The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is as an equivalence class similar to that used by von Neumann to describe macroscopic subsystems. He showed that such equivalence classes are necessary in order to maximize information entropy and achieve agreement with experimental entropy. However, the significance of these results for the quantum theory of measurement has been overlooked. Current formulations of measurement theory are therefore manifestly in conflict with experiment. This conflict is resolved by the definition of the quantum state proposed here.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is as an equivalence class similar to that used by von Neumann to describe macroscopic subsystems. He showed that such equivalence classes are necessary in order to maximize information entropy and achieve agreement with experimental entropy. However, the significance of these results for the quantum theory of measurement has been overlooked. Current formulations of measurement theory are therefore manifestly in conflict with experiment. This conflict is resolved by the definition of the quantum state proposed here.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, aside from the exclusion of such things as hidden variables. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is not as a density operator but as an equivalence class of density operators. The specific equivalence class is determined by a stability criterion taken from decoherence theory. The central issue is the extraction of information from experiments, as stressed by Bohr. The theory developed here can be regarded as an inevitable consequence of merging Bohr's concepts of complementarity with the Everett formulation of quantum mechanics. The resulting definition of the quantum state is, however, relevant for all interpretations of quantum mechanics, because the extraction of information from experiments is an operational question that must be considered in any interpretation.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
I present here a thought experiment which violates the most widely accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics “The Copenhagen Interpretation” and Bohr’s complementarity which says that there is no meaning of the state of a particle until it is observed and the act of observation might change it. The experiment consists of a double slit apparatus which is modified by putting a second double slit apparatus between the source and the original apparatus with certain conditions imposed on both the apparatuses using the facts of interference and diffraction. A striking paradox emerges if we consider the arguments of Bohr’s complementarity, i.e. the photon travels through both the paths simultaneously in a double slit apparatus whenever there is interference. It turns out that this paradox can be resolved only if the photon travels through one path even if interference fringes are visible.
In quantum theory as it is currently formulated the measurement of an observable quantity of a physical system is the occasion for a change of state of the system, except when the state prior to the measurement is an eigenstate of the observable. Two proposals for interpreting this kind of change are examined in detail, and several variant proposals are considered briefly. According to the interpretation proposed by von Neumann, and by London and Bauer the change of state is completed only when the result of the observation is registered in the observer's consciousness. Although this interpretation appears to be free from inconsistencies, it is not supported by psychological evidence and it is difficult to reconcile with the intersubjective agreement of several independent observers. According to the interpretation proposed by Bohr, the change of state is a consequence of the fundamental assumption that the description of any physical phenomenon requires reference to the experimental arrangement. Bohr's proposals are valuable as practical maxims in scientific activity, but they are shown to involve the renunciation of any ontological framework in which all types of events—physical and mental, microscopic and macroscopic—can be located. It is concluded that a satisfactory account of the observation of microphysical quantities is unlikely if the present formulation of quantum theory is rigorously maintained.
This article explores Bohr's argument, advanced under the heading of 'complementarity,' concerning quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, and its physical and philosophical implications.In Bohr, the term complementarity designates both a particular concept and an overall interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in part grounded in this concept.While the argument of this article is primarily philosophical, it will also address, historically, the development and transformations of Bohr's thinking, under the impact of the development of quantum theory and Bohr's confrontation with Einstein, especially their exchange concerning the EPR experiment, proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935.Bohr's interpretation was progressively characterized by a more radical epistemology, in its ultimate form, which was developed in the 1930s and with which I shall be especially concerned here, defined by his new concepts of phenomenon and atomicity.According to this epistemology, quantum objects are seen as indescribable and possibly even as inconceivable, and as manifesting their existence only in the effects of their interactions with measuring instruments upon those instruments, effects that define phenomena in Bohr's sense.The absence of causality is an automatic consequence of this epistemology.I shall also consider how probability and statistics work under these epistemological conditions.
This thesis is an examination of the measurement problem from within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics where I take issue with von Neumann’s theory of measurement which argues for the subjective collapse of the wave function by a conscious observer. I argue that von Neumann’s postulate of collapse has led to several intractable philosophical and conceptual problems in its account of quantum measurement. I argue that these problems arise from von Neumann’s misreading of Bohr’s complementarity regarding the relationship between subject and object as distinct metaphysical entities. Instead, I offer a new way of defining the subject-object relation based on Don Howard’s reading of Bohr’s complementarity as subject-object nonseparability (SON). I argue that the SON principle has the potential of placing Copenhagen on more solid philosophical footing by viewing the subject-object relationship not as a causal relation, but as a relation of ontological dependence to avoid the idea of collapse altogether.