinginterpretations of quantum states, focusing on the distinction between epistemicand ontological accounts of the wave function (Harrigan & Spekkens, 2010).Rather than treating interpretative disputes as purely metaphysical, this studyanalyses the extent to which quantum theory constrains, enables or underminesclaims to knowledge about physical reality (van Fraassen, 2008). By situatingthe epistemic–ontological debate within broader discussions of realism,objectivity and scientific explanation, this study argues that quantum theorynecessitates a reconceptualisation of epistemic access to reality (O’Neill,1997). Particular attention is given to the roles of uncertainty, contextuality andobserver-dependence in shaping the epistemic limits of quantum physics (Bohr,1935). The article concludes by proposing a moderate epistemic realism thatpreserves empirical objectivity while acknowledging principled limits onontological transparency (Healey, 2017).
Traditionally, to be a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms about what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of an ontology that is scientifically informed. But according to some philosophers, the realistic attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
Problem Science (and also the myths concerning science) plays a dom inant role in contem porary society. In this study, the epistemological implications of quantum physics were investigated in order to clear aw ay some of the m yths concerning science. Method Q uantum mechanics was studied. After analyzing the basic postulates of quantum mechanics, several interpretations of the theory were examined. From quantum mechanics and its interpretations several epistemological implications were drawn. Results Several m yths concerning science were identified. These include perm anence of science, reductionism, determinism, absoluteness of logic, subject-object dichotomy, and the reality of the objects of a scientific model. Conclusions It is important for theologians to be aware of the myths concerning science. The main benefit of quantum mechanics for theologians is in clearing away these myths from the metaphysical conceptual space of theology.
What does quantum physics tell us about the nature of reality, specifically the parts of reality we do not directly perceive called hidden variables? One may think it could tell us a lot because of our enhanced technological sensing abilities that delve into the realms that quantum physics covers so well. Surprisingly, it seems to surround us in a deeper mystery rather than reveal more of nature's secrets. It seems that we cannot escape from philosophical consideration when dealing with what is hidden in quantum physics. In Part I we will look at how Epistemology and Ontology bear upon Hidden Variables. In Part II we will consider Hidden Variables in the light of Contextuality, and Non-Classicality. Inevitably questions of subjectivity and objectivity arise in dealing with states of observation. How should we think about these states? Perhaps it is a question of the meaning associated with our knowledge of a state-that is, a question of ontology or epistemology. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering hidden variables in quantum physics because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how reality is constructed; if it is constructed or not. It also raises the question of what attributes we are able to observe simultaneously and that brings contextuality into the discussion. If it turns out that reality is constructed contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? If on the other hand reality is constructed non-contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? Many implications can arise when considering these questions from a quantum physical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss how quantum physics provides some answers to these questions by considering quantum physical states and their measurements.