Philosophers concerned with making physical sense of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics tend to distinguish between interpretations of the theory that aim to present a coherent picture of reality, and anti-realist (empiricist, operationalist, instrumentalist,…) interpretations, which content themselves with looking upon the theory’s formal apparatus as a tool for making predictions. It is rarely appreciated that these alternatives are not exclusive. There are other ways of presenting a coherent picture of reality than to invest with physical reality a calculational tool such as the wave function. In what follows we shall present a coherent picture of reality that explains why the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus, and why the events to which it serves to assign probabilities are the possible outcomes of measurements.
Philosophers concerned with making physical sense of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics tend to distinguish between interpretations of the theory that aim to present a coherent picture of reality, and anti-realist (empiricist, operationalist, instrumentalist,…) interpretations, which content themselves with looking upon the theory’s formal apparatus as a tool for making predictions. It is rarely appreciated that these alternatives are not exclusive. There are other ways of presenting a coherent picture of reality than to invest with physical reality a calculational tool such as the wave function. In what follows we shall present a coherent picture of reality that explains why the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus, and why the events to which it serves to assign probabilities are the possible outcomes of measurements.
The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus. The probability algorithms it places at our disposal—state vectors, wave functions, density matrices, statistical operators—all serve the same purpose, which is to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements, on the basis of the actual outcomes of other (not necessarily earlier) measurements. In other words, the general theoretical framework of contemporary physics is essentially a calculus of correlations between measurement outcomes. This is reason enough to begin by putting together what we already know, and what we need to know, about probabilities.
The main theme of this book is the idea that quantum mechanics is valid not only for microscopic objects but also for the macroscopic apparatus used for quantum mechanical measurements. The author demonstrates the intimate relations that exist between quantum mechanics and its interpretation which are induced by the quantum mechanical measurement process. Consequently, the book is concerned both with the philosophical, metatheoretical problems of interpretations and with the more formal problems of quantum object theory. The consequences of this approach turn out to be partly very promising and partly rather disappointing. On the one hand, it is possible to give a rigorous justification of some important parts of interpretation, such as probability, by means of object theory. On the other hand, the problem of the objectification of measurement results leads to inconsistencies which cannot be resolved in an obvious way. This open problem has far-reaching consequences for the possibility of recognising an objective reality in physics.
How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and (ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities - unconditionally definite quantities and quantities that have values only if they are measured - as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics has been a cause of much puzzlement over the years. The very idea of having two different versions of reality for the same system has been a cause for much debate. Often quantum mechanics textbooks follow the ‘shut up and calculate’ paradigm. This denies the opportunity for the common student to understand the consequence of one of the most elegant and beautiful aspects of science. The state of the art textbooks give a purely algebraic, perfunctory and monotonous approach where the real consequence of the system is not fully appreciated. A good reason for this is the considerable deviation of the quantum mechanical process from the commonsensical idea of truth, reality and reason. We tend to look at the world in a materialistic, deterministic, causal and objectivistic way. We tend not to accept a world of contradictions. A quantum measurement is essentially an amalgamation of contradictions, mystery and duality. It encompasses an implicit dependence on subjectivity and contradicts with causality as we know it. We look at the world as in the present. But a quantum mechanical measurement is a prediction of the future influenced by the observer or the measurer. This offers a philosophical and pedagogical conundrum. It poses a challenge on not just how our perception of the world might change in addition to providing a big challenge on how to make it compatible with the other successful theories of physics. The most common text book interpretation of quantum mechanics has been the Copenhagen Interpretation suggests the ‘collapse of the wave function’ as a mechanism of transition between duality. But a more bizarre yet elegant theory, extending quantum formalism to the classical domain, called the Many Worlds Interpretation has been catching up very quickly; it stands for the split of the universe when we make a quantum mechanical measurement. Consequently, reality as we is redefined as a universal wave function which is a superposition of several outcomes, which is incompatible with many of the successful concepts of physics and has several problems like the correct idea about probability or basis. We adapt the idea of the universal wave function, but instead suggest a continuum interpretation of quantum mechanics where the universal wave function represents the entire singular universe and the concept of atoms or electrons as conceptually a continuous part of it rather than a distinct separate entity. Such an interpretation could be compatible with other continuum theories like the Superfluid vacuum theory or the Higgs Field.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
Despite quantum mechanics’ unrivalled empirical success, its unrestricted formal applicability does not by itself establish that it provides a physically self-sufficient account of an entirely quantum world. This paper argues that the common operational core of quantum mechanics is not a complete theory of purely quantum reality. It is an interface architecture: it connects quantum states and transformations to physical preparations, measurement contexts, stable records, and definite outcomes. The argument distinguishes formal universality, conditional predictive adequacy, and physical self-sufficiency. Quantizing the apparatus extends the chain of quantum correlations but does not derive a single outcome from unitary dynamics; decoherence explains interference suppression, pointer stability, and record proliferation, but does not by itself convert an improper mixture into the actuality of one alternative. A closed universe provides the decisive test because preparation, subsystem decomposition, time, probability, and records can no longer be assigned to an external domain. Decoherent histories, Everettian quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics, objective-collapse theories, relational quantum mechanics, and contextual approaches are accordingly analysed as distinct strategies for closing or redefining the interface. The diagnosis extends to quantum field theory and quantum gravity: quantizing matter, apparatuses, reference frames, or geometry does not alone close the record interface. A fundamental theory must derive, constrain, or replace the conditions under which determinate empirical reality becomes possible. The measurement problem is therefore a local manifestation of a broader problem concerning the physical domain of quantum mechanics. This is a preprint version of a manuscript currently under journal review.