Classic probability theory (CPT) is generally considered the rational way to make inferences, but there have been some empirical findings showing a divergence between reasoning and the principles of classical probability theory (CPT), inviting the conclusion that humans are irrational. Perhaps the most famous of these findings is the conjunction fallacy (CF). Recently, the CF has been shown consistent with the principles of an alternative probabilistic framework, quantum probability theory (QPT). Does this imply that QPT is irrational or does QPT provide an alternative interpretation of rationality? Our presentation consists of 3 parts. First, we examine the putative rational status of QPT using the same argument as used to establish the rationality of CPT, the Dutch Book (DB) argument, according to which reasoners should not commit to bets guaranteeing a loss. We prove the rational status of QPT by formulating it as a particular case of an extended form of CPT, with separate probability spaces produced by changing context. Second, we empirically examine the key requirement for whether a CF can be rational or not; the results show that participants indeed behave rationally, at least relative to the representations they employ. Finally, we consider whether the conditions for the CF to be rational are applicable in the outside (nonmental) world. Our discussion provides a general and alternative perspective for rational probabilistic inference, based on the idea that contextuality requires either reasoning in separate CPT probability spaces or reasoning with QPT principles. (PsycINFO Database Record
Classic probability theory (CPT) is generally considered the rational way to make inferences, but there have been some empirical findings showing a divergence between reasoning and the principles of classical probability theory (CPT), inviting the conclusion that humans are irrational. Perhaps the most famous of these findings is the conjunction fallacy (CF). Recently, the CF has been shown consistent with the principles of an alternative probabilistic framework, quantum probability theory (QPT). Does this imply that QPT is irrational or does QPT provide an alternative interpretation of rationality? Our presentation consists of 3 parts. First, we examine the putative rational status of QPT using the same argument as used to establish the rationality of CPT, the Dutch Book (DB) argument, according to which reasoners should not commit to bets guaranteeing a loss. We prove the rational status of QPT by formulating it as a particular case of an extended form of CPT, with separate probability spaces produced by changing context. Second, we empirically examine the key requirement for whether a CF can be rational or not; the results show that participants indeed behave rationally, at least relative to the representations they employ. Finally, we consider whether the conditions for the CF to be rational are applicable in the outside (nonmental) world. Our discussion provides a general and alternative perspective for rational probabilistic inference, based on the idea that contextuality requires either reasoning in separate CPT probability spaces or reasoning with QPT principles. (PsycINFO Database Record
There is considerable variety in human inference (e.g., a doctor inferring the presence of a disease, a juror inferring the guilt of a defendant, or someone inferring future weight loss based on diet and exercise). As such, people display a wide range of behaviors when making inference judgments. Sometimes, people's judgments appear Bayesian (i.e., normative), but in other cases, judgments deviate from the normative prescription of classical probability theory. How can we combine both Bayesian and non-Bayesian influences in a principled way? We propose a unified explanation of human inference using quantum probability theory. In our approach, we postulate a hierarchy of mental representations, from 'fully' quantum to 'fully' classical, which could be adopted in different situations. In our hierarchy of models, moving from the lowest level to the highest involves changing assumptions about compatibility (i.e., how joint events are represented). Using results from 3 experiments, we show that our modeling approach explains 5 key phenomena in human inference including order effects, reciprocity (i.e., the inverse fallacy), memorylessness, violations of the Markov condition, and antidiscounting. As far as we are aware, no existing theory or model can explain all 5 phenomena. We also explore transitions in our hierarchy, examining how representations change from more quantum to more classical. We show that classical representations provide a better account of data as individuals gain familiarity with a task. We also show that representations vary between individuals, in a way that relates to a simple measure of cognitive style, the Cognitive Reflection Test. (PsycINFO Database Record
Purpose: Decision-making under uncertainty remains a foundational challenge in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Classical Bayesian Probability Models (CBM) often fail to explain paradoxical cognitive behaviors such as order effects, ambiguity aversion, and context-dependent reasoning. This study seeks to compare Quantum Probability Theory (QPT) and Classical Bayesian Models in their ability to capture the dynamics of human decision-making. It aims to determine which framework more accurately reflects the cognitive mechanisms underlying reasoning under uncertainty. Methodology: A qualitative, exploratory research design was adopted, involving in-depth semi-structured interviews with 16 experts across psychology, philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive neuroscience. Participants were purposively selected for their theoretical and empirical expertise in probabilistic reasoning. Data were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis, guided by the Dual-Process Theory and Busemeyer’s Quantum Cognition framework. The analysis emphasized participants’ perspectives on theoretical assumptions, cognitive plausibility, and predictive utility between QPT and CBM paradigms. Findings: Thematic findings reveal that Quantum Probability Theory offers superior explanatory power in contexts involving cognitive ambiguity, contextual dependence, and non-commutativity of mental operations. Participants consistently reported that QPT better models real-world reasoning tasks where classical logic collapses, capturing the fluid and context-sensitive nature of human judgment. Conversely, while CBM remains effective in structured, low-uncertainty scenarios, it fails to accommodate superposition and interference effects inherent in human cognition. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice, and Policy (Recommendations): The study contributes theoretically by demonstrating how quantum probabilistic models expand existing theories of bounded rationality and probabilistic reasoning in cognitive science. Practically, it encourages interdisciplinary collaboration between cognitive scientists, AI researchers, and philosophers to refine decision models that mirror human intuition more closely. Policy-wise, the findings support the integration of quantum-inspired approaches in the design of intelligent decision-support systems and cognitive architectures. The study recommends continued empirical validation of QPT within applied domains—such as behavioral economics, machine learning, and cognitive modeling—to strengthen its predictive and explanatory robustness.
There has been a growing trend to develop cognitive models based on the mathematics of quantum theory. A common theme in the motivation of such models has been findings which apparently challenge the applicability of classical formalisms, specifically ones based on classical probability theory. Classical probability theory has had a singularly important place in cognitive theory, because of its (in general) descriptive success but, more importantly, because in decision situations with low, equivalent stakes it offers a multiply justified normative standard. Quantum cognitive models have had a degree of descriptive success and proponents of such models have argued that they reveal new intuitions or insights regarding decisions in uncertain situations. However, can quantum cognitive models further benefit from normative justifications analogous to those for classical probability models? If the answer is yes, how can we determine the rational status of a decision, which may be consistent with quantum theory, but inconsistent with classical probability theory? In this paper, we review the proposal from Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, and Yearsley (2017), that quantum decision models benefit from normative justification based on the Dutch Book Theorem, in exactly the same way as models based on classical probability theory.
How can we use quantum theory to model other phenomena of interest to researchers in cognition and decision making? Quantum theory is not easy for researchers in cognition and decision making to accept. In fact, quantum mechanics was not easy for physicists to accept either, but it was forced on them by several paradoxical findings that could not be explained using classical physics. We have a similar problem in cognition and decision making – there are numerous paradoxical findings that just seem irrational according to classic probability theory. For example, under some conditions, people judge the probability of event A and B to be greater than the probability of event B , which is called the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Also, under the same conditions, they judge the probability of A or B to be less than the probability of event A (Carlson & Yates, 1989), which is called the disjunction fallacy. In this chapter we examine how quantum probability theory explains these and other puzzling results from human probability judgment research. This chapter has two main parts. In the first part, we use a quantum model to derive qualitative predictions for conjunction errors, disjunction errors, and other closely related findings. The first section provides a general set of predictions that do not depend on specific assumptions about the features used to represent events, and the predictions are parameter free. In the second part, we examine the quantitative predictions of the quantum model for a Bayesian inference task, which we use to explain order effects on inference.
Human reasoning is traditionally modeled through rational-order frameworks that assume stability, separability, and coherence. Yet across judgment, valuation, perception, and social decision-making, empirical work consistently reveals patterned violations of these assumptions. These deviations intensify in real-world contexts shaped by institutional constraints, identity commitments, and collective narratives, where reasoning must navigate incompatible interpretive frames and interdependent evaluative pressures. Existing theories typically treat such phenomena as noise, bias, or bounded rationality, leaving no formal account of how rational-order rules interact with the variability inherent in social domains. This article proposes a structural framework that explains why these two regimes diverge and how their interaction produces systematic mismatches. Building on quantum probability theory, not as a physical metaphor but as a representational tool, it formalizes evaluative states that remain indeterminate until elicited, transform under contextual modulation, and become relationally coupled across agents and domains. Whereas, existing quantum-cognition models primarily address task-level effects such as conjunction errors or order dependence, this framework scales quantum principles to socially and institutionally embedded reasoning. The account identifies contradiction, interference, entanglement, and resolution as recurrent properties of real-world cognition and shows how quantum formalisms provide a coherent vocabulary for capturing these phenomena. To support cumulative progress, the article outlines a research agenda with empirically testable designs for distinguishing incompatible bases, assessing inseparability, modeling context-driven transformations, and integrating multi-level reasoning environments. This program positions quantum and classical approaches within a unified architecture and advances a broader science of reasoning.
Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality.