Abstract Human decision-making is relevant for concept formation and cognitive illusions. Cognitive illusions can be explained by quantum probability, while the reason for introducing quantum mechanics is based on ad hoc bounded rationality (BR). Concept formation can be explained in a set-theoretic way, although such explanations have not been extended to cognitive illusions. We naturally expand the idea of BR to incomplete BR and introduce the key notion of nonlocality in cognition without any attempts on quantum theory. We define incomplete bounded rationality and nonlocality as a binary relation, construct a lattice from the relation by using a rough-set technique, and define probability in concept formation. By using probability defined in concept formation, we describe various cognitive illusions, such as the guppy effect, conjunction fallacy, order effect, and so on. It implies that cognitive illusions can be explained by changes in the probability space relevant to concept formation.
Abstract Human decision-making is relevant for concept formation and cognitive illusions. Cognitive illusions can be explained by quantum probability, while the reason for introducing quantum mechanics is based on ad hoc bounded rationality (BR). Concept formation can be explained in a set-theoretic way, although such explanations have not been extended to cognitive illusions. We naturally expand the idea of BR to incomplete BR and introduce the key notion of nonlocality in cognition without any attempts on quantum theory. We define incomplete bounded rationality and nonlocality as a binary relation, construct a lattice from the relation by using a rough-set technique, and define probability in concept formation. By using probability defined in concept formation, we describe various cognitive illusions, such as the guppy effect, conjunction fallacy, order effect, and so on. It implies that cognitive illusions can be explained by changes in the probability space relevant to concept formation.
The broader scope of our investigations is the search for the way in which concepts and their combinations carry and influence meaning and what this implies for human thought. More specifically, we examine the use of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as a modeling instrument and propose a general mathematical modeling scheme for the combinations of concepts. We point out that quantum mechanical principles, such as superposition and interference, are at the origin of specific effects in cognition related to concept combinations, such as the guppy effect and the overextension and underextension of membership weights of items. We work out a concrete quantum mechanical model for a large set of experimental data of membership weights with overextension and underextension of items with respect to the conjunction and disjunction of pairs of concepts, and show that no classical model is possible for these data. We put forward an explanation by linking the presence of quantum aspects that model concept combinations to the basic process of concept formation. We investigate the implications of our quantum modeling scheme for the structure of human thought, and show the presence of a two-layer structure consisting of a classical logical layer and a quantum conceptual layer. We consider connections between our findings and phenomena such as the disjunction effect and the conjunction fallacy in decision theory, violations of the sure thing principle, and the Allais and Elsberg paradoxes in economics.
Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of life; most events, affairs, and questions are uncertain. A key problem in behavioral sciences is how the mind copes with uncertain information. Quantum probability theory offers a set of principles for inference, which align well with intuition about psychological processes in certain cases: cases when it appears that inference is contextual, the mental state changes as a result of previous judgments, or there is interference between different possibilities. We motivate the use of quantum theory in cognition and its key characteristics. For each of these characteristics, we review relevant quantum cognitive models and empirical support. The scope of quantum cognitive models encompasses fallacies in decision-making (such as the conjunction fallacy or the disjunction effect), question order effects, conceptual combination, evidence accumulation, perception, over-/underdistribution effects in memory, and more. Quantum models often formalize psychological ideas previously expressed in heuristic terms, allow unified explanations of previously disparate findings, and have led to several surprising, novel predictions. We also cast a critical eye on quantum models and consider some of their shortcomings and issues regarding their further development.
We consider several puzzles of bounded rationality. These include the Allais- and Ellsberg paradox, the disjunction effect, and related puzzles. We argue that the present account of quantum cognition—taking quantum probabilities rather than classical probabilities—can give a more systematic description of these puzzles than the alternate treatments in the traditional frameworks of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, the quantum probabilistic treatment does not always provide a deeper understanding and a true explanation of these puzzles. One reason is that quantum approaches introduce additional parameters which possibly can be fitted to empirical data but which do not necessarily explain them. Hence, the phenomenological research has to be augmented by responding to deeper foundational issues. In this article, we make the general distinction between foundational and phenomenological research programs, explaining the foundational issue of quantum cognition from the perspective of operational realism. This framework is motivated by assuming partial Boolean algebras (describing particular perspectives). They are combined into a uniform system (i.e. orthomodular lattice) via a mechanism preventing the simultaneous realization of perspectives. Gleason’s theorem then automatically leads to a distinction between probabilities that are defined by pure states and probabilities arising from the statistical mixture of pure states. This formal distinction relates to the conceptual distinction between risk and ignorance. Another outcome identifies quantum aspects in dynamic macro-systems using the framework of symbolic dynamics. Finally, we discuss several ideas that are useful for justifying complementarity in cognitive systems.
A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced--the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.
Quantum theory has inspired many new ideas for understanding Cognition and decision making. Given the nascent state of this field, many new challenges still remain. What are the strengths and unique contributions of these ideas? What are likely next steps in its development? How can it be applied to practical problems in cognitive science? Is this a rational or an irrational system of reasoning? What, if any, are its connections to neuroscience? Should the hard problem of consciousness be considered? These are questions that we try to address in this chapter, albeit at times in a limited way. We end with a debate with a fictitious skeptic (actually previous reviewers) of these ideas. Let us start by reviewing what we have covered so far. Contributions to cognition and decision We begin by summarizing the conclusions reached in previous chapters regarding the usefulness of quantum theory for modelling phenomena in cognition and decision. Chapter 1 provided some motivation and Chapter 2 provided a theoretical introduction to quantum theory. Chapter 3 presented a quantum model to account for question order effects on survey research. An exact and parameter-free test was derived from the model, which produced surprisingly accurate predictions for results obtained from three different large Gallup poll survey studies. Chapter 4 described a quantum model of probability judgments to account for findings that produce violations of classic probability theory, including conjunction and disjunction fallacies and order effects on inference.
Classic probability theory (CPT) is generally considered the rational way to make inferences, but there have been some empirical findings showing a divergence between reasoning and the principles of classical probability theory (CPT), inviting the conclusion that humans are irrational. Perhaps the most famous of these findings is the conjunction fallacy (CF). Recently, the CF has been shown consistent with the principles of an alternative probabilistic framework, quantum probability theory (QPT). Does this imply that QPT is irrational or does QPT provide an alternative interpretation of rationality? Our presentation consists of 3 parts. First, we examine the putative rational status of QPT using the same argument as used to establish the rationality of CPT, the Dutch Book (DB) argument, according to which reasoners should not commit to bets guaranteeing a loss. We prove the rational status of QPT by formulating it as a particular case of an extended form of CPT, with separate probability spaces produced by changing context. Second, we empirically examine the key requirement for whether a CF can be rational or not; the results show that participants indeed behave rationally, at least relative to the representations they employ. Finally, we consider whether the conditions for the CF to be rational are applicable in the outside (nonmental) world. Our discussion provides a general and alternative perspective for rational probabilistic inference, based on the idea that contextuality requires either reasoning in separate CPT probability spaces or reasoning with QPT principles. (PsycINFO Database Record