Ensuring the secure provision of data and services using critical information infrastructures amidst the evolving technology landscape is a crucial yet recurrent task. However, these infrastructures can become vulnerable due to developments in quantum computing and modifying the infrastructures with quantum-safe (QS) technology is unlike regular control and maintenance. Organizations need to modify their cryptographic layers, which act as the fundamental building blocks of infrastructures. For organizations, many uncertainties pose challenges across technological, organizational and ecosystem areas. While QS technology is new and not yet available for implementation and adoption, changes in critical information infrastructures require collaboration among multiple public and private organizations spanning industries and borders. By understanding the roles, organizations may better understand what should be done for QS transitions. Until now, there has been no academic research examining the roles that government could or should play in QS transitions. This paper reveals 12 different roles, showing the diversity and breadth of actions needed. While there are many possible roles that still need to be allocated for coordinated efforts, there is a high reliance on the government, and organizations are waiting for and expecting governments to take more active roles in QS transitions. The results also signals that QS transition research is at its early stage with a clear governance void and lack of collective urgency in the ecosystem.
Ensuring the secure provision of data and services using critical information infrastructures amidst the evolving technology landscape is a crucial yet recurrent task. However, these infrastructures can become vulnerable due to developments in quantum computing and modifying the infrastructures with quantum-safe (QS) technology is unlike regular control and maintenance. Organizations need to modify their cryptographic layers, which act as the fundamental building blocks of infrastructures. For organizations, many uncertainties pose challenges across technological, organizational and ecosystem areas. While QS technology is new and not yet available for implementation and adoption, changes in critical information infrastructures require collaboration among multiple public and private organizations spanning industries and borders. By understanding the roles, organizations may better understand what should be done for QS transitions. Until now, there has been no academic research examining the roles that government could or should play in QS transitions. This paper reveals 12 different roles, showing the diversity and breadth of actions needed. While there are many possible roles that still need to be allocated for coordinated efforts, there is a high reliance on the government, and organizations are waiting for and expecting governments to take more active roles in QS transitions. The results also signals that QS transition research is at its early stage with a clear governance void and lack of collective urgency in the ecosystem.
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) provide digital public services and communication by securing information-sharing and strong credentials for digital identity management to individuals, businesses, and government agencies. While cryptographic algorithms that current PKI systems depend on are mostly resilient against hacks and other threats launched from computers we use today, the advancement of quantum computing technology introduces new security threats. This calls for current PKI systems to be modified with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms. However, transitioning to Quantum-safe (QS) PKI systems remains complex, and the challenges are socio-technical. The research aims to guide organizations transitioning towards QS PKI systems. In doing so, we will deconstruct the QS transition into a series of stages and paths using growth models and examine how organizations can transit over time towards QS PKI systems.
The computation power of quantum computers introduces new security threats in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a system used by many governments to secure their digital public services and communication. This calls for an inevitable need for governments to be quantum-safe (QS) by modifying their PKI systems to be resistant to the attacks of quantum computers. However, there is limited academic literature on a QS PKI system, and in this limited literature, the transition challenges are perceived as exclusively technological. This paper aims to create a structured overview of challenges when transitioning to a QS PKI system. We do this by reviewing literature and classifying the challenges using Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) framework and using an expert workshop to explore the challenges in the context of the PKI system in the Dutch government. The main challenges in the technological context include no universal QS solution, legacy system, complex PKI interoperability, and vulnerable Root CA. The main challenges in the organizational context include knowledge gap, unclear governance, lack of urgency, and in-house management support. Furthermore, the main challenges in the environmental context include institutional void, stakeholder collaboration, lack of awareness, and policy guidance. The results indicate that the QS transition from the current PKI system is complex, and the challenges are socio-technical. For policy-makers, this implies that they should start early to prepare, whereas organizations are hardly aware of the process of QS transition and the topic of quantum computing is yet to develop the urgency in organizations.
By utilizing the properties of quantum mechanics, quantum computers have the potential to factor a key pair of a large prime number and break some of the core cryptographic primitives that most information infrastructures depend on. This means that today's widely used cryptographic algorithms can soon become unsafe and need to be modified with quantum-safe (QS) cryptography. While much work is still needed in developing QS cryptographic algorithms, the institutional, organizational, and policy aspects of transitioning the current infrastructures have received less attention. This paper provides an empirical analysis of QS transition challenges and policy recommendations for moving to a QS situation. We analyzed the data collected through interviews with experts and practitioners from the Dutch government. The results reveal that institutional, organizational and policy aspects of QS transitions are interconnected, and solutions for QS transitions are scattered. Consequently, organizations may face a Catch-22 loop without further actionable approaches and planning for QS transitions.
As the development of quantum computers advances, actors relying on public key infrastructures (PKI) for secure information exchange are becoming aware of the disruptive implications. Currently, governments and businesses employ PKI for many core processes that may become insecure or unavailable when quantum computers break the cryptographic algorithms foundational to PKI. While standardization institutes are currently testing quantum safe cryptographic algorithms, there are no globally agreed-upon cryptographic solutions available. Actors looking to prepare for the implementation of quantum safe cryptographic algorithms lack methods that allow for collective planning and action across organizations, sectors, and nations. The goal of this policy paper is to elicit requirements for a serious game on QS PKI, and derive policy guidelines that actors can use to prepare and formulate governance arrangements. We followed a two-step approach, drawing on technology threat avoidance theory and collective action theory, followed by empirical grounding through a focus group. The results from the literature confirm that a serious game could be a suitable governance mechanism for QS PKI. The focus group results discussed 12 requirements and the requirement's relation to the theoretical background. From this, the findings section arrived at four policy guidelines derived from the requirements that can function as focus areas for further requirement development and as input for policy makers. The policy guidelines concluded are (1) prioritize increasing collective awareness through emphasizing social networks, (2) acknowledge the interdependencies in migrating towards QS PKI, (3) create an understanding of the technical standards in the field and their issuers, and (4) being highly realistic with both negative and positive scenarios to center the players’ understanding of real-world impact.
Quantum technologies are rapidly emerging as a transformative force with profound implications for critical infrastructures, national security, and global governance. Quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing promise unprecedented advances in data processing, secure communications, and environmental and infrastructure monitoring. At the same time, their disruptive potential introduces new ethical, security, and geopolitical risks, particularly for systems that underpin modern societies such as energy networks, telecommunications, finance, transportation, and defence infrastructures. This paper examines the governance of quantum technologies for critical infrastructures, moving from ethical impact assessment to the formulation of coherent national strategies. The study argues that the unique characteristics of quantum technologies — including their high degree of complexity, dual-use nature, and capacity to undermine existing cryptographic and security frameworks — require a shift from reactive regulation to anticipatory and responsible governance. Traditional regulatory approaches are insufficient to address the speed, uncertainty, and strategic relevance of quantum innovation. Instead, the paper emphasizes the need to integrate ethical impact assessment, risk analysis, and societal considerations at the earliest stages of research, development, and deployment. Ethical governance is presented not as a constraint on innovation, but as a foundational element for ensuring trust, resilience, and long-term sustainability. The analysis situates quantum governance within a broader geopolitical context, highlighting how major global actors are investing in quantum capabilities as strategic assets. This competition increases the urgency for coordinated governance frameworks that balance technological sovereignty, security, and international cooperation. Particular attention is given to the protection of critical infrastructures and the transition towards quantum-safe systems, especially in the field of cybersecurity and secure communications. Finally, the paper outlines the implications for national and European strategies, stressing the importance of multi-level governance involving governments, international organisations, industry, and research institutions. It concludes that only a holistic approach — combining ethical foresight, anticipatory governance, and strategic planning — can ensure that quantum technologies enhance societal resilience and security rather than exacerbate systemic vulnerabilities. In this sense, quantum governance becomes a central component of future national strategies for critical infrastructure protection and technological leadership.
Quantum computing promises breakthroughs in areas such as optimization and simulation but also threatens widely used cryptographic systems that secure contemporary digital infrastructures. As a result, organizations and governments are beginning to explore the opportunities and risks associated with quantum computing. Yet key questions remain regarding the current landscape of quantum computing adoption, how organizations should prepare for the inherent threat to cryptography, and who should govern the transition to quantum-safe infrastructures. This panel brings together leading scholars from information systems and cybersecurity to discuss these issues from technological, organizational, and governance perspectives. The discussion aims to clarify emerging adoption patterns, explore strategies for preparing for post-quantum cryptography, and identify implications for the governance of future digital infrastructures.