Quantum physics can be understood as an epistemological rupture that transforms the foundations of modern scientific rationality. In contrast to the Newtonian mechanistic worldview that underpinned universalist notions of progress, objectivity, and control, quantum mechanics introduces uncertainty, contextuality, non-locality, and the constitutive role of observation into scientific knowledge. These features destabilize the image of reality as a unified, hierarchically structured, and fully transparent domain, thereby challenging the epistemic premises of Western universalism. At the cultural level, this rupture finds expression in forms of scientific magical realism, where the quantum world appears as strange, paradoxical, elusive and fundamentally ungraspable. Such representations allow the quantum revolution to be interpreted not only as a theoretical breakthrough in physics but as an internal epistemological transformation of modern rationality itself. The issue is not the abandonment of rationality, but the reconfiguration of its foundations: the acknowledgment of uncertainty, contextuality, and the participatory role of the observer as structural features of knowledge. This shift is comparable to the epistemological tensions identified by postcolonial theory in situations where hegemonic discourses encounter forms of knowledge that cannot be reduced to their universalist logic. In this sense, quantum physics emerges as a form of internal epistemological alterity within Western science: while remaining part of its canon, it simultaneously rearticulates its ontological assumptions and limits its claim to constitute the sole normative regime of rationality. Extending quantum logic into social theory enables a shift from mechanistic social ontology toward a quantum social ontology, in which relationality, co-constitution, and process take precedence over fixed entities and linear causality. This transformation unfolds as a form of passive revolution, in the Gramscian sense: a profound ontological reorientation achieved not through the destruction of disciplinary institutions, but through their gradual conceptual reconfiguration. The epistemological outcome of this shift is the pluralization of knowledge and the emergence of a pluriversal onto-epistemological horizon, where scientific rationality becomes compatible with multiple cosmologies and situated ways of knowing. In this sense, the quantum turn opens a pathway toward the decolonization of knowledge and the rethinking of global order beyond universalist epistemic hierarchies.
Quantum physics can be understood as an epistemological rupture that transforms the foundations of modern scientific rationality. In contrast to the Newtonian mechanistic worldview that underpinned universalist notions of progress, objectivity, and control, quantum mechanics introduces uncertainty, contextuality, non-locality, and the constitutive role of observation into scientific knowledge. These features destabilize the image of reality as a unified, hierarchically structured, and fully transparent domain, thereby challenging the epistemic premises of Western universalism. At the cultural level, this rupture finds expression in forms of scientific magical realism, where the quantum world appears as strange, paradoxical, elusive and fundamentally ungraspable. Such representations allow the quantum revolution to be interpreted not only as a theoretical breakthrough in physics but as an internal epistemological transformation of modern rationality itself. The issue is not the abandonment of rationality, but the reconfiguration of its foundations: the acknowledgment of uncertainty, contextuality, and the participatory role of the observer as structural features of knowledge. This shift is comparable to the epistemological tensions identified by postcolonial theory in situations where hegemonic discourses encounter forms of knowledge that cannot be reduced to their universalist logic. In this sense, quantum physics emerges as a form of internal epistemological alterity within Western science: while remaining part of its canon, it simultaneously rearticulates its ontological assumptions and limits its claim to constitute the sole normative regime of rationality. Extending quantum logic into social theory enables a shift from mechanistic social ontology toward a quantum social ontology, in which relationality, co-constitution, and process take precedence over fixed entities and linear causality. This transformation unfolds as a form of passive revolution, in the Gramscian sense: a profound ontological reorientation achieved not through the destruction of disciplinary institutions, but through their gradual conceptual reconfiguration. The epistemological outcome of this shift is the pluralization of knowledge and the emergence of a pluriversal onto-epistemological horizon, where scientific rationality becomes compatible with multiple cosmologies and situated ways of knowing. In this sense, the quantum turn opens a pathway toward the decolonization of knowledge and the rethinking of global order beyond universalist epistemic hierarchies.
This study examines the epistemological implications of competinginterpretations of quantum states, focusing on the distinction between epistemicand ontological accounts of the wave function (Harrigan & Spekkens, 2010).Rather than treating interpretative disputes as purely metaphysical, this studyanalyses the extent to which quantum theory constrains, enables or underminesclaims to knowledge about physical reality (van Fraassen, 2008). By situatingthe epistemic–ontological debate within broader discussions of realism,objectivity and scientific explanation, this study argues that quantum theorynecessitates a reconceptualisation of epistemic access to reality (O’Neill,1997). Particular attention is given to the roles of uncertainty, contextuality andobserver-dependence in shaping the epistemic limits of quantum physics (Bohr,1935). The article concludes by proposing a moderate epistemic realism thatpreserves empirical objectivity while acknowledging principled limits onontological transparency (Healey, 2017).
In this presentation, I explore the possibility of combining pluralism and scientific realism in the framework of Putnam’s pragmatic realism (Putnam, 1999; Bernstein, 2005). I illustrate my claim through the analysis of a case of Duhem-Quine underdetermination originating in the violation of Bell’s Inequalities and involving several contemporary conceptions of quantum mechanics: the instrumentalist approach called ‘no interpretation view’ (Fuchs and Peres, 2000), Bohmian Mechanics (Dürr and Teufel, 2009), the veiled reality conception (d'Espagnat, 2011) and the approach with extended probabilities (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 2012). First, I briefly expose how the violation of Bell’s Inequalities can be understood as imposing a necessary trade-off between epistemic values usually satisfied in the context of classical physics. This allows conceiving the proponents of the studied approaches as standing in “faultless” or “rational” disagreement (Gattei, 2008; Pritchard, 2009). However, while the idea of faultless disagreement becomes more and more accepted, pluralism is rarely advocated for beyond the epistemological (cognitive) human sphere. Indeed, while it is often acknowledged that several competing theories can all be reasonably endorsed (Kelly, 2005), admitting that more than one is really is usually considered as opening the door to anti-realism (about entities described by scientific theories and about truth) or to relativism. I then mobilize Putnam’s pragmatic realism to challenge this last claim, in discussing the possibility of admitting a plurality of true theories while preserving scientific realism and realism about truth. The core of Putnam’s conception is to reject sense data (or inner theater) epistemology in considering that genuine aspects of reality (and not mere mental phenomena) are met in our ordinary perception (Putnam, 1999, 2013). Putnam arrived at this conclusion after a long intellectual path initiated with the rejection of metaphysical realism and its associated understanding of truth as a unique (and transcontextual) substantive property (of correspondence to the metaphysical reality). Putnam first opposed to this type of view his internal realism in which truth becomes intimately connected to standards of rational acceptability, opening the road for conceptual pluralism (Putnam, 1981). However, this first attempt proved unsatisfying, providing no sufficient ground for realism and for discrimination between truth and verification. Putnam diagnosis is then radical: in the framework of sense data epistemology, one cannot escape the forced choice between metaphysical realism and verificationism – this is the antinomy of realism (Putnam, 1999). With pragmatic realism and the rejection of the inner theater picture, Putnam proposes an interesting alternative. It becomes possible to admit the disquotational conception of truth from Tarski while 1) escaping its deflationist interpretation without returning to metaphysical realism and 2) maintaining conceptual pluralism. According to pragmatic realism, the way a knowledge claim can be responsible to reality – can be true – is neither unique nor fixed in advance. As it will be illustrated with the discussion of the disagreement about quantum mechanics, this pragmatic realism framework permits the combined admission of conceptual pluralism and scientific realism. • Bernstein, R. J. (2005). In Y. Ben-Menahem (Ed.), Hilary Putnam (pp. 251-265): Cambridge University Press. • D'Espagnat, B. (2011). Foundations of Physics, 41(11), 1703-1716. • Dürr, D. and Teufel, S. (2009). Bohmian Mechanics: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. • Fuchs, C. A. and Peres, A. (2000). Physics Today, 53(3), 70-71. • Gattei, S. (2008). Thomas Kuhn's "Linguistic Turn" and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth: Ashgate. • Gell-Mann, M. and Hartle, J. B. (2012). Physical Review A, 85(6), 062120. • Kelly, T. (2005). In T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne
The text points out that one of the main contradictions of quantum realism, which is particularly relevant to the social sciences, is the tension between the existence of an observer-independent reality and the idea that this reality is mediated by the cognitive and interpretative processes of the subject. This contradiction arises from the central role of the observer in phenomena such as the collapse of the wave function and their influence on the construction of reality, which challenges the classical notion of an objective, non-perceptual nature. Moreover, the encounter between social realism and social interpretivism lies in the fact that, in the social sciences, it is also recognized that human interpretations and actions shape social reality, creating a scenario in which absolute objectivity becomes difficult to sustain. These tensions, therefore enrich the epistemological and ontological debate, showing that the contradictions of quantum realism transcend physics and connect deeply with the difficulties and dynamics of the social construction of reality.
The text points out that one of the main contradictions of quantum realism, which is particularly relevant to the social sciences, is the tension between the existence of an observer-independent reality and the idea that this reality is mediated by the cognitive and interpretative processes of the subject. This contradiction arises from the central role of the observer in phenomena such as the collapse of the wave function and their influence on the construction of reality, which challenges the classical notion of an objective, non-perceptual nature. Moreover, the encounter between social realism and socialinterpretivism lies in the fact that, in the social sciences, it is also recognized that human interpretations and actions shape social reality, creating a scenario in which absolute objectivity becomes difficult to sustain. These tensions, therefore enrich the epistemological and ontological debate, showing that the contradictions of quantum realism transcend physics and connect deeply with the difficulties and dynamics of the social construction of reality.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
Quantum mechanics is often perceived as conceptually paradoxical because it appears to conflict with deeply rooted intuitions about fixed reality, determinism, and observation. This paper does not propose a new physical theory. Instead, it offers an epistemological reframing of quantum mechanics: not as a direct mathematical unveiling of a fully fixed pre-existing reality, but as a highly precise description of phenomenological structures emerging through observational conditions and interaction. The paper explores: the distinction between mathematical predictive success and ontological completeness, the role of human perception in constructing “fixed reality” intuitions, the phenomenological nature of qualities such as color and temperature, the possibility that some conceptual tensions in quantum mechanics arise from assumptions inherited from macroscopic cognition, and how quantum theory may be interpreted as describing observable structures rather than fixed hidden states. The work intentionally avoids mystical, anti-scientific, or consciousness-centric interpretations of quantum mechanics. It does not deny the existence of reality, nor reject modern physics. Rather, it attempts to clarify what exactly mathematical models are describing when applied to quantum phenomena. This text is positioned as a conceptual and phenomenological reorganization of perspective — a small doorway toward reconsidering how humans frame “reality” itself.