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Entropy

Violation of Leggett–Garg Inequality in Perceiving Cup-like Objects and Cognitive Contextuality

Likan Zhan, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, Yingce Zhu

Published Nov 5, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper is devoted to an experimental investigation of cognitive contextuality inspired by quantum contextuality research. This contextuality is related to, but not identical to context-sensitivity which is well-studied in cognitive psychology and decision making. This paper is a part of quantum-like modeling, i.e., exploring the methodology of quantum theory outside of physics. We examined the bistable perception of cup-like objects, which strongly depends on experimental contexts. Our experimental data confirmed the existence of cognitive hysteresis, the important role of memory, and the non-commutative structure of cognitive observables. In physics, quantum contextuality is assessed using Bell-CHSH inequalities, and their violation is incorrectly believed to imply the nonlocality of Nature. The violation of Bell-type inequalities in cognitive and social science strongly indicates that the metaphysical implications of these inequalities are quite limited. In our experiments, modified Leggett-Garg inequalities were also significantly violated, but this only means that experimental data from experiments performed in different contexts cannot be modeled by a unique set of noncontextual, jointly distributed random variables. In our experiments, we know the empirical probability distributions measured in different contexts; thus, we can obtain much more detailed and reliable information about contextuality in human cognition by performing nonparametric compatibility tests.

DOI
10.3390/e26110950

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This paper is devoted to an experimental investigation of cognitive contextuality inspired by quantum contextuality research. This contextuality is related to, but not identical to context-sensitivity which is well-studied in cognitive psychology and decision making. This paper is a part of quantum-like modeling, i.e., exploring the methodology of quantum theory outside of physics. We examined the bistable perception of cup-like objects, which strongly depends on experimental contexts. Our experimental data confirmed the existence of cognitive hysteresis, the important role of memory, and the non-commutative structure of cognitive observables. In physics, quantum contextuality is assessed using Bell-CHSH inequalities, and their violation is incorrectly believed to imply the nonlocality of Nature. The violation of Bell-type inequalities in cognitive and social science strongly indicates that the metaphysical implications of these inequalities are quite limited. In our experiments, modified Leggett-Garg inequalities were also significantly violated, but this only means that experimental data from experiments performed in different contexts cannot be modeled by a unique set of noncontextual, jointly distributed random variables. In our experiments, we know the empirical probability distributions measured in different contexts; thus, we can obtain much more detailed and reliable information about contextuality in human cognition by performing nonparametric compatibility tests.
We interpret the Leggett–Garg (LG) inequality as a kind of contextual probabilistic inequality in which one combines data collected in experiments performed for three different contexts. In the original version of the inequality, these contexts have a temporal nature and they are represented by three pairs of instances of time, where We generalize LG conditions of macroscopic realism and noninvasive measurability in a general contextual framework. Our formulation is performed in purely probabilistic terms: the existence of the context-independent joint probability distribution P and the possibility of reconstructing the experimentally found marginal (two-dimensional) probability distributions from . We derive an analog of the LG inequality, 'contextual LG inequality', and use it as a test of 'quantum-likeness' of statistical data collected in a series of experiments on the recognition of ambiguous figures. In our experimental study, the figure under recognition is the Schröder stair, which is shown with rotations for different angles. Contexts are encoded by dynamics of rotations: clockwise, anticlockwise and random. Our data demonstrated violation of the contextual LG inequality for some combinations of the aforementioned contexts. Since in quantum theory and experiments with quantum physical systems, this inequality is violated, e.g. in the form of the original LG-inequality, our result can be interpreted as a sign that the quantum-like models can provide a more adequate description of the data generated in the process of recognition of ambiguous figures.
Contextuality means non-existence of a joint distribution for random variables recorded under mutually incompatible conditions, subject to certain constraints imposed on how the identity of these variables may change across these conditions. In simple quantum systems contextuality is indicated by violations of Bell-type or Leggett-Garg-type inequalities. These inequalities, however, are predicated on the assumption of no-signaling, defined as invariance of the distributions of measurement results with respect to other (e.g., earlier in time) measurements' settings. Signaling makes the inequalities inapplicable: a non-signaling system with any degree of contextuality, however high, loses any relation to this concept as soon as it exhibits any degree of signaling, however small. This is unsatisfactory. We describe a principled way of defining and measuring contextuality in arbitrary systems with random outputs, whether signaling is absent or present.
The context-sensitivity of cognition has been demonstrated across a wide range of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, judgement and decision making. A related term, 'contextuality', has appeared from the field of quantum cognition, with mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive phenomena are sometimes contextual. Contextuality is a subtle notion that influences how we must view the properties of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. This article addresses the questions: What does it mean for a cognitive phenomenon to be contextual? What are the implications of contextuality for probabilistic models of cognition? How does contextuality differ from context-sensitivity? Starting from George Boole's "conditions of possible experience", we argue that a probabilistic model of a cognitive phenomenon is necessarily subject to an assumption of realism. By this we mean that the phenomenon being studied is assumed to have cognitive properties with a definite value independent of observation. In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. In turn, incompatibility is necessary for their contextuality. The significance of this argument for cognitive psychology is the following:if a cognitive phenomenon is found to be contextual, then there is reason to believe it may be indeterminate. We illustrate by means of two crowdsourced experiments how context-sensitivity and contextuality of cognitive properties in the form of facial trait judgements can be characterized from empirical data. Finally, we conceptually and formally contrast contextuality with context-sensitivity. We propose that both involve a form of context dependence, with causality being the differentiating factor: the context dependence in context-sensitivity has a causal basis, whereas the context dependence in contextuality is acausal. The resulting implications for probabilistic models of cognition are discussed.
In his article in Science, Nicolas Gisin claimed that quantum correlations emerge from outside space–time. We explainthat they are due to space-time symmetries. This paper is a critical review of metaphysical conclusions found in many recent articles. It advocates the importance of contextuality, Einstein -causality and global symmetries. Bell tests allow only rejecting probabilistic coupling provided by a local hidden variable model, but they do not justify metaphysical speculations about quantum nonlocality and objects which know about each other’s state, even when separated by large distances. The violation of Bell inequalities in physics and in cognitive science can be explained using the notion of Bohr- contextuality. If contextual variables, describing varying experimental contexts, are correctly incorporated into a probabilistic model, then the Bell–CHSH inequalities cannot be proven and nonlocal correlations may be explained in an intuitive way. We also elucidate the meaning of statistical independence assumption incorrectly called free choice, measurement independence or no- conspiracy. Since correlation does not imply causation, the violation of statistical independence should be called contextuality; it does not restrict the experimenter’s freedom of choice. Therefore, contrary to what is believed, closing the freedom-of choice loophole does not close the contextuality loophole.
We highlight the existence of a joint probability distribution as the common underpinning assumption behind Bell-type, contextuality, and Leggett-Garg-type tests. We then present a procedure to translate contextual scenarios into temporal Leggett-Garg-type and spatial Bell-type ones. To demonstrate the generality of this approach we construct a family of spatial Bell-type inequalities. We show that in the Leggett-Garg scenario a necessary condition for contextuality in time is given by a violation of consistency conditions in the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics.
Contextuality is a central property in comparative analysis of classical, quantum, and supercorrelated systems. We examine and compare two well-motivated approaches to contextuality. One approach ("contextuality-by-default") is based on the idea that one and the same physical property measured under different conditions (contexts) is represented by different random variables. The other approach is based on the idea that while a physical property is represented by a single random variable irrespective of its context, the joint distributions of the random variables describing the system can involve negative (quasi-)probabilities. We show that in the Leggett-Garg and EPR-Bell systems, the two measures essentially coincide.