I begin by examining the question of the quantum limits of knowledge by briefly presenting the constraints of the theory that derive from its mathematical structure (in particular the no-go theorems formulated by von Neumann and Kochen and Specker). I then argue that these theorems reflect on a formal level those practical and experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems. In particular, I discuss some aspects of this relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. Both interpretations are based on the widely shared fact that quantum mechanics does not describe previously definite quantities. In the final part I show that, as a consequence of a relationist and perspectival approach to quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the universe regarded as an isolated system cannot be known in principle, so that the universe must be described “from within” by dividing it into two "parts". This is in fact the only way in which any two systems can exchange information by being physically correlated.
I begin by examining the question of the quantum limits of knowledge by briefly presenting the constraints of the theory that derive from its mathematical structure (in particular the no-go theorems formulated by von Neumann and Kochen and Specker). I then argue that these theorems reflect on a formal level those practical and experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems. In particular, I discuss some aspects of this relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. Both interpretations are based on the widely shared fact that quantum mechanics does not describe previously definite quantities. In the final part I show that, as a consequence of a relationist and perspectival approach to quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the universe regarded as an isolated system cannot be known in principle, so that the universe must be described “from within” by dividing it into two "parts". This is in fact the only way in which any two systems can exchange information by being physically correlated.
I begin by examining the question of the quantum limits of knowledge by briefly presenting the constraints of the theory that derive from its mathematical structure (in particular the no-go theorems formulated by von Neumann and Kochen and Specker). I then argue that these theorems reflect on a formal level those practical and experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems. In particular, I discuss some aspects of this relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. Both interpretations are based on the widely shared fact fact that quantum mechanics does not describe previously definite quantities. In the final part I show that, as a consequence of a relationist and perspectival approach to quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the universe regarded as an isolated system cannot be known in principle, so that the universe must be described “from within” by dividing it into two arbitrary parts. This is in fact the only way in which the two systems can exchange information by being physically correlated.
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist) ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr's landmark 1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about the necessity of Bohr's philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, aside from the exclusion of such things as hidden variables. Here I show that the application of Bohr's main concepts of complementarity to the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The appropriate definition is not as a density operator but as an equivalence class of density operators. The specific equivalence class is determined by a stability criterion taken from decoherence theory. The central issue is the extraction of information from experiments, as stressed by Bohr. The theory developed here can be regarded as an inevitable consequence of merging Bohr's concepts of complementarity with the Everett formulation of quantum mechanics. The resulting definition of the quantum state is, however, relevant for all interpretations of quantum mechanics, because the extraction of information from experiments is an operational question that must be considered in any interpretation.
A persistent focus on the concept of emergence as a core element of the scientific method allows a clean separation, insofar as this is possible, of the physical and philosophical aspects of the problem of outcomes in quantum mechanics. The philosophical part of the problem is to explain why a closed system has definite experimental outcomes. The physical part is to show mathematically that there exists a limit in which the contradiction between unitary Schroedinger dynamics and a reduction process leading to distinct outcomes becomes negligible according to an explicitly stated criterion, and to make this criterion as objective as possible. The physical problem is solved here by redefining the notion of a quantum state and finding a suitable measure for the change of state upon reduction. The appropriate definition of the quantum state is not as a ray or density operator in Hilbert space, but rather as an equivalence class consisting of all density operators in a given subspace, the members of which all describe the same experimental outcome. For systems containing only subsystems that are integrated with their environments, these equivalence classes can be represented mathematically by projection operators, and the resulting formalism is closely related to that used by von Neumann to study the increase of entropy predicted by the second law of thermodynamics. However, nearly isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly, as a consequence of their interaction with integrated subsystems. The reduced states of isolated subsystems are the same conditional states used in the definition of quantum discord. The key concepts of decoherence theory can all be adapted to fit this definition of a quantum state, resulting in a unified theory capable of resolving, in principle, all aspects of the quantum measurement problem. The theory thus obtained is weakly objective but not strongly objective.
A case study of quantum mechanics is investigated in the framework of the philosophical opposition “mathematical model – reality”. All classical science obeys the postulate about the fundamental difference of model and reality, and thus distinguishing epistemology from ontology fundamentally. The theorems about the absence of hidden variables in quantum mechanics imply for it to be “complete” (versus Einstein’s opinion). That consistent completeness (unlike arithmetic to set theory in the foundations of mathematics in Gödel’s opinion) can be interpreted furthermore as the coincidence of model and reality. The paper discusses the option and fact of that coincidence it its base: the fundamental postulate formulated by Niels Bohr about what quantum mechanics studies (unlike all classical science). Quantum mechanics involves and develops further both identification and disjunctive distinction of the global space of the apparatus and the local space of the investigated quantum entity as complementary to each other. This results into the analogical complementarity of model and reality in quantum mechanics. The apparatus turns out to be both absolutely “transparent” and identically coinciding simultaneously with the reflected quantum reality. Thus, the coincidence of model and reality is postulated as necessary condition for cognition in quantum mechanics by Bohr’s postulate and further, embodied in its formalism of the separable complex Hilbert space, in turn, implying the theorems of the absence of hidden variables (or the equivalent to them “conservation of energy conservation” in quantum mechanics). What the apparatus and measured entity exchange cannot be energy (for the different exponents of energy), but quantum information (as a certain, unambiguously determined wave function) therefore a generalized law of conservation, from which the conservation of energy conservation is a corollary. Particularly, the local and global space (rigorously justified in the Standard model) share the complementarity isomorphic to that of model and reality in the foundation of quantum mechanics. On that background, one can think of the troubles of “quantum gravity” as fundamental, direct corollaries from the postulates of quantum mechanics. Gravity can be defined only as a relation or by a pair of non-orthogonal separable complex Hilbert space attachable whether to two “parts” or to a whole and its parts. On the contrary, all the three fundamental interactions in the Standard model are “flat” and only “properties”: they need only a single separable complex Hilbert space to be defined.
I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world, nor our observatons, experiences or opinions of it. Instead, the theory offers reliable advice on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The actual outcome is a perspectival fact: a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why shoud the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner's friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect.