Ongoing disagreement about the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is a major obstacle for the project of scientific metaphysics, because there do not seem to be any universally accepted scientific standards that would let us decide what the true metaphysics of quantum mechanics is. One response by scientific metaphysicians has been the attempt to dissolve (rather than to solve) the measurement problem. After discussing one particular proposal in that spirit (due to Ladyman and Ross), I will explore the prospects of such an approach in general. The tentative lesson to be drawn seems to be the following: the more narrowly „scientific“ one’s approach to the measurement problem is, the more it is in conflict with the kind of scientific realism that is usually presupposed by the very project of scientific metaphysics.
Ongoing disagreement about the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is a major obstacle for the project of scientific metaphysics, because there do not seem to be any universally accepted scientific standards that would let us decide what the true metaphysics of quantum mechanics is. One response by scientific metaphysicians has been the attempt to dissolve (rather than to solve) the measurement problem. After discussing one particular proposal in that spirit (due to Ladyman and Ross), I will explore the prospects of such an approach in general. The tentative lesson to be drawn seems to be the following: the more narrowly „scientific“ one’s approach to the measurement problem is, the more it is in conflict with the kind of scientific realism that is usually presupposed by the very project of scientific metaphysics.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
We discuss some methodological aspects of the relation between physics and metaphysics by dealing specifically with the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Our main claim is that current attempts to productively integrate quantum mechanics and metaphysics are best seen as approaches of what should be called `the metaphysics of science', which is developed by applying already existing metaphysical concepts to scientific theories. We argue that, in this perspective, metaphysics must be understood as an autonomous discipline. It results that this metaphysics cannot hope to derive any kind of justification from science. Thus, one of the main motivations of such project, which is the obtaining of a scientifically respectable justification for the attribution of a single true metaphysical profile to the posits of a scientific theory, is doomed because of the emergence of metaphysical underdetermination from the outset. If metaphysics floats free from physics, which is a premise of such project of integration between these two areas, then it is always possible to attribute more than one metaphysical profile to dress physical entities.
Quantum physics confronts contemporary metaphysicians with a fascinating and frustrating puzzle. It appears to be telling us something novel and surprising about the nature of the physical world, but it is hard to pin down exactly what it tells us. Hidden variable theories constitute a second major class of solutions to the measurement problem. They differ from the standard theory and spontaneous collapse theories in eschewing collapse altogether; according to hidden variable theories, the wavefunction always evolves according to the Schrodinger equation. The simplest and most radical response to the measurement problem is to assert that standard quantum mechanics without wavefunction collapse constitutes a complete physical theory. The many worlds theory is more flexible in this regard; according to the standard contemporary version, no presupposition is made concerning precisely which physical properties form the basis of measurement results. There are several approaches to quantum mechanics, any or none of which might yield an acceptable physical theory.
Many attempts have been made to characterise and solve the infamous measurement problem of quantum mechanics by advocating, implicitly or explicitly, different realist perspectives. As a result, we are still uncertain where this problem and its corresponding solution are to be located in the realism-antirealism debate. On the basis of a well-known characterisation of scientific realism, this paper intends to fill this gap by arguing that the quantum description of the processes involved in typical measurements is problematic from the standpoint of semantic realism, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for fully-fledged scientific realism.
Many attempts have been made to characterise and solve the infamous measurement problem of quantum mechanics by advocating, implicitly or explicitly, different realist perspectives. As a result, we are still uncertain where this problem and its corresponding solution are to be located in the realism-antirealism debate. On the basis of a well-known characterisation of scientific realism, this paper intends to fill this gap by arguing that the quantum description of the processes involved in typical measurements is problematic from a minimal realist point of view, known as semantic realism.
In this article I defend that an underlying framework exists among those interpretations of quantum mechanics which crucially consider the measurement problem as a central obstacle. I characterise that framework as the Received View on the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, I analyse the extent to which two of the most relevant attempts at quantum mechanics, namely, many worlds interpretations and Bohmian mechanics, belong within the Received View. However, I claim that scientific realism in itself does not entail commitment to such a view, and I propose to consider a form of realism that dissolves the measurement problem. It is simply a stripped down version of realism. I derive the methodological questions in this form of realism, speculating that within it a novel realist interpretation of quantum mechanics could be conceived.