We present unambiguous experimental evidence for (quantum-like) probabilistic contextuality in psychology. All previous attempts to find contextuality in a psychological experiment were unsuccessful because of the gross violations of marginal selectivity in behavioral data, making the traditional mathematical tests developed in quantum mechanics inapplicable. In our crowdsourcing experiment respondents were making two simple choices: of one of two characters in a story (The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen), and of one of two characteristics, such as Kind and Evil, so that the character and the characteristic chosen matched the story line. The formal structure of the experiment imitated that of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm in the Bohm-Bell version. Marginal selectivity was violated, indicating that the two choices were directly influencing each other, but the application of a mathematical test developed in the Contextuality-by-Default theory, extending the traditional quantum-mechanical test, indicated a strong presence of contextuality proper, not reducible to direct influences.
We present unambiguous experimental evidence for (quantum-like) probabilistic contextuality in psychology. All previous attempts to find contextuality in a psychological experiment were unsuccessful because of the gross violations of marginal selectivity in behavioral data, making the traditional mathematical tests developed in quantum mechanics inapplicable. In our crowdsourcing experiment respondents were making two simple choices: of one of two characters in a story (The Snow Queen by Hans Christian Andersen), and of one of two characteristics, such as Kind and Evil, so that the character and the characteristic chosen matched the story line. The formal structure of the experiment imitated that of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradigm in the Bohm-Bell version. Marginal selectivity was violated, indicating that the two choices were directly influencing each other, but the application of a mathematical test developed in the Contextuality-by-Default theory, extending the traditional quantum-mechanical test, indicated a strong presence of contextuality proper, not reducible to direct influences.
In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The Contextuality-by-Default analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowd-sourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making. The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the Snow Queen experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), in which contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
Most behavioural and social experiments aimed at revealing contextuality are confined to cyclic systems with binary outcomes. In quantum physics, this broad class of systems includes as special cases Klyachko-Can-Binicioglu-Shumovsky-type, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell-type and Suppes-Zanotti-Leggett-Garg-type systems. The theory of contextuality known as contextuality-by-default allows one to define and measure contextuality in all such systems, even if there are context-dependent errors in measurements, or if something in the contexts directly interacts with the measurements. This makes the theory especially suitable for behavioural and social systems, where direct interactions of 'everything with everything' are ubiquitous. For cyclic systems with binary outcomes, the theory provides necessary and sufficient conditions for non-contextuality, and these conditions are known to be breached in certain quantum systems. We review several behavioural and social datasets (from polls of public opinion to visual illusions to conjoint choices to word combinations to psychophysical matching), and none of these data provides any evidence for contextuality. Our working hypothesis is that this may be a broadly applicable rule: behavioural and social systems are non-contextual, i.e. all 'contextual effects' in them result from the ubiquitous dependence of response distributions on the elements of contexts other than the ones to which the response is presumably or normatively directed.
In a recent paper Basieva, Cervantes, Dzhafarov, and Khrennikov (2019) presented a series of experiments which they claimed show evidence for contextuality in human judgments. This was based on a set of modified Bell-like inequalities designed to rule out effects caused by signalling. In this comment we show that it is, however, possible to construct a non-contextual model which explains the experimental data via direct influences, which we take to mean that a measurement outcome has a (model-specific) causal dependence on other measurements. We trace the apparent inconsistency to a definition of signalling which does not account for all possible forms of direct influence. Further, we cast doubt on the idea that any experimental data in psychology could provide conclusive evidence for contextuality beyond that explainable by direct influence.
This paper is devoted to an experimental investigation of cognitive contextuality inspired by quantum contextuality research. This contextuality is related to, but not identical to context-sensitivity which is well-studied in cognitive psychology and decision making. This paper is a part of quantum-like modeling, i.e., exploring the methodology of quantum theory outside of physics. We examined the bistable perception of cup-like objects, which strongly depends on experimental contexts. Our experimental data confirmed the existence of cognitive hysteresis, the important role of memory, and the non-commutative structure of cognitive observables. In physics, quantum contextuality is assessed using Bell-CHSH inequalities, and their violation is incorrectly believed to imply the nonlocality of Nature. The violation of Bell-type inequalities in cognitive and social science strongly indicates that the metaphysical implications of these inequalities are quite limited. In our experiments, modified Leggett-Garg inequalities were also significantly violated, but this only means that experimental data from experiments performed in different contexts cannot be modeled by a unique set of noncontextual, jointly distributed random variables. In our experiments, we know the empirical probability distributions measured in different contexts; thus, we can obtain much more detailed and reliable information about contextuality in human cognition by performing nonparametric compatibility tests.
The context-sensitivity of cognition has been demonstrated across a wide range of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, judgement and decision making. A related term, 'contextuality', has appeared from the field of quantum cognition, with mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive phenomena are sometimes contextual. Contextuality is a subtle notion that influences how we must view the properties of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. This article addresses the questions: What does it mean for a cognitive phenomenon to be contextual? What are the implications of contextuality for probabilistic models of cognition? How does contextuality differ from context-sensitivity? Starting from George Boole's "conditions of possible experience", we argue that a probabilistic model of a cognitive phenomenon is necessarily subject to an assumption of realism. By this we mean that the phenomenon being studied is assumed to have cognitive properties with a definite value independent of observation. In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. In turn, incompatibility is necessary for their contextuality. The significance of this argument for cognitive psychology is the following:if a cognitive phenomenon is found to be contextual, then there is reason to believe it may be indeterminate. We illustrate by means of two crowdsourced experiments how context-sensitivity and contextuality of cognitive properties in the form of facial trait judgements can be characterized from empirical data. Finally, we conceptually and formally contrast contextuality with context-sensitivity. We propose that both involve a form of context dependence, with causality being the differentiating factor: the context dependence in context-sensitivity has a causal basis, whereas the context dependence in contextuality is acausal. The resulting implications for probabilistic models of cognition are discussed.
Dzhafarovet al.(Dzhafarovet al.2016Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A374, 20150099. (doi:10.1098/rsta.2015.0099)) reviewed several behavioural datasets imitating the formal design of the quantum-mechanical contextuality experiments. The conclusion was that none of these datasets exhibited contextuality if understood in the generalized sense proposed by Dzhafarovet al.(2015Found. Phys.7, 762-782. (doi:10.1007/s10701-015-9882-9)), while the traditional definition of contextuality does not apply to these data because they violate the condition of consistent connectedness (also known as marginal selectivity, no-signalling condition, no-disturbance principle, etc.). In this paper, we clarify the relationship between (in)consistent connectedness and (non)contextuality, as well as between the traditional and extended definitions of (non)contextuality, using as an example the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequalities originally designed for detecting contextuality in entangled particles.