Instead of either formulating new metaphysical images (as realists would do) or rejecting any metaphysical attempt (as empiricists would do), the case of quantum mechanics might well require from us a complete redefinition of the nature and task of metaphysics.The sought redefinition can be performed in the spirit of Kant, according to whom metaphysics is the discipline of the boundaries of human knowledge.This can be called a "reflective" conception of metaphysics.In this paper, each one of the most popular "interpretations" of quantum mechanics is shown to be naturally associated with a variety of Kant-like reflective metaphysics.Then, the two major "paradoxes" of quantum mechanics (the measurement problem and the EPR correlations) are reformulated by way of this reflective attitude, and they are thereby "dissolved".Along with this perspective, quantum mechanics becomes one of the most elegant and understandable theories of the history of physics in addition of being one of the most efficient.The only point that must be clarified is why it looks culturally so difficult to accept a reflective and non-ontological standpoint on physical theories.
Instead of either formulating new metaphysical images (as realists would do) or rejecting any metaphysical attempt (as empiricists would do), the case of quantum mechanics might well require from us a complete redefinition of the nature and task of metaphysics.The sought redefinition can be performed in the spirit of Kant, according to whom metaphysics is the discipline of the boundaries of human knowledge.This can be called a "reflective" conception of metaphysics.In this paper, each one of the most popular "interpretations" of quantum mechanics is shown to be naturally associated with a variety of Kant-like reflective metaphysics.Then, the two major "paradoxes" of quantum mechanics (the measurement problem and the EPR correlations) are reformulated by way of this reflective attitude, and they are thereby "dissolved".Along with this perspective, quantum mechanics becomes one of the most elegant and understandable theories of the history of physics in addition of being one of the most efficient.The only point that must be clarified is why it looks culturally so difficult to accept a reflective and non-ontological standpoint on physical theories.
This paper will present questions from three perspectives about Quantum Mechanics (QM): physics, epistemological, and metaphysical.The quantum phenomena do not fit with the parameters of classical physics, so a daily intuition on macroscopic world is dispensable when it is the quantum object investigated.This physical domain induces a new thinking, which requires also new concepts to describe such object.The QM is disturbing and stimulates epistemological reflections, as the issues of access about what is known; and metaphysical theme are not to be left behind with regard to QM: What would the quantum object to?What is apprehended when this object is perceived, once considered the disturbing characteristics that constitute its physical description: interference and non-separability?What is its nature?This paper focuses briefly on the analysis of B. d'Espagnat in Veiled Reality, which would represent the physical perspective of QT; for epistemological questions, one will resort to the Kantian conception of knowledge; and with regard to the metaphysical perspective, we will rely on an article by Professor J. B. Arenhart.It is necessary to note that the question that pervades in this paper is about if the experience in QM is built.Thus, we will try to seek clarity on the philosophical issues through QT, regarding the problems about the possibility of knowledge of the quantum object and its nature, and whether experience in this case is built.But furthermore, the QM instigates us to think whether metaphysics proceeds on the investigation of nature when it comes to the QM.And such a question is more than to have as problem as the scope of the description of physical data, but rather whether it makes sense or whether metaphysical research is pertinent to the QM.
Ongoing disagreement about the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is a major obstacle for the project of scientific metaphysics, because there do not seem to be any universally accepted scientific standards that would let us decide what the true metaphysics of quantum mechanics is. One response by scientific metaphysicians has been the attempt to dissolve (rather than to solve) the measurement problem. After discussing one particular proposal in that spirit (due to Ladyman and Ross), I will explore the prospects of such an approach in general. The tentative lesson to be drawn seems to be the following: the more narrowly „scientific“ one’s approach to the measurement problem is, the more it is in conflict with the kind of scientific realism that is usually presupposed by the very project of scientific metaphysics.
We discuss some methodological aspects of the relation between physics and metaphysics by dealing specifically with the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our main claim is that current attempts to productively integrate quantum mechanics and metaphysics are best seen as approaches of what should be called `the metaphysics of science', which is developed by applying already existing metaphysical concepts to scientific theories. We argue that, in this perspective, metaphysics must be understood as an autonomous discipline. It results that this metaphysics cannot hope to derive any kind of justification from science. Thus, one of the main motivations of such project, which is the obtaining of a scientifically respectable justification for the attribution of a single true metaphysical profile to the posits of a scientific theory, is doomed because of the emergence of metaphysical underdetermination from the outset. If metaphysics floats free from physics, which is a premise of such project of integration between these two areas, then it is always possible to attribute more than one metaphysical profile to dress physical entities.
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
For Bohr quantum mechanics is complete. It expresses all that can be said about the atomic world, which he regards as a newly discovered and separate ontological component of reality, operating at the Planck scale, and describable only with a separate physics, namely, quantum mechanics. The classical world, in contrast, represents its binary and symbiotic counterpart, which is also ontologically substantive, but operates according to 'classical concepts'. The different physics of each component indicates a different ontology, the classical one is accessible to us, as we are classical objects, where the Planck scale does not apply, while the other is not. The measurement problem cannot therefore be solved through the discovery of hidden variables as these are classical in nature and therefore ineffective in explaining the quantum world. The measurement problem is therefore not due to epistemological limitations but emerges directly from a 'two worlds' dualism. Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation has therefore been erroneously misunderstood as a positivist retreat rather than as a view of reality proposing an ontological structure which is dualistic. l then propose similarities between Bohr and a ‘two worlds’ view of Kant, where noumena is an ontology which is inherently unknowable as it is devoid of a priori agents, much as the quantum world is unknowable as it is devoid of Bohr's classical concepts. However, just as classical concepts in Bohr are crucial in constituting classical reality, a priori intuitions and concepts in Kant are crucial in constituting phenomena, which are real ontological objects and not just appearances. The noumenal and quantum realms are therefore both substantive, but impossible to investigate. The phenomenal and classical worlds are also substantive. They are where objects and therefore meaning condenses. They are therefore open to our investigations.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.