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arXiv:1807.05684 · Journal of Experimental Psychology General

True contextuality beats direct influences in human decision making.

Irina Basieva, Victor Hernando Cervantes, Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Published Apr 25, 2019• 88 citations

Abstract

In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The Contextuality-by-Default analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowd-sourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making. The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the Snow Queen experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), in which contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

DOI: 10.1037/xge0000585

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In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The Contextuality-by-Default analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowd-sourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making. The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the Snow Queen experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), in which contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

In a recent paper Basieva, Cervantes, Dzhafarov, and Khrennikov (2019) presented a series of experiments which they claimed show evidence for contextuality in human judgments. This was based on a set of modified Bell-like inequalities designed to rule out effects caused by signalling. In this comment we show that it is, however, possible to construct a non-contextual model which explains the experimental data via direct influences, which we take to mean that a measurement outcome has a (model-specific) causal dependence on other measurements. We trace the apparent inconsistency to a definition of signalling which does not account for all possible forms of direct influence. Further, we cast doubt on the idea that any experimental data in psychology could provide conclusive evidence for contextuality beyond that explainable by direct influence.

We present unambiguous experimental evidence for (quantum-like) probabilistic contextuality in psychology. All previous attempts to find contextuality in a psychological experiment were unsuccessful because of the gross violations of marginal selectivity in behavioral data, making the traditional mathematical tests developed in quantum mechanics inapplicable. In our crowdsourcing experiment respondents were making two simple choices: of one of two characters in a story (The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen), and of one of two characteristics, such as Kind and Evil, so that the character and the characteristic chosen matched the story line. The formal structure of the experiment imitated that of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm in the Bohm-Bell version. Marginal selectivity was violated, indicating that the two choices were directly influencing each other, but the application of a mathematical test developed in the Contextuality-by-Default theory, extending the traditional quantum-mechanical test, indicated a strong presence of contextuality proper, not reducible to direct influences.

Contextual situations are those in which seemingly ‘the same’ random variable changes its identity depending on the conditions under which it is recorded. Such a change of identity is observed whenever the assumption that the variable is one and the same under different conditions leads to contradictions when one considers its joint distribution with other random variables (this is the essence of all Bell-type theorems). In our Contextuality-by-Default approach, instead of asking why or how the conditions force ‘one and the same’ random variable to change ‘its’ identity, any two random variables recorded under different conditions are considered different ‘automatically.’ They are never the same, nor are they jointly distributed, but one can always impose on them a joint distribution (probabilistic coupling). The special situations when there is a coupling in which these random variables are equal with probability 1 are considered noncontextual. Contextuality means that such couplings do not exist. We argue that the determination of the identity of random variables by conditions under which they are recorded is not a causal relationship and cannot violate laws of physics.

From behavioral sciences to biology to quantum mechanics, one encounters situations where (i) a system outputs several random variables in response to several inputs, (ii) for each of these responses only some of the inputs may "directly" influence them, but (iii) other inputs provide a "context" for this response by influencing its probabilistic relations to other responses. These contextual influences are very different, say, in classical kinetic theory and in the entanglement paradigm of quantum mechanics, which are traditionally interpreted as representing different forms of physical determinism. One can mathematically construct systems with other types of contextuality, whether or not empirically realizable: those that form special cases of the classical type, those that fall between the classical and quantum ones, and those that violate the quantum type. We show how one can quantify and classify all logically possible contextual influences by studying various sets of probabilistic couplings, i.e., sets of joint distributions imposed on random outputs recorded at different (mutually incompatible) values of inputs.

Contextuality is a central property in comparative analysis of classical, quantum, and supercorrelated systems. We examine and compare two well-motivated approaches to contextuality. One approach ("contextuality-by-default") is based on the idea that one and the same physical property measured under different conditions (contexts) is represented by different random variables. The other approach is based on the idea that while a physical property is represented by a single random variable irrespective of its context, the joint distributions of the random variables describing the system can involve negative (quasi-)probabilities. We show that in the Leggett-Garg and EPR-Bell systems, the two measures essentially coincide.

Most behavioural and social experiments aimed at revealing contextuality are confined to cyclic systems with binary outcomes. In quantum physics, this broad class of systems includes as special cases Klyachko-Can-Binicioglu-Shumovsky-type, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell-type and Suppes-Zanotti-Leggett-Garg-type systems. The theory of contextuality known as contextuality-by-default allows one to define and measure contextuality in all such systems, even if there are context-dependent errors in measurements, or if something in the contexts directly interacts with the measurements. This makes the theory especially suitable for behavioural and social systems, where direct interactions of 'everything with everything' are ubiquitous. For cyclic systems with binary outcomes, the theory provides necessary and sufficient conditions for non-contextuality, and these conditions are known to be breached in certain quantum systems. We review several behavioural and social datasets (from polls of public opinion to visual illusions to conjoint choices to word combinations to psychophysical matching), and none of these data provides any evidence for contextuality. Our working hypothesis is that this may be a broadly applicable rule: behavioural and social systems are non-contextual, i.e. all 'contextual effects' in them result from the ubiquitous dependence of response distributions on the elements of contexts other than the ones to which the response is presumably or normatively directed.