As the development of quantum computers advances, actors relying on public key infrastructures (PKI) for secure information exchange are becoming aware of the disruptive implications. Currently, governments and businesses employ PKI for many core processes that may become insecure or unavailable when quantum computers break the cryptographic algorithms foundational to PKI. While standardization institutes are currently testing quantum safe cryptographic algorithms, there are no globally agreed-upon cryptographic solutions available. Actors looking to prepare for the implementation of quantum safe cryptographic algorithms lack methods that allow for collective planning and action across organizations, sectors, and nations. The goal of this policy paper is to elicit requirements for a serious game on QS PKI, and derive policy guidelines that actors can use to prepare and formulate governance arrangements. We followed a two-step approach, drawing on technology threat avoidance theory and collective action theory, followed by empirical grounding through a focus group. The results from the literature confirm that a serious game could be a suitable governance mechanism for QS PKI. The focus group results discussed 12 requirements and the requirement's relation to the theoretical background. From this, the findings section arrived at four policy guidelines derived from the requirements that can function as focus areas for further requirement development and as input for policy makers. The policy guidelines concluded are (1) prioritize increasing collective awareness through emphasizing social networks, (2) acknowledge the interdependencies in migrating towards QS PKI, (3) create an understanding of the technical standards in the field and their issuers, and (4) being highly realistic with both negative and positive scenarios to center the players’ understanding of real-world impact.
As the development of quantum computers advances, actors relying on public key infrastructures (PKI) for secure information exchange are becoming aware of the disruptive implications. Currently, governments and businesses employ PKI for many core processes that may become insecure or unavailable when quantum computers break the cryptographic algorithms foundational to PKI. While standardization institutes are currently testing quantum safe cryptographic algorithms, there are no globally agreed-upon cryptographic solutions available. Actors looking to prepare for the implementation of quantum safe cryptographic algorithms lack methods that allow for collective planning and action across organizations, sectors, and nations. The goal of this policy paper is to elicit requirements for a serious game on QS PKI, and derive policy guidelines that actors can use to prepare and formulate governance arrangements. We followed a two-step approach, drawing on technology threat avoidance theory and collective action theory, followed by empirical grounding through a focus group. The results from the literature confirm that a serious game could be a suitable governance mechanism for QS PKI. The focus group results discussed 12 requirements and the requirement's relation to the theoretical background. From this, the findings section arrived at four policy guidelines derived from the requirements that can function as focus areas for further requirement development and as input for policy makers. The policy guidelines concluded are (1) prioritize increasing collective awareness through emphasizing social networks, (2) acknowledge the interdependencies in migrating towards QS PKI, (3) create an understanding of the technical standards in the field and their issuers, and (4) being highly realistic with both negative and positive scenarios to center the players’ understanding of real-world impact.
The computation power of quantum computers introduces new security threats in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a system used by many governments to secure their digital public services and communication. This calls for an inevitable need for governments to be quantum-safe (QS) by modifying their PKI systems to be resistant to the attacks of quantum computers. However, there is limited academic literature on a QS PKI system, and in this limited literature, the transition challenges are perceived as exclusively technological. This paper aims to create a structured overview of challenges when transitioning to a QS PKI system. We do this by reviewing literature and classifying the challenges using Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) framework and using an expert workshop to explore the challenges in the context of the PKI system in the Dutch government. The main challenges in the technological context include no universal QS solution, legacy system, complex PKI interoperability, and vulnerable Root CA. The main challenges in the organizational context include knowledge gap, unclear governance, lack of urgency, and in-house management support. Furthermore, the main challenges in the environmental context include institutional void, stakeholder collaboration, lack of awareness, and policy guidance. The results indicate that the QS transition from the current PKI system is complex, and the challenges are socio-technical. For policy-makers, this implies that they should start early to prepare, whereas organizations are hardly aware of the process of QS transition and the topic of quantum computing is yet to develop the urgency in organizations.
By utilizing the properties of quantum mechanics, quantum computers have the potential to factor a key pair of a large prime number and break some of the core cryptographic primitives that most information infrastructures depend on. This means that today's widely used cryptographic algorithms can soon become unsafe and need to be modified with quantum-safe (QS) cryptography. While much work is still needed in developing QS cryptographic algorithms, the institutional, organizational, and policy aspects of transitioning the current infrastructures have received less attention. This paper provides an empirical analysis of QS transition challenges and policy recommendations for moving to a QS situation. We analyzed the data collected through interviews with experts and practitioners from the Dutch government. The results reveal that institutional, organizational and policy aspects of QS transitions are interconnected, and solutions for QS transitions are scattered. Consequently, organizations may face a Catch-22 loop without further actionable approaches and planning for QS transitions.
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) provide digital public services and communication by securing information-sharing and strong credentials for digital identity management to individuals, businesses, and government agencies. While cryptographic algorithms that current PKI systems depend on are mostly resilient against hacks and other threats launched from computers we use today, the advancement of quantum computing technology introduces new security threats. This calls for current PKI systems to be modified with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms. However, transitioning to Quantum-safe (QS) PKI systems remains complex, and the challenges are socio-technical. The research aims to guide organizations transitioning towards QS PKI systems. In doing so, we will deconstruct the QS transition into a series of stages and paths using growth models and examine how organizations can transit over time towards QS PKI systems.
Ensuring the secure provision of data and services using critical information infrastructures amidst the evolving technology landscape is a crucial yet recurrent task. However, these infrastructures can become vulnerable due to developments in quantum computing and modifying the infrastructures with quantum-safe (QS) technology is unlike regular control and maintenance. Organizations need to modify their cryptographic layers, which act as the fundamental building blocks of infrastructures. For organizations, many uncertainties pose challenges across technological, organizational and ecosystem areas. While QS technology is new and not yet available for implementation and adoption, changes in critical information infrastructures require collaboration among multiple public and private organizations spanning industries and borders. By understanding the roles, organizations may better understand what should be done for QS transitions. Until now, there has been no academic research examining the roles that government could or should play in QS transitions. This paper reveals 12 different roles, showing the diversity and breadth of actions needed. While there are many possible roles that still need to be allocated for coordinated efforts, there is a high reliance on the government, and organizations are waiting for and expecting governments to take more active roles in QS transitions. The results also signals that QS transition research is at its early stage with a clear governance void and lack of collective urgency in the ecosystem.
Abstract Quantum computing technologies pose a significant threat to the currently employed public-key cryptography protocols. In this paper, we discuss the impact of the quantum threat on public key infrastructures (PKIs), which are used as a part of security systems for protecting production environments. We analyze security issues of existing models with a focus on requirements for a fast transition to post-quantum solutions. Although our primary focus is on the attacks with quantum computing, we also discuss some security issues that are not directly related to the used cryptographic algorithms but are essential for the overall security of the PKI. We attempt to provide a set of security recommendations regarding the PKI from the viewpoints of attacks with quantum computers.
The anticipated development of cryptographically relevant quantum computing presents a strategic challenge to governments because contemporary public-sector information systems depend extensively on cryptographic mechanisms for confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and secure communication. The principal difficulty is not limited to replacing existing cryptographic algorithms; rather, it concerns the coordinated transformation of national information infrastructures, institutional policies, data-protection practices, procurement procedures, and long-term security architectures. This research and review article develops a policy-oriented framework for quantum-safe cybersecurity in government environments. The study adopts a conceptual methodology that synthesizes the supplied literature on predictive modeling, statistical decision-making, machine learning, and quantum-resistant national-security policy. Although several supplied studies originate in pharmaceutical stability prediction rather than cybersecurity, their methodological emphasis on prediction, modeling, optimization, and risk-oriented decision processes provides transferable analytical foundations for constructing migration and prioritization mechanisms. The proposed framework integrates cryptographic inventory, risk classification, data sensitivity assessment, migration prioritization, algorithm-agility requirements, governance controls, validation mechanisms, and continuous monitoring. The analysis indicates that quantum-safe transformation should be treated as a national digital-resilience program rather than as an isolated cryptographic upgrade. The paper further identifies implementation challenges involving legacy systems, interoperability, institutional coordination, resource allocation, and uncertainty concerning future quantum capabilities. The resulting framework provides a structured basis for government agencies to prioritize critical assets, reduce exposure to future cryptographic compromise, and establish adaptive cybersecurity governance.