All mental representations change with time. A baseline intuition is that mental representations have specific values at different time points, which may be more or less accessible, depending on noise, forgetting processes, etc. We present a radical alternative, motivated by recent research using the mathematics from quantum theory for cognitive modelling. Such cognitive models raise the possibility that certain possibilities or events may be incompatible, so that perfect knowledge of one necessitates uncertainty for the others. In the context of time-dependence, in physics, this issue is explored with the so-called temporal Bell (TB) or Leggett-Garg inequalities. We consider in detail the theoretical and empirical challenges involved in exploring the TB inequalities in the context of cognitive systems. One interesting conclusion is that we believe the study of the TB inequalities to be empirically more constrained in psychology than in physics. Specifically, we show how the TB inequalities, as applied to cognitive systems, can be derived from two simple assumptions: cognitive realism and cognitive completeness. We discuss possible implications of putative violations of the TB inequalities for cognitive models and our understanding of time in cognition in general. Overall, this paper provides a surprising, novel direction in relation to how time should be conceptualized in cognition.
All mental representations change with time. A baseline intuition is that mental representations have specific values at different time points, which may be more or less accessible, depending on noise, forgetting processes, etc. We present a radical alternative, motivated by recent research using the mathematics from quantum theory for cognitive modelling. Such cognitive models raise the possibility that certain possibilities or events may be incompatible, so that perfect knowledge of one necessitates uncertainty for the others. In the context of time-dependence, in physics, this issue is explored with the so-called temporal Bell (TB) or Leggett-Garg inequalities. We consider in detail the theoretical and empirical challenges involved in exploring the TB inequalities in the context of cognitive systems. One interesting conclusion is that we believe the study of the TB inequalities to be empirically more constrained in psychology than in physics. Specifically, we show how the TB inequalities, as applied to cognitive systems, can be derived from two simple assumptions: cognitive realism and cognitive completeness. We discuss possible implications of putative violations of the TB inequalities for cognitive models and our understanding of time in cognition in general. Overall, this paper provides a surprising, novel direction in relation to how time should be conceptualized in cognition.
Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of life; most events, affairs, and questions are uncertain. A key problem in behavioral sciences is how the mind copes with uncertain information. Quantum probability theory offers a set of principles for inference, which align well with intuition about psychological processes in certain cases: cases when it appears that inference is contextual, the mental state changes as a result of previous judgments, or there is interference between different possibilities. We motivate the use of quantum theory in cognition and its key characteristics. For each of these characteristics, we review relevant quantum cognitive models and empirical support. The scope of quantum cognitive models encompasses fallacies in decision-making (such as the conjunction fallacy or the disjunction effect), question order effects, conceptual combination, evidence accumulation, perception, over-/underdistribution effects in memory, and more. Quantum models often formalize psychological ideas previously expressed in heuristic terms, allow unified explanations of previously disparate findings, and have led to several surprising, novel predictions. We also cast a critical eye on quantum models and consider some of their shortcomings and issues regarding their further development.
The representation and processing of concepts is one of the hardest challenges in cognitive science. While computer scientists and engineers have focused on developing advances for particular tasks, philosophers and cognitive scientists have focused on elucidating the structural nature of meaning. A remarkable bridge between these two limited-success approaches can be found in behavioral research, since, in a variety of tasks, humans process information at a conceptual level in a way that is incompatible with classical probability and fuzzy set theory. Recently, attempts have been made to use mathematical schemes founded on quantum structures as alternative approaches. For this reason, the application of quantum structures to this type of phenomena has received increasing attention. The quantum approach allows to faithfully model a number of non-classical deviations observed in experimental data. Moreover, it shows that genuine quantum theoretical notions, such as contextuality, superposition, emergence, and entanglement, are powerful epistemic tools to understand and represent cognitive phenomena. In this thesis, we identify the limitations of classical theories to handle some important cognitive tasks, and introduce the fundamentals of the quantum cognitive approach to concepts. Next, we perform a mathematical analysis of current concept combination models and develop an extension that allows for concrete representations of multiple exemplars simultaneously. Our analysis indicates that a superposition of logical reasoning and a specific form of non-logical reasoning, where non-logical reasoning is dominant, allows to faithfully represent the experimental data. Therefore, the non-logical reasoning introduced by this model represents an important but unexplored form of reasoning in humans. In addition, we develop novel experimental methodologies to identify quantum conceptual structures for concept combinations in the context of natural language processing and psychological experiments. Namely, we present a methodology to build entangled concepts represented as sets of words with respect to a corpus of text, and present a computational and psychological methodology to discern if a collection of concepts behaves statistically as a collection of quantum or classical particles. Using both methodologies we have identified a significant presence of quantum conceptual structure in the context of natural language processing and psychological experiments.
Quantum probability theory (QPT) has provided a novel, rich mathematical framework for cognitive modelling, especially for situations which appear paradoxical from classical perspectives. This work concerns the dynamical aspects of QPT, as relevant to cognitive modelling. We aspire to shed light on how the mind's driving potentials (encoded in Hamiltonian and Lindbladian operators) impact the evolution of a mental state. Some existing QPT cognitive models do employ dynamical aspects when considering how a mental state changes with time, but it is often the case that several simplifying assumptions are introduced. What kind of modelling flexibility does QPT dynamics offer without any simplifying assumptions and is it likely that such flexibility will be relevant in cognitive modelling? We consider a series of nested QPT dynamical models, constructed with a view to accommodate results from a simple, hypothetical experimental paradigm on decision-making. We consider Hamiltonians more complex than the ones which have traditionally been employed with a view to explore the putative explanatory value of this additional complexity. We then proceed to compare simple models with extensions regarding both the initial state (e.g. a mixed state with a specific orthogonal decomposition; a general mixed state) and the dynamics (by introducing Hamiltonians which destroy the separability of the initial structure and by considering an open-system extension). We illustrate the relations between these models mathematically and numerically.This article is part of the themed issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.
The attempt to employ quantum principles for modeling cognition has enabled the introduction of several new concepts in psychology, such as the uncertainty principle, incompatibility, entanglement, and superposition. For many commentators, this is an exciting opportunity to question existing formal frameworks (notably classical probability theory) and explore what is to be gained by employing these novel conceptual tools. This is not to say that major empirical challenges are not there. For example, can we definitely prove the necessity for quantum, as opposed to classical, models? Can the distinction between compatibility and incompatibility inform our understanding of differences between human and nonhuman cognition? Are quantum models less constrained than classical ones? Does incompatibility arise as a limitation, to avoid the requirements from the principle of unicity, or is it an inherent (or essential?) characteristic of intelligent thought? For everyday judgments, do quantum principles allow more accurate prediction than classical ones? Some questions can be confidently addressed within existing quantum models. A definitive resolution of others will have to anticipate further work. What is clear is that the consideration of quantum cognitive models has enabled a new focus on a range of debates about fundamental aspects of cognition.
Quantum mechanics emerged as the result of a successful resolution of stringent empirical and profound conceptual conflicts within the development of atomic physics at the beginning of the last century. At first glance, it seems to be bizarre and even ridiculous to apply ideas of quantum physics in order to improve current psychological and linguistic or semantic ideas. However, a closer look shows that there are some parallels in the development of quantum physics and advanced theories of cognitive science. In psychology, geometric models of meaning have a long tradition. However, they suffer from many shortcomings which are illustrated by discussing several puzzles of bounded rationality. In the first part of this article, we argue that the present account of quantum cognition - taking quantum probabilities rather than classical probabilities - can give a more systematic description of these puzzles than the alternate and rather eclectic treatments in the traditional framework of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always and does not automatically provide a deeper understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. In the second part of this article, we explain the foundational issue from the perspective of Piron, Foulis, Randall, and others, and we apply it to the foundation of quantum cognition. In this connection, we show that quantum probabilities are of (virtual) conceptual necessity if grounded in an abstract algebraic framework of orthomodular lattices. This framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras (describing particular perspectives) that are combined into a uniform system while considering certain capacity restrictions. It is at this point that one important aspect of the whole idea of bounded rationality directly enters the theoretical scenery of quantum cognition: resource limitation.
The majority of quantum models of cognition are based on quantum physical reductionism. Since the brain is composed of quantum systems, one might try to use QM (as a physical theory) to describe such quantum-like features of mind as complementarity (which was well established in psychology long before creation of QM), interference of minds and recently even nonlocality (under the influence of the EPR-Bohr debate and recent results on Bell's inequality). Opposite to the traditional quantum reductionism, we present a quantum-like model of the brain functioning which is not related to the evident fact that the brain is composed of quantum systems. In our model the quantum-like brain is described by the mathematical formalism of QM. However, quantum-like features are generated on the macrolevel - from processing of information on two time scales: precognitive (the quick one) and cognitive (the slow one). Our basic postulate is that the brain operates with averages (encoding mental quantities - images, emotions, minds) of stochastic processes evolving on the precognitive scale and that these averages are computed approximately by using the mathematical formalism of QM.