This study examines the epistemological implications of competinginterpretations of quantum states, focusing on the distinction between epistemicand ontological accounts of the wave function (Harrigan & Spekkens, 2010).Rather than treating interpretative disputes as purely metaphysical, this studyanalyses the extent to which quantum theory constrains, enables or underminesclaims to knowledge about physical reality (van Fraassen, 2008). By situatingthe epistemic–ontological debate within broader discussions of realism,objectivity and scientific explanation, this study argues that quantum theorynecessitates a reconceptualisation of epistemic access to reality (O’Neill,1997). Particular attention is given to the roles of uncertainty, contextuality andobserver-dependence in shaping the epistemic limits of quantum physics (Bohr,1935). The article concludes by proposing a moderate epistemic realism thatpreserves empirical objectivity while acknowledging principled limits onontological transparency (Healey, 2017).
This study examines the epistemological implications of competinginterpretations of quantum states, focusing on the distinction between epistemicand ontological accounts of the wave function (Harrigan & Spekkens, 2010).Rather than treating interpretative disputes as purely metaphysical, this studyanalyses the extent to which quantum theory constrains, enables or underminesclaims to knowledge about physical reality (van Fraassen, 2008). By situatingthe epistemic–ontological debate within broader discussions of realism,objectivity and scientific explanation, this study argues that quantum theorynecessitates a reconceptualisation of epistemic access to reality (O’Neill,1997). Particular attention is given to the roles of uncertainty, contextuality andobserver-dependence in shaping the epistemic limits of quantum physics (Bohr,1935). The article concludes by proposing a moderate epistemic realism thatpreserves empirical objectivity while acknowledging principled limits onontological transparency (Healey, 2017).
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
What does quantum physics tell us about the nature of reality, specifically the parts of reality we do not directly perceive called hidden variables? One may think it could tell us a lot because of our enhanced technological sensing abilities that delve into the realms that quantum physics covers so well. Surprisingly, it seems to surround us in a deeper mystery rather than reveal more of nature's secrets. It seems that we cannot escape from philosophical consideration when dealing with what is hidden in quantum physics. In Part I we will look at how Epistemology and Ontology bear upon Hidden Variables. In Part II we will consider Hidden Variables in the light of Contextuality, and Non-Classicality. Inevitably questions of subjectivity and objectivity arise in dealing with states of observation. How should we think about these states? Perhaps it is a question of the meaning associated with our knowledge of a state-that is, a question of ontology or epistemology. The issue of ontic and epistemic states is particularly important when considering hidden variables in quantum physics because, as one may argue, the interpretation of quantum states as either ontic or epistemic will naturally lead to different assumptions about how reality is constructed; if it is constructed or not. It also raises the question of what attributes we are able to observe simultaneously and that brings contextuality into the discussion. If it turns out that reality is constructed contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? If on the other hand reality is constructed non-contextually what does that imply about ontological realism? Many implications can arise when considering these questions from a quantum physical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss how quantum physics provides some answers to these questions by considering quantum physical states and their measurements.
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the main philosophical and metaphysical implications of quantum physics, especially those which concern the issues of epistemic humility and ontological realism. My thesis is that the impossibility of reaching an objective knowledge of nature does not imply the renunciation of ontological realism, but rather encourages scientists to adopt an attitude of epistemic humility. The argument firstly presents the main theories of quantum physics currently discussed, focusing on the measurement problem and its ontological implications. Afterwords, the issues of objectivity and realism are properly addressed. In the end, we discuss statistics as the new form of scientific epistemology, along with the concept of potentiality as the fundamental category of quantum metaphysics. Throughout, we establish some parallelisms between quantum physics theories and theology to show that, when human beings investigate the foundations of reality, some thought patterns, some core problems, and some possible solutions resemble one another, regardless of the specific perspective and language with which they are formulated.
Quantum physics can be understood as an epistemological rupture that transforms the foundations of modern scientific rationality. In contrast to the Newtonian mechanistic worldview that underpinned universalist notions of progress, objectivity, and control, quantum mechanics introduces uncertainty, contextuality, non-locality, and the constitutive role of observation into scientific knowledge. These features destabilize the image of reality as a unified, hierarchically structured, and fully transparent domain, thereby challenging the epistemic premises of Western universalism. At the cultural level, this rupture finds expression in forms of scientific magical realism, where the quantum world appears as strange, paradoxical, elusive and fundamentally ungraspable. Such representations allow the quantum revolution to be interpreted not only as a theoretical breakthrough in physics but as an internal epistemological transformation of modern rationality itself. The issue is not the abandonment of rationality, but the reconfiguration of its foundations: the acknowledgment of uncertainty, contextuality, and the participatory role of the observer as structural features of knowledge. This shift is comparable to the epistemological tensions identified by postcolonial theory in situations where hegemonic discourses encounter forms of knowledge that cannot be reduced to their universalist logic. In this sense, quantum physics emerges as a form of internal epistemological alterity within Western science: while remaining part of its canon, it simultaneously rearticulates its ontological assumptions and limits its claim to constitute the sole normative regime of rationality. Extending quantum logic into social theory enables a shift from mechanistic social ontology toward a quantum social ontology, in which relationality, co-constitution, and process take precedence over fixed entities and linear causality. This transformation unfolds as a form of passive revolution, in the Gramscian sense: a profound ontological reorientation achieved not through the destruction of disciplinary institutions, but through their gradual conceptual reconfiguration. The epistemological outcome of this shift is the pluralization of knowledge and the emergence of a pluriversal onto-epistemological horizon, where scientific rationality becomes compatible with multiple cosmologies and situated ways of knowing. In this sense, the quantum turn opens a pathway toward the decolonization of knowledge and the rethinking of global order beyond universalist epistemic hierarchies.
The ontological status of the quantum wavefunction remains one of the most debated questions in quantum theory. While epistemic interpretations regard the wavefunction as a reflection of our knowledge or beliefs, ontic interpretations treat it as a real physical object. In this paper, we argue that epistemic approaches struggle to explain the universality and precision of the uncertainty principle, a core feature of quantum mechanics. By contrast, treating the wave-function as ontic allows a consistent and natural derivation of quantum uncertainty from the mathematical structure of Hilbert space. We examine key interpretations on both sides and highlight why the epistemic view falls short in addressing constraints that appear to be intrinsic to nature.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.