Type I contextuality or inconsistent connectedness is a fundamental feature of both the classical as well as the quantum realms. Type II contextuality (true contextuality or CHSH-type contextuality) is frequently asserted to be specific to the quantum realm. Nevertheless, evidence for Type II contextuality in classical settings is slowly emerging (at least in the psychological realm). Sign intransitivity can be observed in preference relations in the setting of decision making and so intransitivity in decision making may also yield examples of Type II contextuality. Previously, it was suggested that a fruitful setting in which to search for such contextuality is that of decision making by collective intelligence systems. An experiment was conducted by using a detailed simulation of nest emigration by workers of the ant Temnothorax albipennis. In spite of the intransitivity, these simulated colonies came close to but failed to violate Dzhafarov’s inequality for a 4-cyclic system. Further research using more sophisticated simulations and experimental paradigms is required.
Type I contextuality or inconsistent connectedness is a fundamental feature of both the classical as well as the quantum realms. Type II contextuality (true contextuality or CHSH-type contextuality) is frequently asserted to be specific to the quantum realm. Nevertheless, evidence for Type II contextuality in classical settings is slowly emerging (at least in the psychological realm). Sign intransitivity can be observed in preference relations in the setting of decision making and so intransitivity in decision making may also yield examples of Type II contextuality. Previously, it was suggested that a fruitful setting in which to search for such contextuality is that of decision making by collective intelligence systems. An experiment was conducted by using a detailed simulation of nest emigration by workers of the ant Temnothorax albipennis. In spite of the intransitivity, these simulated colonies came close to but failed to violate Dzhafarov’s inequality for a 4-cyclic system. Further research using more sophisticated simulations and experimental paradigms is required.
In recent years there has been interest in the relationship between intransitivity and the presence of true (Type II) contextuality (contextuality with context independent marginals). The latter has been considered to be a sine qua non of quantum mechanics, although it has been observed in experiments on human decision making. Transitivity has long been viewed as essential to rational decision making although intransitivity appears to be ubiquitous in the natural world. An analogue of a preference graph is introduced for non-deterministic dynamical systems (of which decision making is an example) and used to identify several conditions which appear necessary for true contextuality to be present. Comparing the preference graph for the system against a reference preference graph formed from the marginals of the observables, one sees losses of options and intransitivity as necessary conditions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Quantum theory and topology in models of decision making (Part 1)’.
Contextuality is often described as a unique feature of the quantum realm, which distinguishes it fundamentally from the classical realm. This is not strictly true, and stems from decades of the misapplication of Kolmogorov probability. Contextuality appears in Kolmogorov theory (observed in the inability to form joint distributions) and in non-Kolmogorov theory (observed in the violation of inequalities of correlations). Both forms of contextuality have been observed in psychological experiments, although the first form has been known for decades but mostly ignored. The complex dynamics of neural systems (neurobehavioural regulatory systems) and of collective intelligence systems (social insect colonies) are described. These systems are contextual in the first sense and possibly in the second as well. Process algebra, based on the Process Theory of Whitehead, describes systems that are generated, transient, open, interactive, and primarily information-driven, and seems ideally suited to modeling these systems. It is argued that these dynamical characteristics give rise to contextuality and non-Kolmogorov probability in spite of these being entirely classical systems.
Our aim is to compare the fundamental notions of quantum physics - contextuality vs. incompatibility. One has to distinguish two different notions of contextuality, {\it Bohr-contextuality} and {\it Bell-contextuality}. The latter is defined operationally via violation of noncontextuality (Bell type) inequalities. This sort of contextuality will be compared with incompatibility. It is easy to show that, for quantum observables, there is {\it no contextuality without incompatibility.} The natural question arises: What is contextuality without incompatibility? (What is "dry-residue"?) Generally this is the very complex question. We concentrated on contextuality for four quantum observables. We shown that in the CHSH-scenarios (for "natural quantum observables") {\it contextuality is reduced to incompatibility.} However, generally contextuality without incompatibility may have some physical content. We found a mathematical constraint extracting the contextuality component from incompatibility. However, the physical meaning of this constraint is not clear. In appendix 1, we briefly discuss another sort of contextuality based on the Bohr's complementarity principle which is treated as the {\it contextuality-incompatibility principle}. Bohr-contextuality plays the crucial role in quantum foundations. Incompatibility is, in fact, a consequence of Bohr-contextuality. Finally, we remark that outside of physics, e.g., in cognitive psychology and decision making Bell-contextuality cleaned of incompatibility can play the important role.
This paper is devoted to an experimental investigation of cognitive contextuality inspired by quantum contextuality research. This contextuality is related to, but not identical to context-sensitivity which is well-studied in cognitive psychology and decision making. This paper is a part of quantum-like modeling, i.e., exploring the methodology of quantum theory outside of physics. We examined the bistable perception of cup-like objects, which strongly depends on experimental contexts. Our experimental data confirmed the existence of cognitive hysteresis, the important role of memory, and the non-commutative structure of cognitive observables. In physics, quantum contextuality is assessed using Bell-CHSH inequalities, and their violation is incorrectly believed to imply the nonlocality of Nature. The violation of Bell-type inequalities in cognitive and social science strongly indicates that the metaphysical implications of these inequalities are quite limited. In our experiments, modified Leggett-Garg inequalities were also significantly violated, but this only means that experimental data from experiments performed in different contexts cannot be modeled by a unique set of noncontextual, jointly distributed random variables. In our experiments, we know the empirical probability distributions measured in different contexts; thus, we can obtain much more detailed and reliable information about contextuality in human cognition by performing nonparametric compatibility tests.
Arguments have been made that the violation of the CHSH and similar inequalities shows that reality at the quantum level must be non-local. The derivation of Bell inequality is re-examined, and it is shown that violations of these inequalities merely demonstrate the existence of contextuality—they say nothing about the causal influences underlying such contextuality. It is argued that contextual systems do not possess enduring (propositional) properties, merely contingent properties. An example of a classical situation is presented: a two-player co-operative game, the random variables of which are consistently connected in the sense of Dzhafarov, which is contextual, and violates the CHSH inequality. In fact, it also violates the Tsirel’son bound. The key is that this system is generated, and its properties are disposed of, not determined.
In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The Contextuality-by-Default analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowd-sourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making. The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the Snow Queen experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), in which contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).