Towards security recommendations for public-key infrastructures for production environments in the post-quantum era
Sergey E. Yunakovsky, Maxim Kot, N. O. Pozhar, Denis Nabokov, Mikhail Kudinov, Anton P. Guglya, Evgeniy O. Kiktenko, Ekaterina Kolycheva, Alexander Borisov, Aleksey K. Fedorov
Abstract Quantum computing technologies pose a significant threat to the currently employed public-key cryptography protocols. In this paper, we discuss the impact of the quantum threat on public key infrastructures (PKIs), which are used as a part of security systems for protecting production environments. We analyze security issues of existing models with a focus on requirements for a fast transition to post-quantum solutions. Although our primary focus is on the attacks with quantum computing, we also discuss some security issues that are not directly related to the used cryptographic algorithms but are essential for the overall security of the PKI. We attempt to provide a set of security recommendations regarding the PKI from the viewpoints of attacks with quantum computers.
Abstract Quantum computing technologies pose a significant threat to the currently employed public-key cryptography protocols. In this paper, we discuss the impact of the quantum threat on public key infrastructures (PKIs), which are used as a part of security systems for protecting production environments. We analyze security issues of existing models with a focus on requirements for a fast transition to post-quantum solutions. Although our primary focus is on the attacks with quantum computing, we also discuss some security issues that are not directly related to the used cryptographic algorithms but are essential for the overall security of the PKI. We attempt to provide a set of security recommendations regarding the PKI from the viewpoints of attacks with quantum computers.
In the last few years the threat of quantum computers has become bigger and bigger. The fast computing of the quantum computers puts everything in danger that relies on classical cryptographic algorithms. The question of when a large-scale quantum computer will be built cannot be exactly answered yet. According to the Cloud Security Alliance at around 2030 the power of quantum computers will increase so that the risk for exposure of traditionally encrypted data will be very high. PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) relies on asymmetric cryptographic algorithms and is widely used in many fields. So it is important that it will be completely safe. The way to provide that is to change traditional cryptographic algorithms to post-quantum cryptography algorithms or hybrid solutions. To this, we review in this paper the basics of classical PKI and quantum cryptography methods and the threat of quantum computing for PKI. We present quantum-safe solutions already in use and recommend new, well-performing solutions for a quantum-resistant PKI by comparison.
The potential of quantum computing to compromise traditional public-key cryptography (PKC) has led to a pressing need for more efficient and resilient cryptographic methods. Recent advancements, such as the 800x improvement in the logical error rate by Microsoft and QUANTINUUM, underscore the urgency of this issue. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) offers a promising solution designed to withstand quantum attacks. This paper examines how PQC and other advanced cryptographic techniques can enhance the security and efficiency of PKC in the quantum era. Current PKC methods, despite revolutionizing secure online communication, are vulnerable to flaws in their underlying algorithms. The proposed hybrid model integrates PQC with traditional PKC, leveraging both technologies' strengths to mitigate quantum threats while preserving established security benefits. The investigation addresses critical research questions: how to enhance PKC key management for better efficiency and security, and which PQC techniques can protect PKC from quantum attacks. This paper's contribution includes identifying vulnerabilities in existing PKC, comparing RSA and post-quantum algorithms, and implementing a PQC algorithm between a client and server to analyze integration with existing protocols. Finally, the paper recommends security mechanisms to improve PQC protocols, ensuring robust protection against emerging quantum computing capabilities.
Recently, there has been an increasing focus on the investigation of quantum-safe solutions for a variety of applications. One of the pressing issues that needs to be made quantum secure is the TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol. Proposals for its implementation have been discussed in several articles. The TLS protocol is based on PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). In addition, there are many other PKI applications that are used every day in both private and enterprise environments, so securing their use is essential. The methods currently developed to ensure adequate security will become obsolete with the advent of quantum computers. According to the Cloud Security Alliance, by around 2030, the performance of quantum computers will increase to the point where the risk of vulnerability of traditionally encrypted data will be very high. It is therefore important to make the right preparations in time to ensure that we can transform our solutions into quantum secure solutions by the time quantum computing becomes a real threat. In this paper, we present an analysis to this end, presenting quantum-safe solutions already in use and, in comparison, proposing new, well-performing solutions for a quantum-resistant PKI.
Development of Quantum Computers are growing rapidly, the security of today’s cryptographic systems which are working with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is at serious risk. RSA and ECC algorithms are the backbone of secure communication and digital identity can be breakable by quantum algorithms such as Shor’s. Hence, a transition is required to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which is designed to handle quantum attacks. This work provides a detailed review of how PQC can be integrated with the existing PKI, with a special focus on the auto-enrollment process. Auto-enrollment is an essential process but often overlooked mechanism, responsible for automatically issuing and renewing digital certificates. First, we explored how current PKI systems are exposed to the quantum threats and the readiness. The performance of the algorithms that are standardized by NIST, such as Kyber and Dilithium were discussed. We analyze the technical and operational challenges of transitioning to PQC by referencing both research studies and real-world implementations from major industry players such as Google and Microsoft. These include large key size, certificate size, compatibility issues, complex computations and need for crypto-agility. We also examine the hybrid approaches that combine classical and post-quantum methods as traditional strategies. The survey concludes by outlining best practices, deployment considerations, and open research challenges that must be addressed for a smooth, secure, and scalable shift to quantum-safe PKI. This work aims to guide researchers, engineers, and policymakers in building the next generation of cryptographic infrastructure that can stand the test-time even in a quantum world.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to contemporary cryptographic systems underpinning national security infrastructures globally. Classical public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which secure communications, data storage, and critical infrastructure, are vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly through Shor’s algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in the quantum era. This article explores the implications of PQC adoption for national security, including the challenges of transitioning legacy systems, potential vulnerabilities during migration, and the strategic importance of standardizing PQC protocols to safeguard military, governmental, and critical infrastructure communications. The article also discusses policy recommendations for governments to mitigate emerging quantum risks.
The recent development in Quantum Computing is creating a potential threat to many Digital Banking Systems currently being used today. Most banking systems today use Classical Public Key Cryptography technologies like RSA and Elliptical Curve Cryptography that will be broken by a very powerful, large-scale Quantum Computer. Because financial data typically has to be kept private for an extended time period, this problem creates a major long-term risk. This research proposes a Hybrid Post-Quantum Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Framework for the improvement of banking security while maintaining compatibility with the existing banking systems. Rather than immediately replacing all classical cryptographic mechanisms, the Hybrid Post-Quantum Solution utilizes a combination of post-quantum algorithms along with traditional techniques. The proposed Hybrid Post-Quantum PKI model provides a reasonable and scalable path for banks to transition their systems from current quantum-vulnerable security infrastructures to new quantum-resilient security infrastructures.