The context-sensitivity of cognition has been demonstrated across a wide range of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, judgement and decision making. A related term, 'contextuality', has appeared from the field of quantum cognition, with mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive phenomena are sometimes contextual. Contextuality is a subtle notion that influences how we must view the properties of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. This article addresses the questions: What does it mean for a cognitive phenomenon to be contextual? What are the implications of contextuality for probabilistic models of cognition? How does contextuality differ from context-sensitivity? Starting from George Boole's "conditions of possible experience", we argue that a probabilistic model of a cognitive phenomenon is necessarily subject to an assumption of realism. By this we mean that the phenomenon being studied is assumed to have cognitive properties with a definite value independent of observation. In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. In turn, incompatibility is necessary for their contextuality. The significance of this argument for cognitive psychology is the following:if a cognitive phenomenon is found to be contextual, then there is reason to believe it may be indeterminate. We illustrate by means of two crowdsourced experiments how context-sensitivity and contextuality of cognitive properties in the form of facial trait judgements can be characterized from empirical data. Finally, we conceptually and formally contrast contextuality with context-sensitivity. We propose that both involve a form of context dependence, with causality being the differentiating factor: the context dependence in context-sensitivity has a causal basis, whereas the context dependence in contextuality is acausal. The resulting implications for probabilistic models of cognition are discussed.
The context-sensitivity of cognition has been demonstrated across a wide range of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, judgement and decision making. A related term, 'contextuality', has appeared from the field of quantum cognition, with mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive phenomena are sometimes contextual. Contextuality is a subtle notion that influences how we must view the properties of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. This article addresses the questions: What does it mean for a cognitive phenomenon to be contextual? What are the implications of contextuality for probabilistic models of cognition? How does contextuality differ from context-sensitivity? Starting from George Boole's "conditions of possible experience", we argue that a probabilistic model of a cognitive phenomenon is necessarily subject to an assumption of realism. By this we mean that the phenomenon being studied is assumed to have cognitive properties with a definite value independent of observation. In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. In turn, incompatibility is necessary for their contextuality. The significance of this argument for cognitive psychology is the following:if a cognitive phenomenon is found to be contextual, then there is reason to believe it may be indeterminate. We illustrate by means of two crowdsourced experiments how context-sensitivity and contextuality of cognitive properties in the form of facial trait judgements can be characterized from empirical data. Finally, we conceptually and formally contrast contextuality with context-sensitivity. We propose that both involve a form of context dependence, with causality being the differentiating factor: the context dependence in context-sensitivity has a causal basis, whereas the context dependence in contextuality is acausal. The resulting implications for probabilistic models of cognition are discussed.
The circumstances of measurement have more direct significance in quantum than in classical physics, where they can be neglected for well-performed measurements. In quantum mechanics, the dispositions of the measuring apparatus-plus-environment of the system measured for a property are a non-trivial part of its formalization as the quantum observable. A straightforward formalization of context, via equivalence classes of measurements corresponding to sets of sharp target observables, was recently given for sharp quantum observables. Here, we show that quantum contextuality, the dependence of measurement outcomes on circumstances external to the measured quantum system, can be manifested not only as the strict exclusivity of different measurements of sharp observables or valuations but via quantitative differences in the property statistics across simultaneous measurements of generalized quantum observables, by formalizing quantum context via coexistent generalized observables rather than only its subset of compatible sharp observables. Here, the question of whether such quantum contextuality follows from basic quantum principles is then addressed, and it is shown that the Principle of Indeterminacy is sufficient for at least one form of non-trivial contextuality. Contextuality is thus seen to be a natural feature of quantum mechanics rather than something arising only from the consideration of impossible measurements, abstract philosophical issues, hidden-variables theories, or other alternative, classical models of quantum behavior.
Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of life; most events, affairs, and questions are uncertain. A key problem in behavioral sciences is how the mind copes with uncertain information. Quantum probability theory offers a set of principles for inference, which align well with intuition about psychological processes in certain cases: cases when it appears that inference is contextual, the mental state changes as a result of previous judgments, or there is interference between different possibilities. We motivate the use of quantum theory in cognition and its key characteristics. For each of these characteristics, we review relevant quantum cognitive models and empirical support. The scope of quantum cognitive models encompasses fallacies in decision-making (such as the conjunction fallacy or the disjunction effect), question order effects, conceptual combination, evidence accumulation, perception, over-/underdistribution effects in memory, and more. Quantum models often formalize psychological ideas previously expressed in heuristic terms, allow unified explanations of previously disparate findings, and have led to several surprising, novel predictions. We also cast a critical eye on quantum models and consider some of their shortcomings and issues regarding their further development.
Contextuality is a feature of quantum correlations. It is crucial from a foundational perspective as a non-classical phenomenon, and from an applied perspective as a resource for quantum advantage. It is commonly defined in terms of hidden variables, for which it forces a contradiction with the assumptions of parameter-independence and determinism. The former can be justified by the empirical property of non-signalling or non-disturbance, and the latter by the empirical property of measurement sharpness. However, in realistic experiments neither empirical property holds exactly, which leads to possible objections to contextuality as a form of non-classicality, and potential vulnerabilities for supposed quantum advantages. We introduce measures to quantify both properties, and introduce quantified relaxations of the corresponding assumptions. We prove the continuity of a known measure of contextuality, the contextual fraction, which ensures its robustness to noise. We then bound the extent to which these relaxations can account for contextuality, via corrections terms to the contextual fraction (or to any non-contextuality inequality), culminating in a notion of genuine contextuality, which is robust to experimental imperfections. We then show that our result is general enough to apply or relate to a variety of established results and experimental set-ups. This article is part of the theme issue 'Quantum contextuality, causality and freedom of choice'.
This article extends the combinatorial approach to support the determination of contextuality amidst causal influences. Contextuality is an active field of study in Quantum Cognition, in systems relating to mental phenomena, such as concepts in human memory. In the cognitive field of study, a contemporary challenge facing the determination of whether a phenomenon is contextual has been the identification and management of disturbances. Whether or not said disturbances are identified through the modeling approach, constitute causal influences, or are disregardableas as noise is important, as contextuality cannot be adequately determined in the presence of causal influences. To address this challenge, we first provide a formalization of necessary elements of the combinatorial approach within the language of canonical causal models. Through this formalization, we extend the combinatorial approach to support a measurement and treatment of disturbance, and offer techniques to separately distinguish noise and causal influences. Thereafter, we develop a protocol through which these elements may be represented within a cognitive experiment. As human cognition seems rife with causal influences, cognitive modelers may apply the extended combinatorial approach to practically determine the contextuality of cognitive phenomena.
In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The Contextuality-by-Default analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowd-sourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making. The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the Snow Queen experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), in which contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
There are two basic theories of probability and two scientific perspectives – classical and quantum. In this chapter, assumptions of both the classical and the quantum probability theories will be presented and confronted. The rules for quantum probabilities differ from those of classical probabilities. In this chapter, we will describe what is the difference between the quantum cognitive modelling different from traditional cognitive modelling. In quantum probability theory (QPT) states of individual quantum, systems are called pure states, which are represented as vectors in a vector space (the Hilbert space). Properties of the Hilbert space and vectors’ operations will be explained. Two aspects of quantum theory open the door to addressing problems facing cognition and decision in a totally new light. The first is known as “contextuality” of judgements and decisions: the context generated by making a first judgement or decision interferes with subsequent judgements or decisions to produce order effects, so that judgements and decisions are non-commutative. The second aspect relates to quantum entanglement – a phenomenon whereby making an observation on one part of the system instantaneously affects the state in another part of the system, even if the respective systems are separated by space-like distances. This opens the door to developing quantum-like models of cognitive phenomena which are not decompositional in nature. Examples of cognitive processes modelled using the quantum account and results on the previous studies will be presented. We will also discuss the quantum–classical boundary.