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arXiv:0806.0858 · Quantum Information and Computation

Upper bounds on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Hipólito Gómez-Sousa, Marcos Curty

Published Jan 1, 2009• 11 citations
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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states emitted by the source. We show that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks where the eavesdropper aims to identify the state of each signal emitted by the source unambiguously.

DOI
10.26421/qic9.1-2-4

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In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states emitted by the source. We show that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks where the eavesdropper aims to identify the state of each signal emitted by the source unambiguously.
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We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination and minimum error discrimination, respectively, of the signal states emitted by the source. Sequential attacks represent a special type of intercept-resend attacks and, therefore, they provide ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by quantum key distribution schemes.
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