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AIP conference proceedings

Upper bounds for the security of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution with weak coherent states

Marcos Curty, Kiyoshi Tamaki, Tobias Moroder, Hipólito Gómez-Sousa, Alexander I. Lvovsky

Published Jan 1, 2009• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper we present limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the maximal distance achievable by a differential‐phase‐shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we compare the performance of two possible sequential attacks against DPS QKD where Eve realizes, respectively, optimal unambiguous state discrimination of Alice’s signal states, and optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states. We show that the second eavesdropping strategy provides tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than the former one.

DOI
10.1063/1.3131346

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In this paper we present limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the maximal distance achievable by a differential‐phase‐shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we compare the performance of two possible sequential attacks against DPS QKD where Eve realizes, respectively, optimal unambiguous state discrimination of Alice’s signal states, and optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states. We show that the second eavesdropping strategy provides tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than the former one.
In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states emitted by the source. We show that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks where the eavesdropper aims to identify the state of each signal emitted by the source unambiguously.
We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination and minimum error discrimination, respectively, of the signal states emitted by the source. Sequential attacks represent;I special type of intercept-resend attacks and, therefore, they provide ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by quantum key distribution schemes.
We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination and minimum error discrimination, respectively, of the signal states emitted by the source. Sequential attacks represent a special type of intercept-resend attacks and, therefore, they provide ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by quantum key distribution schemes.