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Chinese Physics B

Lower bound for the security of differential phase shift quantum key distribution against a one-pulse-attack

LI ., Hongwei, Yin, Zhenqiang, Wang, Shuang, Bao, Wansu, Guo, Guang-Can, Han, Zheng-fu

Published Jan 1, 2011• 0 citations
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Quantum key distribution is the art of sharing secret keys between two distant parties, and has attracted a lot of attention due to its unconditional security. Compared with other quantum key distribution protocols, the differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol has higher efficiency and simpler apparatus. Unfortunately, the unconditional security of differential phase shift quantum key distribution has not been proved. Utilizing the sharp continuity of the von Neuman entropy and some basic inequalities, we estimate the upper bound for the eavesdropper Eve's information. We then prove the lower bound for the security of the differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol against a one-pulse attack with Devatak—Winter's secret key rate formula.
In this paper we present limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the maximal distance achievable by a differential‐phase‐shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we compare the performance of two possible sequential attacks against DPS QKD where Eve realizes, respectively, optimal unambiguous state discrimination of Alice’s signal states, and optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states. We show that the second eavesdropping strategy provides tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than the former one.
In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states emitted by the source. We show that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks where the eavesdropper aims to identify the state of each signal emitted by the source unambiguously.