The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, aside from the exclusion of such things as hidden variables. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is not as a density operator but as an equivalence class of density operators. The specific equivalence class is determined by a stability criterion taken from decoherence theory. The central issue is the extraction of information from experiments, as stressed by Bohr. The theory developed here can be regarded as an inevitable consequence of merging Bohr's concepts of complementarity with the Everett formulation of quantum mechanics. The resulting definition of the quantum state is, however, relevant for all interpretations of quantum mechanics, because the extraction of information from experiments is an operational question that must be considered in any interpretation.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, aside from the exclusion of such things as hidden variables. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is not as a density operator but as an equivalence class of density operators. The specific equivalence class is determined by a stability criterion taken from decoherence theory. The central issue is the extraction of information from experiments, as stressed by Bohr. The theory developed here can be regarded as an inevitable consequence of merging Bohr's concepts of complementarity with the Everett formulation of quantum mechanics. The resulting definition of the quantum state is, however, relevant for all interpretations of quantum mechanics, because the extraction of information from experiments is an operational question that must be considered in any interpretation.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is as an equivalence class similar to that used by von Neumann to describe macroscopic subsystems. He showed that such equivalence classes are necessary in order to maximize information entropy and achieve agreement with experimental entropy. However, the significance of these results for the quantum theory of measurement has been overlooked. Current formulations of measurement theory are therefore manifestly in conflict with experiment. This conflict is resolved by the definition of the quantum state proposed here.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
A persistent focus on the concept of emergence as a core element of the scientific method allows a clean separation, insofar as this is possible, of the physical and philosophical aspects of the problem of outcomes in quantum mechanics. The philosophical part of the problem is to explain why a closed system has definite experimental outcomes. The physical part is to show mathematically that there exists a limit in which the contradiction between unitary Schroedinger dynamics and a reduction process leading to distinct outcomes becomes negligible according to an explicitly stated criterion, and to make this criterion as objective as possible. The physical problem is solved here by redefining the notion of a quantum state and finding a suitable measure for the change of state upon reduction. The appropriate definition of the quantum state is not as a ray or density operator in Hilbert space, but rather as an equivalence class consisting of all density operators in a given subspace, the members of which all describe the same experimental outcome. For systems containing only subsystems that are integrated with their environments, these equivalence classes can be represented mathematically by projection operators, and the resulting formalism is closely related to that used by von Neumann to study the increase of entropy predicted by the second law of thermodynamics. However, nearly isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly, as a consequence of their interaction with integrated subsystems. The reduced states of isolated subsystems are the same conditional states used in the definition of quantum discord. The key concepts of decoherence theory can all be adapted to fit this definition of a quantum state, resulting in a unified theory capable of resolving, in principle, all aspects of the quantum measurement problem. The theory thus obtained is weakly objective but not strongly objective.
I present here a thought experiment which violates the most widely accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics “The Copenhagen Interpretation” and Bohr’s complementarity which says that there is no meaning of the state of a particle until it is observed and the act of observation might change it. The experiment consists of a double slit apparatus which is modified by putting a second double slit apparatus between the source and the original apparatus with certain conditions imposed on both the apparatuses using the facts of interference and diffraction. A striking paradox emerges if we consider the arguments of Bohr’s complementarity, i.e. the photon travels through both the paths simultaneously in a double slit apparatus whenever there is interference. It turns out that this paradox can be resolved only if the photon travels through one path even if interference fringes are visible.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
I begin by examining the question of the quantum limits of knowledge by briefly presenting the constraints of the theory that derive from its mathematical structure (in particular the no-go theorems formulated by von Neumann and Kochen and Specker). I then argue that these theorems reflect on a formal level those practical and experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems. In particular, I discuss some aspects of this relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. Both interpretations are based on the widely shared fact that quantum mechanics does not describe previously definite quantities. In the final part I show that, as a consequence of a relationist and perspectival approach to quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the universe regarded as an isolated system cannot be known in principle, so that the universe must be described “from within” by dividing it into two "parts". This is in fact the only way in which any two systems can exchange information by being physically correlated.