The 5G telecommunication network security is based on the standard specified by 3GPP (3rd Generation
Partnership Project) and on the security of the master key shared between the UE (User Equipment) and the
operator. To authenticate to the network, the 5G-AKA (5G-Authentication Key Agreement) protocol uses mutual
authentication. Users resp. operators use cryptography to verify the authenticity of the operator resp. users.
However, knowledge of the master key can create a hacker network that can capture the traffic of users. The QPQ-
CD module (Quantum and Post Quantum Cipherkey Dynamic) consists of modifying the 3GPP standard by adding
a recurrent change of this key to each successful authentication. The quantum part of QPQ-CD will be formed by a
quantum confusion technique based on the Hilbert QHT (Quantum Hilbert Transform) method and the Arnold QAT
(Quantum Arnold Transform) method on 3 matrices. The Post-Quantum part of QPQ-CD will focus on multiple
hashing methods. The 12 families of hash algorithm used will reduce the matrices to 256 bits. An optimizer based on
a one-bit change and an effective probability selector perfect the choice of the next key. The effective probability of
the key will be based on probability of extremity, probability of proximity, probability of a bit changed, and
probability of disorder or binary entropy and probability of penalties. According to the order of its probabilities, the
following key after QPQ-CD thus has the behavior: very far from the ends of the key (00 ... 000 and 11 ... 111); very
far from the previous key; several bits changed and very messy from the point of view bit zero and bit one and the
penalty of bad extremity proximity. One of the 5 approaches of selectors and key optimizer will be perfected to
refine the result. By simulating on MATLAB several authentication tests, the probability of the extremity and
proximity will both be greater than or equal to 50% and the probability in case of binary entropy and disorder will
be close to 100%. The effective probability of selection at this time will be greater than 50%
The 5G telecommunication network security is based on the standard specified by 3GPP (3rd Generation
Partnership Project) and on the security of the master key shared between the UE (User Equipment) and the
operator. To authenticate to the network, the 5G-AKA (5G-Authentication Key Agreement) protocol uses mutual
authentication. Users resp. operators use cryptography to verify the authenticity of the operator resp. users.
However, knowledge of the master key can create a hacker network that can capture the traffic of users. The QPQ-
CD module (Quantum and Post Quantum Cipherkey Dynamic) consists of modifying the 3GPP standard by adding
a recurrent change of this key to each successful authentication. The quantum part of QPQ-CD will be formed by a
quantum confusion technique based on the Hilbert QHT (Quantum Hilbert Transform) method and the Arnold QAT
(Quantum Arnold Transform) method on 3 matrices. The Post-Quantum part of QPQ-CD will focus on multiple
hashing methods. The 12 families of hash algorithm used will reduce the matrices to 256 bits. An optimizer based on
a one-bit change and an effective probability selector perfect the choice of the next key. The effective probability of
the key will be based on probability of extremity, probability of proximity, probability of a bit changed, and
probability of disorder or binary entropy and probability of penalties. According to the order of its probabilities, the
following key after QPQ-CD thus has the behavior: very far from the ends of the key (00 ... 000 and 11 ... 111); very
far from the previous key; several bits changed and very messy from the point of view bit zero and bit one and the
penalty of bad extremity proximity. One of the 5 approaches of selectors and key optimizer will be perfected to
refine the result. By simulating on MATLAB several authentication tests, the probability of the extremity and
proximity will both be greater than or equal to 50% and the probability in case of binary entropy and disorder will
be close to 100%. The effective probability of selection at this time will be greater than 50%
The QPQ-CD (Quantum and PostQuantum CipherKey Dynamic uses a dynamic key after the registration of the
mobile at the 5G Network. The algorithm could be divided in two parts : The Quantum Cryptography (QC) and
Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) . The Post Quantum Cryptography will use 12 families of algorithms which are
duplicate algorithm of : MD45, MD45xor, MD54, MD54xor, SHA256, SHA256xor for treating the 2 output QHT
separately and QAT of the Quantum algorithm. Before the selector of the next key, the 12 keys of 256 bits are
optimized of one bit change and selected the best effective probability. It will be based on probability by the
extremity, probability of proximity, probability of a bit changed, and probability of disorder or binary entropy and
probability of penalties. According to the order of its probabilities, the following key after QPQ-CD thus has the
behavior: very far from the ends of the key (00 ... 000 and 11 ... 111); very far from the previous key; several bits
changed and very messy from the point of view bit zero and bit one and the penalty of bad extremity proximity. All
key chosen keys have a probability by the extremity and proximity between 50% until 100%. The probability of the
bit changed is to 50%, the entropy is near 100%. The result is only obtained if the system uses optimization of one
bit changed. Any chart representative also permits to include all 12 keys obtained after the Post Quantum algorithm
have all chance to be selected by the system. So all varieties of PostQuantum Cryptography is necessary to be
implemented on the QPQ-CD. All the result is simulated with Matlab.
The authentication process in fifth-generation networks between the user equipment and the network relies on secure communication protocols, with the 5G authentication and key agreement (5G-AKA) being a prominent one. However, this protocol still has shortcomings, as identified in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)release, which poses vulnerabilities. Notably, a primary concern is the insufficient protection of user privacy. This deficiency allows attackers to potentially exploit weaknesses in encryption, signing, and update mechanisms, leading to the tracking of a user's identity, location, and activities. Furthermore, the5G-AKA protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which malicious actors can assume the identity of service providers or networks, leading to the interruption of communication between users and servers. Additionally, the protocol lacks robustness in guaranteeing mutual authentication, enabling attackers to forge authentication messages and manipulate user data. In this paper, we propose a key generation method based on the concept of post-quantum cryptography to provide robust resistance to attacks. Furthermore, we propose a key exchange method that authenticates the user's equipment and home network through the application of Kyber, where both parties possess pre-established static public keys. The proposal provides identity protection, non-traceability, mutual authentication, and confidentiality. We implement this protocol to test 5G-AKA's vulnerabilities and analyse its effectiveness against specific attacks. The experiment used Minnet simulation and Ryu controllers to implement 5G-AKA with standard-specified characteristics.
5G serves as a catalyst for transformative digital innovation by enabling convergence with various services in our daily lives. The success of this paradigm shift undeniably hinges on robust security measures, with primary authentication— securing access to the 5G network—being paramount. Two protocols, 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’), have been standardized for this purpose, with the former designed for 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) devices and the latter for non-3GPP devices. However, recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in the 5G-AKA protocol, rendering it susceptible to security breaches, including linkability attacks. Furthermore, the advent of quantum computing poses significant quantum threats, underscoring the urgent need for the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being standardized, the lack of real-world deployment limits its proven robustness. In contrast, conventional cryptographic schemes have demonstrated reliability over decades of practical application. To address this gap, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has initiated the standardization of hybrid PQC algorithms (HPQC), combining classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Consequently, ensuring forward secrecy and resilience to quantum threats in the 5G-AKA protocol is critical. To address these security challenges, we propose the 5G-AKA-HPQC protocol. Our protocol is designed to maintain compatibility with existing standards while enhancing security by combining keys negotiated via the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with those derived from a PQC-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). To rigorously and comprehensively validate the security of 5G-AKA-HPQC, we employ formal verification tools such as SVO Logic and ProVerif. The results confirm the protocol’s security and correctness. Furthermore, performance evaluations highlight the computational and communication overheads inherent to 5G-AKA-HPQC. With only average of 56.5 millisecond(+112.32%) on a total authentication time, proposed protocol provides its advantages. Also, on a environment of multiple UE registration, compared to single UE registration, the difference of increased rate of average authentication time is only 0.01%. The negligible difference 0.01% indicates that the addition of PQC does not lead to increased overhead in multi-UE registration environments, demonstrating its scalability and practical feasibility. In conclusion, our research provides significant insights into the design of secure, quantum-safe authentication protocols and lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure authentication and key agreement protocols for mobile telecommunications.
Fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks support services such as smart healthcare, connected vehicles, smart homes, and the Internet of Things. Because these services exchange important personal and operational data, secure user authentication is essential. The standard 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol helps verify users and establish communication keys, but research has identified concerns including user traceability, attacks by a malicious serving network, and limited protection against future quantum-computing threats. This paper explains these issues in simple terms and reviews two approaches discussed in the selected research article: a hybrid method combining Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), and a fully post-quantum method based on KEM. The source study reports that both approaches aim to improve authentication security, while the hybrid option uses fewer computational resources. This paper is a literature-based explanation of the published study; it does not claim a new protocol or independent experimental results
The QPQ-CD (Quantum and PostQuantum CipherKey Dynamic uses a dynamic key after the registration of the
mobile at the 5G Network. The algorithm could be divided in two parts : The Quantum Cryptography and
Post Quantum Cryptography. The Quantum Cryptography used Quantum Image Scrambling methods
with the Red, Green, and Blue Component which are treated separately by the two algorithms QAT and
QHT. They change only the position of the image pixel without changing the value of this. QAT and QHT
use 2 method different : one is based on the permutation of the pixel position and the others is based on
one the space-filling curveIn this article, the performance of the Quantum Cryptography using at the
QPQ-CD is analyzed by the PSNR(Peak Signal to Noise Ratio), SSIM (Structural SIMilarity),
NPCR(Number of Pixel exchange rate), UACI (Unified Average Changing Intensity), Correlation and
the binary entropy. PSNR for the two methods is near than the value 8 which is a good visual quality
visualThe SSIM and Correlation also offers a best parameter which is near zero. The image transformed
by scrambling methods and originals are no similitude and no correlation. The NPCR give also a good
performance because 99% of pixels changed in the image. But the UACI is not more than 20%. So, the
intensity light of the new image doesn’t change with the maximum. The algorithm of the scrambling is not
resistant to the attack physic using difference power analysis. The binary entropy is less than 50%. There
are quite no disorder between the bits one and bit zeros. The QPQ-CD with evaluation of the Quantum
Cryptography is simulated to Matlab and all curve for this is represented in this article. The QAT and
QHT have quite a similar performance.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.